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Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the
United Statesby
RHONDA R. RrVERA..

Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this Article is to provide a comprehensive picture
of the legal position of homosexual persons in the United States
today. It is hoped that this survey approach will provide, for the legal
scholar, the practicing attorney, and the interested layperson, an
understanding of the multiplicity of situations in which a person's
sexual orientation interfaces with the law. Secondly, it is hoped that
this Article will provide a solid basis from which to begin an in-depth
analysis of any legal problem faced by homosexual persons. This
survey will examine the judicial response to homosexual issues,
primarily focusing on civil matters rather than criminal ones. Where
particularly significant, recent legislative actions will be called to the
reader's attention. Every civil case dealing with homosexuality that
was available to this researcher is described in this Article. By close
attention to the text and particularly the footnotes, the reader can
also locate most currently available and pertinent law review articles.
* The research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Small Grant
Program of Ohio State University.
** B.A., 1959, Douglass College; M.P.A., 1960, Syracuse University; J.D., 1967,
Wayne State University. Member, Bars of Ohio and Michigan. Assistant Professor of Law,
Ohio State University.
*** I would like to thank Jane E. Lesley, J.D., for so competently implementing
most of the research for this Article; Elizabeth L. Heimbach, B.A., for her valuable
research assistance; Dorothy Flynn, Lois Brecht, and Michaele Frost for their dedicated
secretarial assistance: Pamela S. Hyde, J.D., for her incomparable editorial assistance, and
lastly, Lynn Loacker, of The Hastings Law Journalfor a superb editing job.
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This Article will make no attempt to examine the various
theories, either psychological,' sociological 2 or religious,3 seeking to
explain the presence of homosexual individuals in society. It is
assumed that there are approximately twenty million 4 homosexual
Americans today, and that they come from all walks of life, all racial
groups, all ethnic groups, and all religious groups, 5 Moreover,
homosexual persons are found among both sexes. It is the basic
premise of this Article that the legal problems of such a large group of
people, whose very economic and social diversity causes them to
intersect with our institutions at all levels, are an important and
worthwhile area of concern for the legal scholar, the legal
practitioner, and the layperson. While it is the firm belief of the
author that homosexual persons are entitled to equal treatment
before the law, it will be the deviation from this ideal that is,
unfortunately, the focus of this survey Article.
Definitions
Because the focus of this Article is the judicial treatment of
homosexual individuals, it is important to define precisely the
characteristics of a homosexual person. The simplest definition may
be that a homosexual person is one who engages in a sexual act with a
person of the same sex. 6 This definition causes immediate problems.
1. See
UNDERSTANDING
HOMOSEXUALITY:
ITS
BIOLOGICAL
AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES (J.A. Loraine ed. 1974); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY
RE-EXAMINED (1977).
2. See J.H. GAGNON & W. SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT: THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF

HUMAN

SEXUALITY

(1973);

M.

SCHOFIELD,

SOCIOLOGICAL

ASPECTS

OF

HOMOSEXUALITY (1965); C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX (1975).
3. See J. MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL (1976); N. PITTENGER,
TIME FOR CONSENT: A CHRISTIAN'S APPROACH TO HOMOSEXUALITY (rev.

ed. 1970);

L. SCANZONI & V.R. MOLLENKOTT, Is THE HOMOSEXUAL MY NEIGHBOR? (1978);

Barrett, Legal Homophobia and the ChristianChurch, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1019 (1979).
4. According to the Kinsey Institute for Sex Research, Inc., 9.13% of the total
population have had either extensive or more than incidental homosexual experience.
Given the United States population of approximately 210 million people, approximately
19,170,000 persons must fall within that group. Letter from Paul H. Gebhard, Institute for
Sex Research (March 18, 1977). See generally A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN,
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C.
MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 473-74 (1953).
5. Hooker, Homosexuality, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK
FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 11 (1972).

6. "[H]omosexual: One, especially a male, whose desire for sexual relations is
directed to a person of the same sex." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (1969).
"[H]omosexuality: sexual desire or behavior directed toward a person or persons of one's
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Do we label a person "a homosexual" if he or she behaves in this
manner once? Twice? How often does same-sex behavior have to
occur for the actor to earn the label? Does it matter when one
engages in this type of conduct? During puberty? While
heterosexually married? What kind of behavior are we talking
about? Strong emotional attachment to a person of the same sex?
Holding hands and hugging? Kissing? Fantasies? Mutual
masturbation? Fellatio? Cunnilingus? Sodomy? Is a person who
announces his or her status but never engages in any same-sex sexual
behavior considered "homosexual"? Is a celibate homosexual person
really "a homosexual"?
Kinsey recognized some of these problems and, consequently,
examined sexual behavior on a continuum. 7 At one end of the
continuum is the exclusively heterosexual person ("0" on the Kinsey
scale) who fantasizes about and acts sexually only with persons of the
opposite sex. A "6" on the Kinsey scale is the exclusively homosexual
person who fantasizes about and acts sexually only with persons of
the same sex. Varying degrees of heterosexuality and homosexuality
characterize persons in between. At the middle of the continuum
(rated "3") are those persons whose erotic arousal or overt
experiences are equally heterosexual and homosexual. Kinsey's
rating scheme can be used to describe an entire life span or can be
used in reference only to particular periods in a person's life.8 Even
this superficial discussion should illustrate that labeling a person "a
homosexual" is a complex matter, medically or psychologically. 9
Courts have generally been uninterested in these distinctions.
This Article will reveal that courts have treated a wide variety of
persons as "homosexual" individuals. For example, the following
persons have been labeled as "homosexual" and treated as such:
-a married
father who engaged in same-sex behavior in his late
10
teens,

-a man with a single conviction for a same-sex sex crime, 11
own sex." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966).
"[H]omosexuality 1: atypical sexuality characterized by manifestation of sexual desire
toward a member of one's own sex. 2: erotic activity with a member of one's own sex...."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966).
7. A, KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 638- 41 (1948).

8. Id. at 639.
9. "The attempt to categorize all humanity into two mutually exclusive and
contrasting groups of homosexuals and heterosexuals, a form of 'them' and 'us', besides
being ethically and politically dubious, produces misleading over-simplifications." D.J.
WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 1 (1977).
10. Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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-a woman whose friends were bisexuals, 12
- a man who said he was a homosexual but never admitted any
13
overt same-sex behavior,
14
- women in mannish attire,
- persons who exhibited characteristics
and mannerisms which
5
evidenced homosexual propensities.'

The important point is that courts and judges have treated a
variety of people as "homosexuals." Where, in fact, these persons fall

on the Kinsey sexual behavior scale is unimportant for the purposes
of this Article. If the courts treat a person as a "homosexual," then

for the purposes of this Article, that person is a homosexual
individual. For the remainder of this Article, the definition of a
homosexual person is a person so labeled by the courts.
Homosexual individuals include both men and women. The term
"homosexual person" as used in this article applies equally to persons
of both sexes. The term "lesbian"'16 refers specifically to homosexual

women. There is no similar nonpejorative term exclusively for the
male homosexual.' 7 The term "gay"' 8 is synonymous with the term
11. United States v. Flores-Rodriquez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
12. Bennett v. Clemens, 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
13. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist., 85 Wash. 2d 348,535 P.2d 804 (1975).
14. Nickola v. Munro, 162 Cal. App. 2d 449,328 P.2d 271 (1958).
15. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 27 App. Div. 2d 918, 278 N.Y.S.2d
951(1967).
16. D.J. WEST, HOMOSExuALITY 12 (1955); see Reese, The Forgotten Sex: Lesbians,
Liberation, and the Law, 11 WILLAMETrE L.J. 354 (1975). The term lesbian is allegedly
derived from the island of Lesbos, home of the famous Greek poetess Sappho. It is widely
believed that Sappho was a homosexual woman.
17. Male homosexuals are usually called "faggots" by persons wishing to give offense.
The term allegedly arose from the bundles of sticks used to bum homosexual persons alive
during the middle ages. "Dyke" is the term of opprobrium for female homosexuals. Like
the word "nigger," which is offensive only when used by nonblack persons, the words
"faggot" and "dyke" are offensive when used by nonhomosexual persons but permitted
and even used affectionately among some homosexual individuals. The homosexual argot
for a nonhomosexual person is a "straight" person.
18. There are varying theories as to how the word "gay" came to be synonymous with
the word "homosexual." Some persons believe that it came from a story by Gertrude Stein
entitled Miss Furrand Miss Skeene.
"She did not find it gay living in the same place where she had always been living. She
went to a place where some were cultivating something ....She met Georgine Skeene
there who was cultivating her voice which some thought was quite a pleasant one. Helen
Furr and Georgine Skeene lived together then. Georgine Skeene liked travelling. Helen
Furr did not care about travelling, she liked to stay in one place and be gay there. They
were together then and travelled to another place and stayed there and were gay there.
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"homosexual" and these two words will be used interchangeably
throughout this Article.

This Article will not discuss the legal position of transsexual
individuals. 19 There is a popular, but incorrect, belief that
transsexualism and homosexuality are the same thing. A transsexual
person is one whose psychosexual

identity differs from his

physiological sex.20 A male transsexual psychologically believes
himself to be female, but his genitalia are male. A homosexual person
is congruent in his or her psychosexual identity and physiological
appearance. For example, a lesbian believes she is a woman and has
female genitalia. She desires no change in her physiognomy because it
already conforms to her psychosexual identity. 21 The transsexual
person deeply desires sexual reassignment surgery to conform body to
mind. The erotic preference of a transsexual person is generally for a

"They stayed there and were gay there, not very gay there, just gay there. They were
both gay there, they were regularly working there both of them cultivating their voices
there, they were both gay there. Georgine Skeene was gay there and she was regular,
regular in being gay, regular in not being gay, regular in being a gay one who was not
being gay longer than was needed to be one being quite a gay one. They were both gay
then there and both working there then." SELECTED WRITINGS OF GERTRUDE STEIN 563
(Van Vechten ed. 1962).
19. See Wein & Remmers, Employment Discriminationand Gender Dysphoria: Legal
Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1075 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wein & Reuners]. Holloway, Transsexuals-TheirLegal
Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 281 (1968); Note, City of Chicago v. Wilson and Constitutional
Protectionfor PersonalAppearance: Cross Dressing as an Element of Sexual Identity, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1151 (1979); Note, The Law and Transsexualism:A FalteringResponse to a
Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1975); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex
Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 96 (1971); Note, Transsexualsin
Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236 (1971); Comment,
Transsexuals in Search of Legal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome
Test, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 331(1978).
20. A transsexual is an individual anatomically of one sex who firmly believes he or
she belongs to the other sex. This belief is so strong that the transsexual is obsessed with
the desire to have his or her body, appearance, and social status altered to conform to that
of his or her "rightful" gender. Comment, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and
the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 963 n.1 (1977) (citing TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 487 (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969)). The popular method of describing
this situation is that the male transsexual feels like a woman trapped in a man's body. See
Wein & Remmers, Employment Protection and Gender Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of
Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex and Disability,30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1979).
21. In her current research on matched samples of female transsexuals and lesbians,
Dr. Anke Ehrhardt found that the transsexuals had fantasies that they were mates while
having sex relations with other women. This was not true of the lesbians. L. SCANZONI &
V.R. MOLLENKOIT, IS THE HOMOSEXUAL MY NEIGHBOR? 14, 144 (1978) (citing report
by Dr. Ehrhardt at the Institute for Sex Research Summer Program, Bloomington,
Indiana, July 28, 1977).
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person of the opposite sex,22 although this may superficially appear to
be a same-sex orientation. For example, since a male transsexual
believes himself female, his erotic preference is for a male. Once
sexual reassignment surgery conforms external body form to mental
gender identity, the preference of most transsexuals is seen clearly as
heterosexual. On the other hand, the homosexual woman, for
example, knows mentally that she is a woman and wants to remain
physically a woman, but her erotic preference is for another woman.
Homosexuality must also be distinguished from transvestism. A
transvestite is a person who has a fetish of dressing in the clothing of
the opposite sex. 23 The great majority of transvestites are

heterosexual in their sexual preference. 24
Throughout this Article, the author has tried never to refer to
anyone as "a homosexual". Rather, phrases such as homosexual
individual, homosexual person, homosexual teacher, homosexual
doctor, or homosexual sailor have been used. A person's sexual
preference is but one part of his or her character, and acting upon it
occupies a small part of his or her actual existence. Hence, the author
has used the word "homosexual" only as an adjective which describes
the sexual orientation of the individual rather than using
"homosexual" as a noun which implies a being whose sole dimension
is an erotic one32

22. See Holloway, Transsexuals-TheirLegal Sex, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 281, 282 n.6

(1968).
23. TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT 963 n.3 (R. Green & J. Money eds.
1969).
24. C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATmIX 26 (1975).
25. A new study commissioned from the Kinsey Institute by the National Institute of
Mental Health was to be published in late August, 1978. This study by Alan P. Bell and
Martin S. Weinberg is entitled Homosexualilies:A Study of Human Diversity Among Men
and Women. Researchers for this new report discovered a wide diversity among gay
persons and concluded that gay persons "are best understood when they are seen as whole
human beings, not just in terms of what they do sexually." The Advocate, Aug. 23, 1978, at
8. According to Alan P. Bell, the report shows "that homosexuality is not... pathological
and that all homosexuals cannot be lumped together." The report also indicates that
homosexual individuals, like heterosexual individuals, differ widely in their living
arrangements, occupations, social activities, and personal relationships. Moreover, the
study indicates "that most homosexual persons have come to terms with their sexual
orientation and are no more psychologically at odds with the world than heterosexuals."
The Citizen Journal (Columbus, Ohio), Aug. 9, 1978, at 1. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy. A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957,727 n.117 (1979). [hereinafter cited as Richards].
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Methodological Problems
There are a number of methodological problems involved in
researching legal decisions dealing with homosexuality. The first and
most obvious problem is the variety of legal subdisciplines which are
involved. To examine comprehensively the legal position of the
homosexual person, the legal researcher must examine labor law
cases, domestic relations cases, administrative law cases, criminal
cases, and constitutional law cases. Aside from the challenge to the
abilities of the researcher, such a search requires familiarity with a
large variety of indexes and digests. Dealing with so many areas is
even more difficult since many indexes did not in the past, and some
still do not, list cases on homosexuality under a separate topical
heading. In fact, for years most indexes never had a single topic listing
for homosexuality. Thus, the ferreting out of relevant decisions is
often difficult.
Second, the person who is attempting to locate decisions and
information on a controversial and emotion-laden subject is often not
provided the whole-hearted cooperation that researchers in less
controversial fields enjoy. Researching and writing on a subject which
many find personally objectionable often causes the researcher and/or
writer to be socially stigmatized in a manner which is not conducive to
26
open and free research.
Third, judges in their opinions for a variety of reasons may
choose never to use the word homosexuality. 27
Lastly, there is some evidence that cases involving homosexual
issues are unpublished more often than are cases involving other
issues. 2
Because of the various difficulties involved in the use of regular
legal sources, the author has relied at times on information derived
from nonlegal periodicals. 29 Wherever possible, however, traditional

26. "Too often, even those who write about homosexuality are fearful that to express
in interest in the subject, by implication, may be to include oneself within that category.
Surely this is the reason why 'a well established scholar on issues relating to
homosexuality' uses a pseudonym in his published article." Reese, The Forgotten Sex:
Lesbians, Liberation,and the Law, 11 WILLAMETE L.J. 354,355 n.4 (1975).
27. In State v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 118, 313 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1974), Justice
Stem noted in his dissent: "In fact, nowhere in the recorded decisions of the Ohio
Supreme Court has any justice ever used the term 'homosexual' or 'homosexuality' .... "
His opinon indicates that Justice Stem did computerized research using LEXIS. Id. at 118
n.3,313 N.E.2d at 851.
28. See To Publish or Not to Publish-ThatIs The Question, 2 SEX L. RPTR. 18 (1976).
See section on Custody at notes 513-631 & accompanying text infra.
29. Among the nonlegal sources utilized by the author are various periodicals
published by gay groups. These periodicals often contain current information about legal
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legal sources have been utilized.
It is hoped that, in addition to gaining factual information, the
reader of this Article will gain an understanding of current judicial
attitudes toward homosexuality and an appreciation of the tenuous
legal position of the homosexual person in the United States.

Employment and Related Occupational Discrimination
I.

Private Employment

Although it is generally acknowledged that discrimination
against homosexual persons is quite common in the private

employment sector,3 0 the exact extent of such discrimination is

difficult to ascertain. Because homosexual individuals3' are not

readily identifiable, data collection is difficult. Since presumably only

the "known" or "recognizable" homosexual individual is fired, or not
hired, it follows that other homosexual persons would do their best to
remain unknown.
Despite the difficulties inherent in measuring the extent of
employment discrimination against homosexual persons, gay people
clearly perceive themselves as being the subjects of discrimination.

32

The common law, reflecting the Anglo-American belief in the
freedom to contract, has supported the principle that private persons
have a right to hire and fire whomever they wish, and American
courts have been firm in the belief that "[a]n employer's right to

employ and discharge whom he pleases, in the absence of any

statutory or contractualprovision is unquestioned." 33 Thus, under the

common law the homophobic private employer apparently can fire or
refuse to hire any homosexual person in the absence of governmental
prohibitions34
events involving the gay community. The three periodicals of this type most often utilized
are The Advocate, a national gay newspaper published bi-weekly; It's Time, the newsletter
of the National Gay Task Force (NGTF), see note 70 infra, and Lesbian Connection, a
nationally distributed newsletter published monthly in East Lansing, Michigan.
30. See Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REV. 687, 702-03
(1973); Note, Homosexuality and The Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273,278 (1971).
31. See Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697,703 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
32. See National Gay Task Force Action Report, Documenting Discrimination 2
(June-July 1978); Gay Activists Alliance, Employment Discrimination Against
Homosexuals (1970 & Supp. No. 1 1971).
33. United Elee. Radio & Mach. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934, 937
(D.D.C. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956) (emphasis added).
34. If a statute does not forbid discrimination for a specific reason, e.g., sex or race,

1024
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The only federal legislation that prohibits discrimination by
private employers is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 which
proscribes discriminatory employment practices based on certain
enumerated characteristics. While neither homosexuality, sexual
preference nor sexual orientation are36among the enumerations, sex is
one of the proscribed characteristics.
On at least two occasions, disgruntled employees have
unsuccessfully sought to include sexual orientation or transsexualism
within the sex discrimination prohibition. In a case of first impression,
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.3 7 the court held that Title VII
did not forbid employment discrimination based on "affectional or
sexual preference" of the applicant, despite the fact that the plaintiff
was not characterized as a homosexual person but as "effeminate."
The defendant-employer candidly admitted that the plaintiff was not
employed in'38 the employer's mailroom because he appeared
"effeminate.
The plaintiff, however, argued that by hiring a black
female instead, the defendant-employer had hired an employee
displaying effeminate characteristics and thus had discriminated
between two "effeminate" employees on the basis of sex. The court
rejected this analysis on the grounds "that the plaintiff, a male,
displayed characteristics inappropriate to his sex. '39 This assumption
that certain behavior is only appropriate to people of one gender
raises a much broader Title VII issue which was not dealt with at all,
namely, that one of the purposes of Title VII was to eliminate all
conceptions about men and women in the hiring
stereotyped
40
process.

The court in Smith went beyond the issue of discriminatory
hiring on the basis of appearance and evoked the broader principle of

an employer's right to hire and fire by saying that "[i]f the law-making
process has yet reserved freedom of action (by not forbidding it) to an

private persons can exercise their prejudices. See Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 46
U.S.L.W. 2241 (N.Y. Super. Ct., Nov. 9, 1977) (upholding landlord's right to refuse to rent
to a black, divorced female lawyer on the grounds that he did not want to rent to lawyers).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
36. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condictions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national

origin ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
37. 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975).

38. Id. at 1099.
39. Id. at 1099 n.2.
40. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
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employer, it is the duty of the courts to protect it."'41 The court
concluded that Congress had not protected the employment rights of

homosexuals by forbidding discrimination based on "affectional or
sexual preference"42 and that the freedom traditionally afforded the
employer was not circumscribed.
Four months after Smith, another district court reached a similar

conclusion. In Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center43 the court
held that Title VII does not protect the employment rights of

transsexuals, 44 and, in dicta, broadened that lack of protection to
cover homosexuals and bisexuals as well.4 5 The plaintiff in this case

was discharged prior to undergoing a sexual-reassignment operation.
The defendant-employer discharged her for the admitted reason that
such a change might have a potentially adverse effect on both the
patients receiving treatment at the medical center and on the

plaintiff's co-workers. 46
The Voyles court took cognizance of legislation pending in

Congress that would have amended Title VII to afford protection to
homosexuals. The court said that the failure of these amendments
made it "clear that in enacting Title VII, Congress had no intention of

proscribing discrimination based on an individual's transsexualism." 47
This approach seems to indicate either sloppy jurisprudence or total
ignorance of the difference between a homosexual individual and a

transsexual individual. 48

Thus, two federal courts have rather clearly ruled out Title VII as

a protection for homosexual employees in the private sector. The

41. 395 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
42. Il at 1101. The court indicated that there was a bill before Congress to amend
Title VII and add "sexual preference" to the enumerated characteristics. However, the
court noted that such a bill was not yet enacted and "[would] not be enacted here in these
chambers." Id. at 1101 n.6.
43. 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
44. Id at 457. See Wein & Remmers, supra note 19, at 1095. See notes 19-20 &
accompanying text supra for the definition of transsexualism.
45. Id
46. Id. at 456. Legitimate customer preference, related to the manner in which the
work will be performed and the manner in which such performance will be received by
customers, can provide a basis for an employer to select employees on the basis of their
sex. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
(emphasis added).
47. 403 F. Supp. at 457.
48. See notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra. If the judge had known that by far the
majority of transsexuals are heterosexually oriented, he might have reached a different
result.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 49 has been
equally unhelpful.50 In 1975 the EEOC rendered two decisions
dealing with homosexual employees. In both decisions, the
Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with either
a
complaint, on the grounds that Congress did not intend to include
'51
"sex.
term
the
of
meaning
the
within
practices
sexual
person's
Given the intransigent attitudes of the courts and the EEOC, it
would be fair to conclude that at the present time federal law
provides no protection for the privately employed homosexual
individual.
State laws are no better. Although nearly all states now have
prohibitions against employment discrimination based on
characteristics such as sex and race, there is no state fair employment
practices law that specifically protects homosexual individuals. In a
recent case, Gay Law Students' Association v. Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph Co. (GLSA v. PT & T), 52 gay activists unsuccessfully
sought to persuade a California district court to include protection for
the homosexual employee under California's Fair Employment
Practices Act. The plaintiffs first sought to come under the California
Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) by claiming that the
enumerated characteristics (race, sex, religious creed, color, etc.) were
merely illustrative rather than restrictive. The court found not only
that the legislature had specifically listed the only characteristics it
sought to protect but had refused affirmatively to5 3include sexual
orientation by an express refusal to amend the FEPA.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs proferred a rather novel argument
derived from the "disparate impact" test of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.54 They alleged that private employers and PT & T in particular,
discriminated more heavily against male homosexuals than female
homosexuals and hence this was discrimination based on "sex," one
of the enumerated characteristics of the California FEPA.55 The court
49. The EEOC is the agency created by Congress to carry out the goals of Title VII.
While the Commission renders decisions based on complaints, it can also issue opinions
through its General Counsel. However, such opinions can only be relied on by the
addressee(s). 35 Fed. Reg. 18,692 (1970).
50. The General Counsel of the EEOC issued an Opinion holding that an employer
did not commit an unlawful employment practice by failing to hire or by discharging a
homosexual individual. OP. GEN. COUNSEL EEOC M108-66 (Feb. 2,1966).
51. [1976] 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 11 6493,6495.

52. 135 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977), petitionfor hearinggranted,No. SF 32625 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
May 3,1977).
53. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 469-70.
54. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

55. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 470. This argument apparently was first developed in G. COOPER,

H. RABB & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, 275 (1975). The argument has
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in GLSA v. PT&T, however, dismissed this argument by saying that

no showing of disproportionate impact upon one sex had been

made.5 6 Moreover, the court indicated that even if the showing had
been made, the applicability of the Griggs doctrine to men as a class
57
was questionable.

The plaintiffs also argued that discrimination against homosexual
individuals is literally discrimination based on gender, since it
disqualified individuals on the basis of stereotyped characteristics of
the sexes. Rather than confronting the issue of stereotypes, the court

disposed of this argument by citing Smith 58 and Voyles 59 to show that
federal courts do not regard Title VII's "sex" discrimination
prohibition as applying to sexual preference.
Lastly, the Gay Law Students' Association argued that the right
to work was a "fundamental right" and, consequently, that the refusal
of the California State FEP Commission to hear cases of
discrimination against homosexuals constituted a denial of
homosexual persons' due process and equal protection rights. In
answering this contention the court summed up the current situation

of the homosexual employee: "There0 is simply no constitutional right
'6
to work for an unwilling employer.
While neither the federal government nor any state government

prohibits employment discrimination against homosexual individuals
in the private sector, a number of city6' and county62 ordinances have
also been discussed in great detail in Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in
Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 495, 506-11 (1976), as well as in Rivera &
Galvan, Homosexuals and Title VII, 3 TEx. S.U.L. REv. 126, 136-38 (1975). The reasoning
of this argument hardly seems helpful to homosexual persons in general, particularly when
all an employer need show is that he discriminated equally against male homosexuals and
female homosexuals.
56. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975)).
59. Id. at 471 (citing Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456
(N.D. Cal. 1975)).
60. Id. at 471.
61. The following ordinances prohibit private employment discrimination against
homosexuals: Anchorage, Alas., Ordinance A077-75 (Jan. 20, 1976); ANN ARBOR, MICH.,
CODE ch. 112, §§ 9:151-9:155 (1972); DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 10, §§ 7-1004-7-1005
(1976); EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE ch. 4, § 1.127 (1973); MADISON, WIS., CODE §
323(7)(a) (1976); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 945 (1975), PALO ALTO, CAL., ADMIN.
CODE § 2.22.050 (1969); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 102,562 (Sept. 18, 1973); Washington,
D.C., Human Rights Law (Nov. 16,1973).
The following cities and counties were reported by It's Time, the newsletter of the
National Gay Task Force, in March, 1977, to have laws prohibiting private employment

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. so

granted some measure of protection. Many of the ordinances are less
than one year old; virtually none are more than three years old.
Consequently, their respective effects are difficult to gauge. 63
Although advocates of gay rights have received little
encouragent from the courts and only questionable relief from
statutes enacted by municipal and county subdivisions, persistent
efforts are being made to rectify the position of the homosexual
person in the private sector. There is a continuing battle by gay rights
activists to amend Title VII.64 However, it is difficult to ascertain the
likelihood of success. A strong argument for such a bill was made
over seven years ago by Irving Kovarsky in probably the best legal
article on employment rights of homosexuals. 65 Kovarsky suggests a
novel approach to the question of why the government should protect
the homosexual individual from private employment discrimination.
First, he notes that "there is a problem of considerable magnitude
when anywhere from 4 to 20 percent of our adult male population can
anticipate employment difficulty if homosexual behavior is
established or suspected. '66 He then argues that eliminating
discrimination against homosexuals: Alfred, N.Y.; Austin, Tex.; Berkeley, Cal.; Cleveland
Heights, Ohio; Marshall, Minn.; Portland, Ore.; San Jose, Cal.; Toronto, Ont.; Tucson,
Ariz.; Yellow Springs, Ohio; Hennepin County, Minn.; Howard County, Md.; Santa Cruz
County, Cal.
Since March 1977, other cities have passed ordinances prohibiting private
employment discrimination: San Francisco, Cal., see National Gay Task Force Action
Report 3 (May 1978); Aspen, Colo., see The Advocate, Jan. 25, 1977, at 8; Champaign, Ill.,
see The Advocate, Sept. 9, 1977, at 8; Iowa City, Iowa, see The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at
11; Windsor, Ont., see The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at 11. However, a number of such
ordinances recently have been repealed by referendum in Dade County, Fla.; Wichita,
Kan.; St. Paul, Minn.; and Eugene, Ore.
See note 153 infra for a list of ordinances and executive orders banning discrimination
in public employment.
62. The following counties are reported to have laws forbidding discrimination against
homosexual persons in private employment: Santa Cruz, Cal.; Latah, Idaho; Howard, Md;
Hennepin, Minn. It's Time, March, 1977.
63. On July 23, 1976, the Municipal Clerk's Office of Anchorage, Ala., reported no
complaints under their six-month-old ordinance. In Ann Arbor, Mich., only four
complaints were made during the first year of the ordinance's existence, In Seattle, Wash.,
the City Clerk could recall two cases since the statute's inception, both won by the
complainants. S. Berlin, Private Employment Discrimination Based Upon Sexual
Preference (Sept. 26,1976) (unpublished seminar paper).
64. E.g., H.R. 12149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 2937 (1979).
65. Kovarsky, Fair Employment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527. It
should be noted that Kovarsky focuses only on males. See also Oldham, Questions of
Exclusion and Exception Under Title V1J-"Sex-Plus and the BFOQ," 23 HASTINGS L.J.
55, 67-71 (1971).
66. Id., at 530. Recent estimates are that 13.95% of males and 4.25% of females, or a
combined average of 9.13% of the total population, had either extensive or more than
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employment discrimination against homosexuals is in the national
economic interest and in the self-interest of employers:
Economists, public leaders and others display considerable
interest in the gross national product, an indicator of economic
wellbeing, without considering discrimination faced by the
homosexual. While the employment rights of minorities are
protected by state and federal law as a means of meeting economic
objectives, no concern is shown in the income of the homosexual.
Public policy in the United States calls for full employment, an
unreal goal. Therefore, there is a general consensus of opinion that
4 percent unemployment, or less, is socially tolerable. The
unemployment rate of the homosexual may or may not vary from
the national averages, but he faces discrimination and reduced
income in the more skilled and desirable jobs.
In addition, the failure to provide adequate economic
opportunity geared to skill and education has an impact on the
male facing antagonism from the employer. The self-interest of the
homosexual in employment is evident and needs little comment,
but the employer is something else. Given his prejudices and a
genuine interest in uplifting morale in the plant, the employer is
reluctant to hire the effeminate male or known homosexual.
Statistically, however, the large employer is bound to hire sexually
inverted employees since most homosexuals are not effeminate and
are unidentified. Thus the homosexual employee who is aware of
the employer's policy toward homosexuals lives in fear knowing
that he will lose his job and will be unable to find other
employment if discovered. A reasonable assumption is that the
"closet" homosexual performs less efficiently because of inner
torment (however, the homosexual may perform in a superior
fashion so that his employer finds him indispensable). The
employer maximizing profit should be interested in the mental
wellbeing of the unknown (and known) homosexual employee.67
Theorists have long argued that nondiscriminatory hiring was
economically sound, but Kovarsky was first to point out that the idea
applies as much to homosexuals as it does to women and blacks.
In this same article, Professor Kovarsky also suggests that the
Taft-Hartley Act could be a useful fair employment tool. He points
out that nothing in the Act protected black workers from racial
discrimination by an employer or union, until the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) interpreted the requirement of fair
representation and the definition of an unfair labor practice to give
incidental homosexual experience. Letter from Paul Gebhard, Director, Institute for Sex
Research, Indiana University, to the author (March 18,1977).
67. Kovarsky, FairEmployment for the Homosexua 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527,530-31.
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the black worker some measure of protection. In 197 1, Kovarsky felt
that "[i]t [was] within the realm of possibility that the NLRB, faced
with a legitimate question of fair representation or an unfair labor
practice, might extend a helping hand to the homosexual. '68
However, there has been no indication in labor literature that such
developments have occurred. 69
Nevertheless, gay activists, realistically facing the lack of
government protection in the employment area, have begun
negotiations with large employers through the National Gay Task
Force (NGTF). 70 Basically, these activists have sought and obtained
pledges of no discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. To
date such employers as AT&T, IBM, Citibank, and NBC have agreed
to such pledges.71
Although convincing economic and pragmatic arguments can be
made in support of federal relief for the homosexual individual
seeking employment in the private sector, such relief has not been
forthcoming. Until legislatures and courts squarely recognize the
obstacles confronting the homosexual individual, advocates of gay
rights must continue to look to the efforts of such groups as the
NGTF for needed reforms in the area of private employment.
H. Federal Employment

The largest employer in the United States is the federal
government. In 1976 approximately 2.835 million civilians were
directly employed by the United States government. 72 Moreover,
many workers in private industry under government contract are
subject to federal hiring standards. These same federal government
standards indirectly affect state and local government employment as
well as private employment. Therefore, the federal government's long
standing employment policy of discriminating against homosexual
individuals affects a large number of United States citizens. Since the
federal government is generally regarded as being in the forefront of
68. Id. at 560.
69. See generally Modjeska, The Uncertain Miranda Fuel Doctrine, 38 OHIO ST. L.J.
807 (1977). However, in a recent speech to the Annual Conference of the National Public
Employee Labor Relations Association, Robert Kipp, President of the International City
Management Association, alerted public labor negotiators to the needs of gay people,
noting that labor "can expect [homosexuals] to press successfully for entry into, and
special consideration in, the labor force." The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 12.
70. The National Gay Task Force is a national gay civil rights organization founded in
1973. Its address is Room 506,80 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10011.
71. National Gay Task Force Action Report 4 (April 1978).
72. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 269 (1977).
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liberal, nondiscriminatory employment policies, it is ironic that it has
for years discriminated against homosexuals. This discrimination has
particularly far reaching effects, because a person discharged by the
government as a homosexual individual will encounter severe
problems in subsequently locating employment in the private sector.73
Federal Civil Service employees are considered part of the
executive branch but their protection from arbitrary dismissal comes
from Congress. Thus, while Congress authorized the President to

regulate the Civil Service, 74 it limited the President's authority to

remove a civil service employee except for "such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service." 75 The President has delegated
tasks to the United States Civil Service
these regulatory
76
Commission.

In the past, the policies and regulations of the Civil Service
Commission have systematically excluded homosexual persons from
government employ. Not only were these antihomosexual policies
77
and regulations strongly supported by the Congress for a long time,
judicial review of the commission's policies was infrequent. Until
recently, the courts upheld the view that government employment
was a privilege not a right. 78 This idea, coupled with a tradition of
judicial noninterference with the executive branch, supplied the
courts with a basis for upholding nearly all the administrative
decisions of the federal government.7 9

The Early Cases-JudicialDeference to AdministrativeFindings

With the notable exception of Judge Bazelon's opinion for the

73. This stigmatization was recognized by Chief Judge Bazelon in Norton v. Macy, 417
F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) when he said: "ETihe dismissal imposes a 'badge of infamy'
disqualifying the victim from any further Federal employment, damaging his prospects for
private employ, and fixing upon him the stigma of an official defamation of character." l
at 1164 (footnotes omitted).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501(a), 7512(a) (1976).
76. Exec. Order No. 10,577, 3 C.F.R. 218 (1954-1958 Comp.), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
1302 (1976).
77. See EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN
GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 241,81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
78. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw,
81 HARV.L. REV. 1439 (1968).
79. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512 (1920); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S.
290 (1900); Levy v. Woods, 171 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Golding v. United States, 78 Ct.
Cl. 682 (1934), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 643 (1933).
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Scott v. Macy,8 0
federal courts consistently deferred to the finding of the Civil Service
Commission that a dismissal was "for cause." As a result, federal
courts failed to examine the more substantive issues raised by such
dismissals.
Dew v. Halaby,81 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in 1963, was apparently the first
published case of any significance dealing with the homosexuality of a
federal employee 82 and clearly illustrates the traditional judicial
reluctance to override an administrative finding. William Dew, a civil
service employee of the Federal Aviation Agency, had been
employed as an air traffic controller. After successfully completing his
probationary period, he was notified that he was being discharged
because of previous marijuana smoking and four "unnatural sex acts"
he had allegedly committed eight years prior to his dismissal and six
years prior to his government service. Although at the time of his
dismissal Dew was married, a parent and, according to a psychiatric
evaluation, "functioning within a normal range," the court upheld his
dismissal and avoided any substantive discussion of the issue of Dew's
homosexuality. 83 Rather, the court found the conclusion of the Board
of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission "rational and
valid," citing with approval the finding of the Appeals Examiner that
"[to] require employees to work with persons who have committed
acts that are repugnant to the established and accepted standards of
decency and morality can only have a disrupting effect upon the
morals and efficiency of any organization." 84
While the court recognized that by statute Dew could only be
removed if his removal would "promote the efficiency of the
service," 85 it deferred to the agency's judgment and required no proof
of such impairment other than the above noted conclusion of the
government.8 6 Thus, the court paid homage to what was then the

80. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
81. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. dismissedper stipulation,379 U.S. 951 (1964).
82. Id at 586. The court cites two purportedly similar cases: Caplan v. Connally, 299
F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 915 (1963); Shields v. Sharp,
No. 15,666 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 917 (1961). These cases,
however, reveal nothing about the issue of homosexuality.
83. It is interesting to note that even at this early date in the gay rights struggle,
petitioners were seeking to educate the courts and the public. In his defense, Dew
introduced portions of the Kinsey report in his appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
The Commission, however, was seemingly unimpressed. 317 F.2d at 587 n.10.
84. Id.
85. 5 C. F. R. §§ 9. 10 1 (a), 9,102(a)(1), 22.201 (1961).
86. 317 F.2d at 587-89.
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dominant view of the judicial role vis-a-vis the Civil Service
Commission, namely, that the scope of judicial review was severely
limited when the removal of a civil servant was challenged on
substantive rather than procedural grounds.87
Although the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Dew,88 the writ was subsequently dismissed by stipulation 9 when the
Federal Aviation Agency reinstated the employee and granted him
back payf0
Thus, the reinstatement of Dew coupled with the consequent
failure of the Supreme Court to examine the propriety of this type of
dismissal, left the lower courts with no clear guidelines for future
resolution of similar cases. As a result, the courts continued to reach
unpredictable and disparate results with respect to the issue of
homosexuality as grounds for removal from the Civil Service.91
Among these decisions is Scott v. Macy, 2 in which the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia revealed a very different
attitude toward this type of dismissal than that represented by its
previous decision in Dew.
Bruce Scott, a civil service applicant, was twice disqualified for
employment on the basis of "immoral conduct" 93 and was twice
ordered qualified by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 94 In Scott I, the court was less diffident than it had been in
Dew toward the government's right to hire and fire, noting that the
absence of a constitutional guarantee to public employment does not
license the government to 95
" 'resort to any scheme for keeping people
out of such employment."'
87. Id at 589.
88. 376 U.S. 904 (1964).
89. 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
90. Chief Judge Bazelon commented on this occurrence in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969), noting that "[i]f these official actions may not be deemed a
confession of error, the history of the case at least casts considerable doubt on the
authority of what was, in any event, a narrow holding."
91. See generally Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the
Homosexual, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969). This Note provides a fine discussion of the
role of the Civil Service commission and the application of the "efficiency standard." See
note 85 & accompanying text supra.
92. 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Scott I).
93. "Immoral conduct" provided grounds for disqualification of applicants under 5
C.F.R. § 2.106 (1961) and its later counterpart 5 C.F.R. § 731.201 (1968).
94. Scott. v. Macy (Scott I), 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Scott v. Macy (Scott II), 402
F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
95. 349 F.2d at 183.
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Looking to the substantive grounds for Scott's dismissal, the
court recognized that a dismissal under such terms not only
stigmatized Scott and disqualified him for government employment
but also jeopardized his ability to be employed elsewhere. In light of
the grave consequences of dismissal under such circumstances, the
court found that the Commission could not rely on a determination of
immoral conduct based on such impermissibly vague labels as
96
homosexual and homosexual conduct.
Less than three years after his victory in Scott I, Bruce Scott was
back before the same court, challenging the charges that the
Commission had refiled against him. The court again decided in
Scott's favor. Although the charges were basically the same as those
disposed of in Scott I, the Commission argued that it was really
disqualifying Scott for his refusal to answer questions on his
application. The court not only was unconvinced by this argument but
arguably indicated in some strong and prescient dicta that even an
97
alleged homosexual possesses a right of privacy:
But it may also be true that federal applicants for employment do
not.., forfeit all rights of privacy accorded to persons generally by
the First Amendment, and that the reasonableness of requiring
answers to certain questions may be greatly affected by the clarity
and rationality of the policies sought to be effectuated by the
questions. Where disclosure is required of circumstances of an
intensely private and personal nature, the discloser is arguably
entitled to
know the standards by which his revelations will be
98
assessed.
Other federal courts have been less willing to override the
findings of the Commission and directly confront the substantive
issues raised by dismissals on the grounds of homosexual conduct. As
long as the Commission has substantially complied with all procedural
requirements and the dismissal is neither arbitrary nor capricious,
these courts will defer to the judgment of the Commission. In 1967,
the Ninth Circuit in Taylor v. United States Civil Service Commission99
upheld the discharge of a civil service employee of the Air Force on
96. Id. at 184-85. The court observed that "these terms have different meanings for
different people" and illustrated this remark with quotations from a Senate Subcommittee
Report, EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN
GOVERNMENT, S. Doe. No, 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950) and from Thompson,
ChangingConcepts of Homosexuality in Psychoanalysis,in 10 PSYCHIATRY 187 (1947).
97. It is interesting to note that Justice Burger, now Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, dissented in both Scott I and Scott HI. He felt that disqualification from federal
service based on homosexual conduct was not arbitrary. Scott I, 349 F.2d at 189-90; Scott
11. 402 F.2d at 650, 652.
98. 402 F.2d at 648 (emphasis added).
99. 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967).
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the grounds that his removal would "promote the efficiency of the
service and [was] for the best interest of the Air Force."'1 The court
noted that its review powers were limited to insuring procedural
correctness and guarding against arbitrary or capricious action on the
part of the government.
In Anonymous v. Macy, 10 1 decided a year later, the court was
similarly succinct in rejecting the appellant post office employee's
argument that homosexual acts by federal employees were private
acts of those employees and did not as such affect the efficiency of the
102
service.

Another post office employee, an assistant janitor, was also
unsuccessful when the Tenth Circuit decided Vigil v. Post Office
Department0 3 in January of 1969. The court adhered to the limited
scope of review adopted in Taylor, noting that all statutory and

procedural requirements had been complied with and there was "no
plausible basis" for finding that postal officials had acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. The court found substantial evidence to support the
dismissal on the grounds of "infamous, immoral, or notoriously
disgraceful conduct,"'1 4 thereby ostensibly distinguishing Scott I and
Scott II, which rejected "vague" charges of immorality as grounds for
dismissal. 10 5 The court, however, neglected to indicate how the

efficiency of the postal service would be impaired by the retention of
a homosexual assistant janitor.
The Norton "RationalNexus" Test

The judicial lassitude, evident in many of the earlier cases, did
not persist. Six months after Vigil, the Court of Appeals for the

100. Id. at 467.
101. 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
102. The court dismissed the appellant's argument with one sentence: "That contention
is not accepted by this Court." Id. at 318. The sentence was supported by a citation to
Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 353 U.S. 970 (1957), and its
words: "[S]o long as there was substantial compliance with applicable procedures and
statutes the administrative determination was not reviewable as to the wisdom or good
judgment of the department head in exercising his discretion."
103. 406 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1969).
104. Id. at 924 n.5.
105. Police had discovered Vigil and another man in the back seat of a parked car with
their trousers down. Id at 924. Vigil was consequently convicted under a Denver City
ordinance "forbidding any person to commit any indecent or filthy act or to use abusive
language or make an obscene gesture to any person publicly." Vigil pled guilty and was
fined $50. Id. at 922.
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District of Columbia Circuit decided Norton v. Macy,1°6 which is
usually regarded as the landmark case in protecting the rights of
homosexual employees of the federal government. In this important
decision, Chief Judge Bazelon, 10 7 who wrote the opinion in Scott I and
concurred in Scott II, imposed on the Civil Service Commission for
the first time the burden of showing a "rational nexus" between an
employee's homosexuality and the lowering of the efficiency of the
federal service. 10 8

Underlying the "rational nexus" requirement were constitutional
considerations previously stressed by Chief Judge Bazelon in Scott
L109 While the Commission enjoys a wide discretion in determining
what constitutes "cause" for removal of a federal employee, Chief
Judge Bazelon noted that due process limits such dismissals and
forbids administrative decisions that are arbitrary or capricious. The
due process limitations may be even greater where the dismissal, as in
Norton, stigmatized the employee and impaired his future
employment prospects, or infringed upon the employee's right of
privacy." 0 Because of the important constitutionally-protected
interests at stake, the Commission must not only comply with
statutory procedural requirements but "must demonstrate some
'rational basis' for its conclusion that a discharge will promote the
'efficiency of the service'."''

Norton, a budget analyst for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, was discharged for allegedly "immoral conduct" and
106. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
107. In 1967, a task force to study homosexuality was appointed by the Director of the
National Institute of Mental Health. One of the task force members was Chief Judge
Bazelon, who resigned from the task force on June 3, 1969, less than one month before he
decided Norton.
108. 19 CATH. U.L. REV. 267 (1969). This commentary provides an in-depth discussion
of how Norton affected the role of the judiciary in reviewing actions of the Civil Service
Commission, concluding: "In the past, the Commission has enjoyed great latitude in its
policy determinations, and noting that homosexual conduct is contrary to the laws and
mores of our society, the Commission determined that homosexuals are not suitable for
federal employment. After Norton, the Commission may not justify the exclusion of
homosexuals on the ground that such conduct is contrary to the dominant conventional
norms. Instead, there must be a showing that the individual's conduct has an ascertainable
deleterious effect on the efficiency of the service. If Norton stands, the following seems
clear: (1) the Commission may not sustain the removal of a federal employee who confines
his homosexual conduct to off-duty hours, unless he occupies a particularly sensitive
position, and (2) the Commission may not exclude every homosexual application (sic)
from all federal positions." Id at 275.
109. See notes 94-96 & accompanying text supra.
110. The court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
111. 417 F.2d at 1164.
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for possessing personality traits which allegedly rendered him
"unsuitable" for government employment. In applying the "rational
basis" test to Norton's dismissal, Chief Judge Bazelon observed that
"immoral conduct," as grounds for dismissal, was impermissibly
broad, encompassing a "multitude of sins,"' " 2 and that it invited the
Commission to indulge in moral judgments that were inappropriate to
the proper functions of a federal agency and "at war with elementary
concepts of liberty, privacy and diversity." 1 3 The court observed that
while a finding of immorality could result in dismissal if those
immoral acts had some "ascertainable deleterious effect on the
efficiency of the service, 11 4 no such effect had been demonstrated in
the instant case. Norton was a competent employee, who did not meet
the public and whose preference was unknown to his colleagues. In
fact, the government admitted that it was the "custom" to fire
homosexuals and that in Norton's case they were worried that
continued employment of Norton "might turn out to be embarrassing
to the agency. '11 5 The court stated that "the unparticularized and
' 6
unsubstantiated conclusion that such possible embarrassment""
threatened the agency lacked the "reasonably foreseeable, specific
connection" 117 required to support Norton's dismissal." 8
Subsequent Applications of the Norton "RationalNexus" Test

The Norton "rational nexus" test met with varying degrees of
approval in other federal courts. Some courts purported to apply the
112. Id. at 1165.

113. Id.
114. Id& The court admitted that it was possible for an employee's homosexuality to
have an effect on the efficiency of the service. It hypothesized that blackmail might affect
security; that homosexuality might be evidence of an unstable personality unsuitable for
some jobs; or that offensive overtures on the job or notorious conduct might so affect
other employees or the public as to warrant dismissal.
115. I& at 1167.
116. Id
117. I&
118. Although the Norton opinion is most significant for its discussion of the
constitutionally protected interests of the homosexual civil servant and the articulation of
the "rational nexus" test, it also illustrates growing judicial awareness of the practical
impact of discrimination against homosexual employees. In a footnote, the court cited
Kinsey's statistics on male homosexuality, concluding that "a policy of excluding all
persons who have engaged in homosexual conduct from government employ would
disqualify for public service over one-third of the male population. This result would be
both inherently absurd and devastating to the public service." The court also noted that
the Civil Service Commission of the City of New York had determined that homosexual
conduct is not an automatic bar to employment. Id. at 1167 n.28.
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rational-nexus requirement but nevertheless distinguished Norton on
its facts; only one court clearly applied the test within the meaning
and spirit of Norton.
In Schlegel v. United States,119 decided only three months after
Norton, the Court of Claims upheld Schlegel's dismissal from a
civilian position with the Department of the Army, on the basis of
testimony by three of Schlegel's superiors that the morale and
efficiency of the office would be affected adversely by his continued
presence. The court concurred in the conclusion of Schlegel's
superiors and noted that the four homosexual acts allegedly
committed by Schlegel distinguished that case from Norton where
"merely a homosexual advance" had been involved. 120 In upholding
Schlegel's dismissal the court remarked:
Any schoolboy knows that a homosexual act is immoral, indecent,
lewd, and obscene. Adult persons are even more conscious that this
is true. If activities of this kind are allowed to be practiced in a
government department, it is inevitable 12that the efficiency of the
service will in time be adversely affected. '
While similarly purporting to apply the "rational nexus" test, the
court in Richardson v. Hampton2 2 upheld the Civil Service
Commission's rejection of an applicant who refused to answer
questions relevant to his fitness for public service.'23 Although the
court noted that "[c]ourts have increasingly recognized that an
individual's private sexual preferences, activities and associations are
among those areas protected from governmental inquiry by the First
Amendment,"'124 it nevertheless concluded that because both Scott
and Norton recognized that homosexuality might bear on efficiency,
the government has a need to make inquiries which are "reasonably
calculated to elicit information concerning an applicant's private sex

119. 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. C1. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); see 48 N.C.L. REV.
912 (1970). This Note discusses Schlegel in depth and compares it with Norton.
120. 416 F.2d at 1378.
121. Id For an interesting discussion and review of the federal employment situation
for homosexual individuals in 1970, see Note, Government Employrment and the
Homosexual, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (1970). This Note discusses Norton, Dew, and
Schlegel and their relationship to Morrison v. State Board of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d
375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969), and McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn.
1970). For a discussion of Morrison, see text accompanying notes 377-84 infra; for a
discussion of McConnell, see text accompanying notes 156-68 infra.
122. 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972).
123. Id. at 609. Richardson was discharged from his prior federal job for emotional
instability and for attempting to make a sexual advance to a boy of 16 in the HEW
building while employed there. Id.
124. Id. at 608.
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life which bears directly on his suitability for Federal employment."'2
The first unequivocal application of Norton came in 1973 in
Society For Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton.126 In that case, a
discharged

27

federal employee was joined by a gay rights group in a

class action suit challenging the Civil Service Commission's policy
that homosexual persons were not suitable for federal employment
because they would bring the government service "into public
contempt."' 28 As a threshold determination, the court found a class to

which it was capa ble of giving relief, to wit:
those homosexual persons who the Commission would deem unfit
for government employment for the sole reason that the
employment of a homosexual person in the government service
might bring that service into the type of public contempt which
might reduce the government's ability to perform the public
essential respect and confidence of the citizens
business with the
129
which it serves.
The court further determined that it was proper to grant relief to this

class in order "to prohibit the Commission from continuing to ignore
the plain holding of Norton"130 and consequently held that the
overbroad3 rule found in the FederalPersonnel Manual could not be
enforced.' '
As a result of this case, the Commission altered its regulations as
of December 21, 1973 to better comport with the requirements of
125. Id at 609. The court indicated that the applicant could renew his application if he
answered the proper questions and that the burden would then be on the government to
show whether his homosexuality would interfere with the performance of his duties.
126. 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973), affd on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1975).
127. Mr. Hickerson, a supply clerk, was discharged from the Agriculture Department
upon disclosure of his prior discharge from the Army because of his homosexuality.
128. This policy was explicitly enunciated in the FederalPersonnelManual Supplement,
which provided as follows: "Homosexuality and Sexual Perversion-Personsabout whom

there is evidence that they have engaged in or solicited others to engage in homosexual or
sexually perverted acts with them, without evidence of rehabilitation, are not suitable for
Federal employment. In acting on such cases, the Commission will consider arrest records,
or records of conviction for some form of homosexuality or sexual perversion; or medical
evidence, admissions, or other credible information that the individual has engaged in or
others to engage in such acts with him. Evidence showing that a person has homosexual
tendencies, standing alone, is insufficient to support a rating of unsuitability on the ground
of immoral conduct." 63 F.R.D. at 400 n.1.
129. Id. at 401.
130. Id.
131. Id.

1040

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

Norton. The Civil Service Regulations relating to suitability
disqualifications which became effective on July 2, 1975 were also
substantially amended to eliminate "immoral" conduct as a grounds
for dismissal and restrict those permissible grounds to "criminal,
dishonest, infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct. '132 The
"Suitability Guidelines for Federal Employment" was also revised to
conform to the new regulation. The amended guidelines for
determining "Infamous or Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct"
provides in part:
Individual sexual conduct will be considered under the guides
discussed above. Court decisions require that persons not be
disqualified from Federal employment solely on the basis of
homosexual conduct. The Commission and agencies have been
enjoined not to find a person unsuitable for Federal employment
solely because that person is homosexual or has engaged in
homosexual acts. Based upon these court decisions and outstanding
injunction, while a person may not be found unsuitable based on
unsubstantiated conclusions concerning possible embarrassment to
the Federal service, a person may be dismissed or found unsuitable
for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such
person's sexual conduct affects job fitness. 133
With this change in federal regulations and policy to reflect the more
enlightened approach of many courts, the ability of a homosexual
person to obtain or keep a federal job solely on his or her individual
merit seemed assured.
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Singer v. United States
Civil Service Commission,134 upholding the dismissal on grounds of
homosexuality of a clerk-typist 35 for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court 136 and ultimately remanded to the Civil Service
Commission for reconsideration in light of the newly promulgated
regulations, 137 it nevertheless illustrates the intransigent attitude of
132. 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1975).
133. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 n.15 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated,429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
134. 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated,429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
135. It is interesting to note that the cases reviewed in this section mainly focus on
clerks, typists, and janitors. Somehow one cannot help wondering why managers, lawyers,
and other professionals are not the plaintiffs. Is it because only the relatively powerless are
discharged under these statutes and regulations? Or are higher ranking officials given the
chance to resign rather than face dismissal? Also note the irony of the Singer case: Singer
was fired by the EEOC, the government agency charged with fighting job discrimination
under Title VII.
136. 429 U.S. 1034 (1977).
137. On October 13, 1977, the Bureau of Personnel Investigations (BPI) of the Civil
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some courts toward the homosexual federal employee.
The Singer case can be seen as representative of the new wave of
cases in the federal employment area brought by openly gay persons,
Unlike Messrs. Norton, Scott, or Dew, Singer was openly gay and not
forced to acknowledge his sexual preference by events subsequent to

his hiring. Moreover,
Singer was conspicuously engaged in gay
138

political activities.
As a result of the considerable publicity surrounding Singer's
political activities and attempted marriage, which linked his name
with the EEOC, Singer was discharged for "immoral and notoriously
disgraceful conduct.' 39 In its letter to Singer the Commission

Service Commission reaffirmed its 1972 decision with respect to Singer, evidently
disregarding the instructions of the remand. On November 4, 1977, Singer appealed to the
Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA), which held that the October 13, 1977
suitability determination did not "clearly set forth reasons for the disqualification which
will stand scrutiny" under the 1975 guidelines and remanded the case to the BPI for
further investigation. On April 11, 1978, the BPI refused to reinvestigate claiming the
lapse of time made it economically impractical and declaring that its October 13, 1977
decision remained "final." On June 13, 1978, the BPI formally reissued its October 13,
1977, decision and on June 21, 1978, Singer appealed once again to the Federal Employee
Appeals Authority. As of this writing Mr. Singer is awaiting another decision from the
FEAA. Telephone conversation with Lawrence Baker, Esq., of Seattle, Wash. (June 28,
1978). Opinions mentioned on file with the author.
138. Singer was the organizer and leader of the Seattle Gay Alliance. Moreover, Singer
attempted to legitimize his private relationship by seeking to marry his lover. Singer v.
Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). See the discussion of homosexual
marriages at text accompanying notes 450-80 infra. As a result of his attempted marriage
and his political activities, Singer was the subject of television, newspaper, and magazine
reports, some of which indicated that he was a clerk-typist for the EEOC. Singer alleged
that he never authorized the use of his place of employment in media reports and that any
such statements were made without his knowledge or consent.
139. The Commission cited specific acts in support of Singer's dismissal, including his
attempted marriage and political activities, the "flaunting" of his homosexuality by kissing
a man near the place of previous employment, the exposition of sexual preference in an
article published in the San FranciscoChronicle,and his dress and demeanor at the EEOC
offices which purportedly indicated an intention to stay gay. Singer denied none of the
charges, but contended that nothing in any of the acts violated regulations affecting
federal employees. 530 F.2d at 249.
The Commission's accusation that Singer "flaunted his homosexuality" is evidently
susceptible of several meanings. Webster's Third InternationalDictionarydefines flaunt as:
"2a: to display or obtrude oneself to public notice esp. by reason of excessive or gaudy
finery or impropriety of behavior: seek to attract attention esp. by appearing or acting
brash and brazen... b: to make a showy appearance: stand out brightly or distinctly .... "
WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1965). Rev. Malcolm Boyd
presents this view of "flaunting": "When we walked in, the rector announced that John
had a guest to introduce, 'I would like you to meet my friend and lover, Malcolm Boyd,'
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informed him that his "activities in these
matters are those of an
40
advocate for socially repugnant concept.'

The Commission alleged that such behavior reflected discredit
upon the federal government and thus impeded the efficiency of the
14 1
service by lessening the confidence of the general public.

In his appeal to the courts, Singer claimed that there was no
"rational nexus" between his homosexual activities and the efficiency
of the Service and hence his dismissal constituted a violation of his
due process rights. 42 Singer also claimed he was being denied his first

amendment right of freedom of expression.
In rejecting Singer's contentions, the Ninth Circuit noted that
while Norton required a "rational nexus," the Norton court had

indicated that homosexuality of a federal employee might, under
certain circumstances, affect the efficiency of the service. This case,
the court concluded, constituted such circumstances where the

notorious conduct, open flaunting, and careless display of unorthodox
sexual conduct in public would potentially cause embarrassment to
the federal government. 143

After briefly reviewing Gay Students Organizationof University
of New Hampshire v. Bonner 44 and Acanfora v. Board of
Education,145 both of which were highly protective of the first
amendment rights of homosexual individuals, the court concluded
that these cases were factually distinguishable from Singer because
"[n]either involved the open and public flaunting or advocacy of
homosexual conduct.' 46 Even assuming that this interpretation of
Bonner and Acanfora was correct, the court's decision seems highly

John said. He perceived love, affection, integrity, and dignity as the natural right of a gay
person. Some people stand ready to criticize a natural expression of freedom as 'flaunting'.
But in an open and free society there is inevitably too fine a line between a minority's
freedom and a majority's attack upon 'flaunting' to let it be erased. Often what is as
natural as breathing to member of the majority-a public sign of affection, a symbol of
relationship-is labeled a 'flaunting' when practiced by people who belong to a minority."
M. BOYD, TAKE OFF THE MASKS 147 (1978).

140. 530 F.2d at 250 n.3.
141. Id at 251.
142. In an evaluation report Singer was rated by his supervisor as "superior" or "very
good." Moreover, a letter from his co-workers said he was competent and that their
experience with him was "educational" and "positive." Id.at 250 n.4.
143. Id. at 255. The court flatly refused to consider the new regulations adopted since
Hampton because they were not in effect when Singer's case arose. IdL
144. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). See notes 789-99 & accompanying text infra for a
discussion of this case.
145. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). See notes 418-25 &
accompanying text infra for a discussion of this case.
146. 530 F.2d at 256.
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repressive, particularly in light of the court's conclusion that the
interest of the government as an employer in promoting the efficiency
of the public service outweighed the interest of its employee in
exercising his first amendment rights by publicly flaunting and
broadcasting his homosexual activities. 147
The court's balancing of governmental and first amendment
interests inevitably restricts a federal civil servant's right to espouse
unconventional social ideas. 148
On balance, the position of the homosexual individual as an
employee of the federal government has significantly improved. Not
only are most courts recognizing the important constitutional rights of
such employees by requiring a rational nexus between the alleged
grounds for dismissal and the purported effect on the efficiency of the
employer, but the Civil Service Commission has also incorporated
some of these constitutional considerations into its recently
promulgated regulations. Other significant protections remain to be
achieved, however. In particular, more attention should be given to
the first amendment interests of homosexual employees and a more
careful balancing of those interests against the interests of the
government is warranted.
H. State and Local Government Employment

An examination of state and local government employment
policies dealing with homosexual employees is relatively simple
compared with a similar examination of federal government
employment policies. With the exception of cases involving teachers,
discussed separately in a following section, there are few reported
state cases.
Such an examination is further complicated by the numerous
state and municipal statutes and ordinances which variously promote
or protect against discrimination. Some state codes provide that
applicants can be excluded from state civil service positions because
of their infamous or notoriously disgraceful conduct. 149 Other state
statutes provide that permanent employees may be disciplined or
147. Id.
148. See 20 UTAH L. REv. 172 (1976). This comment, which explores in depth the first
amendment questions raised by Singer, concludes that "[t]he Singer opinion marks a
major reversal in the current trend of cases allowing greater freedom of speech for
government employees in general and homosexual employees in particular." Id. at 185.
149. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b108b.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 43.14 (West 1970). Mississippi still includes the term "immoral." MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 21-31-21 (1972).
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removed for immoral conduct. 150
On the other hand, many recent state and local enactments

indicate a growing concern with the dilemma of the homosexual
employee. Discrimination on the basis of sexual preference was
prohibited in 1975 in Pennsylvania by an Executive Order issued by
then Governor Milton Shapp applying to all state offices and
positions. 151 With the notable exception of New York City, where the
refusal of the city council to pass a gay rights bill prompted Mayor
Koch to issue an Executive Order banning discrimination on the basis
of sexual preference in city agencies, 152 a number of municipalities
discrimination in employment based on
have ordinances prohibiting
53
sexual preference.
In addition to the protection increasingly afforded by statutes
and ordinances, the procedural rights which have been found to
protect federal employees also presumably protect state and
municipal employees through the application of the fourteenth
amendment due process limitations to the states.154 Homosexual

150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19572(1) (West Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
124.34 (Page 1978).
151. 3 SEX. L. REP. 43 (1977).
152. The Advocate, March 22, 1978, at 37. The Executive Order, issued on January 23,
1978, applies to employment, housing, credit, contracting and the provision of services by
all agencies under the control of the mayor.
The New York Civil Service Commission has also been relatively progressive in
recognizing the rights of homosexual employees. As early as 1966, the Commission
announced that known homosexual persons were eligible for employment but not in jobs
requiring contact with young people or with people easily influenced. In May 1969, the city
decided that homosexual applicants could not absolutely be barred from any job.
Kovarsky, FairEmployment for the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527, 535-36 535-36.
This later decision seems to have been in response to Brass v. Hoberman, 295 F. Supp. 358
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), in which two men who were denied jobs as social workers on the basis of
suspected homosexuality sued in federal district court claiming an abridgement of their
due process rights. Prior to a decision on the merits, the New York Civil Service
Commission settled with the plaintiffs and issued a statement that "[t]he City of New York
does not have a policy of absolute disqualification for homosexuality." N.Y. Times, May 9,
1969, at 1, col. 2. The Commission nevertheless retained the right to exclude homosexual
individuals from positions requiring contact with young people or other persons who
might easily be influenced.
153. The following cities have ordinances or executive orders banning discrimination
against homosexual persons in municipal employment only: Amherst, Mass.; Atlanta, Ga.;
Boston, Mass.; Chapel Hill, N.C.; Cupertino, Cal.; Ithaca, NY.; Los Angeles, Cal.;
Mountain View, Cal.; New York, N.Y.; Ottawa, Can.; Pullman, Wash.; Santa Barbara,
Cal.; Sunnyvale, Cal. It's Time, March, 1977, at 3. See notes 61 & 62 supra for cities and
counties which offer additional protection to homosexuals in the area of private
employment.
154. See Illinois State Employees Union Council v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 572 (7th Cir.
1972) ("[B]asic rights of citizenship survive acceptance of public employment.").
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employees of state governments or instrumentalities have
consequently sought the protection, with varying degrees of success,
of the "rational nexus" standard articulated in Norton v. Macy. 155
The first application of the rational-nexus standard to dismissals
56
of homosexuals by state agencies was McConnell v. Anderson.
While James McConnell was awaiting confirmation by the Board of
Regents of the state university of his appointment as a university
librarian, an action that was usually a rubber stamp of a lower
managerial decision, he and another man attempted to marry. 157 This
action drew a great deal of media interest and prompted the Board of
Regents to reject McConnell on the grounds that his personal conduct
was not consistent with the best interests of the university. Relying
upon Norton v. Macy'58 and Morrison v. State Board of Education, 59
both of which required a finding of a rational nexus between the
homosexuality of the employee and any alleged diminution of
efficiency, the court concluded that the university had not shown an
observable and reasonable relationship between McConnell's
efficiency on the job and his homosexuality. 160
In emphasizing the constitutional significance of the rationalnexus requirement, Judge Neville made the strongest statement in
favor of gay civil rights of any federal judge to date:
An homosexual is after all a human being, and a citizen of the
United States despite the fact that he finds his sex gratification in
what most consider to be an unconventional manner. He is as much
entitled to the protection and benefits of the laws, and due process
fair treatment as are others, at least as to public employment in the
absence of proof and not mere surmise that he has committed or
that his employment efficiency is
will commit criminal acts or 161
impaired by his homosexuality.
Despite Judge Neville's logical interpretation and application of
the Norton standard, McConnell v. Anderson was reversed on appeal
by the Eighth Circuit.162 Harking back to the days of excessive judicial
deference to the executive branch, the court observed that the
155. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-48 & accompanying text supra.
156. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd,451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir., 1971).
157. The case generated by the attempted marriage is Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
191 N.W.2d 185 (1971). See notes 452-60 & accompanying text infra.
158. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-118 & accompanying text supra.
159. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See notes 377-84 &
accompanying text infra.
160. 316 F. Supp. at 814.
161. Id162. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
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discretion of the Board of Regents was broad and could not be
overturned unless arbitrary or capricious. 163 Construing McConnell's
conduct as demanding the "right to pursue an activist role in
implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status
to be accorded homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of
the socially repugnant concept upon his employer,"' 164 the court
concluded that the Board's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable
or capricious. 165 The court characterized McConnell as a person
making "extravagant demands"'166 and indicated a greater tolerance
for either latent or closet homosexuals. 167
In addition to denying McConnell the due process rights
protected in Norton and emphasized by Judge Neville in the lower
summarily dismissed
court opinion, the Court of Appeals
168
McConnell's first amendment objections.
Safransky v. State Personnel Board, decided by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in 1974,169 similarly upheld the dismissal of an

avowed homosexual but nevertheless reflects a less cavalier attitude
toward the constitutional interests protected in Norton. Safransky was
a houseparent in a state institution for retarded teenage boys who was
dismissed after discussing his sexual preference with colleagues in
front of patients, wearing make-up to work, accusing another
employee of being a lesbian and threatening to dress up one of the
patients as a "drag queen." The State Personnel Board dismissed him
on the basis of these acts and found that (1) "homosexual activity is
contrary to the generally recognized standards of morality" and that
(2) Safransky's activity had a substantial adverse effect on his job
performance. 170
While the state supreme court upheld the dismissal, it noted that
whether homosexuality is immoral or not was irrelevant to a
determination of "just cause.' 171 Citing to Norton v. Macy,172
163. Id at 196.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Judge Stephenson's obvious dislike of homosexual individuals was revealed
throughout the opinion. In one footnote he referred to McConnell's attempted marriage
as an "antic" and implied it was a publicity stunt. Id. at 195 n.4. He said the Board of
Regents had an "unenviable task and duty" of dealing with McConnell and referred
gratuitously to homosexuality as "socially repugnant." Id. at 196.
166. Id.
167. The court observed that "this is not a case involving mere homosexual
propensities ....Neither is it a case [involving] ...a desire clandestinely to pursue
homosexual conduct." Id.
168. Id. at 196 n.7.
169. 62 Wis. 2d 464,215 NW.2d 379 (1974).
170. Id. at 470,215 N.W.2d at 382.
171. Id. at 473-74,215 N.W.2d at 383.
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Richardson v. Hampton'73 and Morrison v. State Board of

Education, 74 the court observed that the basis for removal must be a

"rational nexus" between conduct complained of and deleterious
effects on job performance and concluded that Safransky's failure "to
represent and project to the patients an appropriate male image
consistent with that experienced by the remainder of society"'175 bore
a rational nexus to the efficient performance of his duties as
houseparent.
While state and local law with respect to employment of

homosexual persons is neither as clear nor as consistent as federal
law, it is reasonable to conclude that, in general, homosexual state

and municipal employees are better protected from discrimination
than their counterparts in private employment. Due process
protections coupled with a growing movement to protection by
ordinance 176 seems to provide a modicum of relief to homosexual

individuals seeking to obtain or retain employment in state or local
governments.
IV. Security Clearances

The need to obtain a security clearance spans both the private
and public employment sectors. Certain federal government
employees in both the civil service and the military need security
clearances, as do certain persons privately employed by a federal
government contractor. The denial of a security clearance can deprive

a person of his ability to earn a living in his chosen profession for the
rest of his life. 177 Moreover, refusal of a government clearance is
172. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra.
173. 345 F. Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1972). See notes 122-25 & accompanying text supra.
174. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See notes 377-84 &
accompanying text infra.
175. 62 Wis. 2d at 475, 215 N.W.2d at 384. It is certainly arguable that Safransky's
conduct was professionally inappropriate to the houseparent position. However, it is
questionable whether even a homosexual houseparent who comported with professional
standards of behavior could meet the court's standard. This kind of standard seemingly
reinforces sex-role stereotypes that may be outdated and inappropriate.
176. At least three cities passed ordinances subsequent to the defeat of the Dade
County, Fla. ordinance in June 1977. These are Aspen, Colo., The Advocate, Jan. 25, 1978,
at 8; Champaign, Ill.,
The Advocate, Sept. 7, 1977, at 8; and Iowa City, Iowa, The
Advocate, Feb. 8. 1978, at 11-12. One county (Ingham County, Mich.) also now prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference in county employment and county
services. The Advocate, July 26, 1978, at 11.
177. For example, George W. Grimm was a specialist in a highly complex field of
spaceflight techniques, privately employed by a federal government contractor. He had
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clearly stigmatizing. 178 Homosexuality has been a ground for refusal
or revocation of security clearances since the inception of the
program in the 1940's. 179 Although there are some indications to the
contrary, 180 it appears highly unlikely that a known or professed
homosexual could obtain a security clearance even today.' 8' One
commentator has suggested three basic assumptions about
homosexual individuals that make them potential security risks in the
eyes of the government: homosexual individuals are open to
blackmail, they engage in criminal conduct and, by their very nature,
they are unstable, unreliable, and untrustworthy. 182 To varying
degrees, the courts, in reviewing government denials of security
clearances, have accepted the validity of these assumptions.
The Industrial Security Clearance Review Office (ISCRO) is the
agency currently entrusted with processing security clearances.1 83 The
general charge to the ISCRO is to give a security clearance to an
individual only when "to do so is clearly consistent with the national
interest.' 84 The following criteria for determining eligibility for
clearance generally have been used to deny security clearances to
homosexual applicants or employees: I' 5
(h) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, or notoriously
disgraceful conduct, habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to
excess, drug addiction, drug abuse, or sexual perversion.

held a security clearance for some 13 years when his security clearance was revoked. He
was subsequently unable to find work despite over 100 job attempts and was ultimately
forced to go on welfare. Note, Security Clearancesfor Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV.
403, 408 n.38 (1973).
178. Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230,241 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J., dissenting).
179. C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 26-27
(1971).
180. According to 35 FACrS ON FILE 107 (1975), on Feb. 1, 1975, the Department of
Defense granted the first security clearance to a homosexual. The field examiner granted a
secret-level industrial security clearance to Otis F. Tabler, Jr., an admitted homosexual,
stating that Tabler "successfully has rebutted any inference that his variant sexual
practices tend to show that he is not reliable or trustworthy."
181. On June 9, 1977, the Department of Defense Appeal Board reversed a hearing
examiner's decision that granted a security clearance to Roy Fulton, a computer engineer
employed by a private company. 3 SEX. L. REP. 45. Fulton has since initiated suit. The
Advocate, Sept. 7, 1977, at 10.
182, Note, Security Clearancesfor Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV. 403, 410 (1973).
183. ISCRO was created by the Department of Defense in 1960 pursuant to Executive
Order No. 10,865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, 3 C.F.R. 398
(1960), -as amended by 3 C.F.R. 691 (1968). For a clear review of the structure and
functioning of ISCRO, see Note, Security Clearancesfor Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L. REV.
403,403-08 (1973).
184. 32 C.F.R. § 155.4(a) (1978).
185. 32 C.F.R. § 155.5(h)-(k) (1978).
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(i) Facts, circumstances or conduct reflecting activity of a
reckless, irresponsible or wanton nature which indicates such poor
judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness as to suggest that the
applicant might fail to safeguard classified information entrusted to
his care and use or might disclose classified information to
unauthorized persons or otherwise assist such persons, whether
deliberately or inadvertently, in activities inimical to the national
interest.
(j) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature
which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause
significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the applicant with
due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and
the medical findings in such cases.
(k) Any facts or circumstances which furnish reason to believe
that the applicant may be subjected to coercion, influence, or
be likely to cause action contrary to the
pressure which 18may
6
national interest.
(m) Refusal by the applicant, without satisfactory subsequent
explanation, to answer questions before a Congressional
Committee, Federal or State court, or Federal administrative body,
regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other conduct relevant
to his security eligibility.' 7
The process of denying or granting security clearance to an
employee, in general, or to a homosexual employee, in particular,
does not totally lack procedural safeguards. Even prior to the creation
of the ISCRO, the Supreme Court, in Greene v. McElroy, 88
recognized that the due process clause of the fifth amendment
encompasses the "right to hold specific private employment and to
follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference."' 8 9
Despite the unequivocal mandate of the Court in Greene v.
McElroy, the federal courts have been somewhat less protective of
the procedural due process rights of homosexual employees denied
security clearance. The earlier decisions, in particular, reveal an
extremely superficial treatment of the due process issue.
Adams v. Lairdy ° decided in 1969, was the first significant

186. Id. These criteria have had different letter designations at earlier times.
187. 32 C.F.R. § 155.5(m) (1978). Criterion (m) has been used when the other criteria
have proven inapplicable.
188. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
189. Id. at 492.
190. 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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challenge by a homosexual employee to the security-clearance
process. Adams, employed in private industry as an electronics
technician, was given a Secret clearance in 1957 and sought a higher
level of clearance in 1962, at his employer's request. When Adams
was subsequently interviewed by investigators of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, he admitted homosexual acts. As a consequence of this
admission, his Secret authorization was suspended and his application
for Top Secret clearance denied. Adams was cited for (1) immoral
conduct and acts of sexual perversion, (2) behavior which tended to
show he was not reliable or trustworthy, (3) acts which indicated poor
judgment, suggesting he might disclose classified information and (4)
being in a situation where he might be subject to coercion or pressure
to act contrary to the national interest.
Adams challenged the denial of his security clearance as a
violation of due process on the grounds that the standard for denial of
a security clearance lacked the requisite degree of specificity and that
the government had failed to show that the denial was "required in
the national interest."' 91 The court quickly disposed of the latter
challenge, noting that "the grant or denial of security clearances is an
inexact science at best. Those who have that responsibility have to do
the best they can with what they have ....192
Similarly, the court found that the criteria used by the
Department of Defense were sufficiently specific, that they included
"ample indications that a practicing homosexual may pose serious
problems," and that "[t]hey refer[red] expressly to the factors of
emotional instability and possible subjection to sinister pressures and
influences which have traditionally been the lot of homosexuals living
in what is, for better or worse, a society still strongly oriented toward
heterosexuality."' 93
Judge Skelly Wright wrote a strong dissent, demanding that the
government show "whether his status as a homosexual related to his
[appellant's] abilities to protect classified information.' 9 4 His position
that the government must establish such a "rational connection"
closely parallels the "rational nexus" requirement of Norton v.
Macy.195 Judge Wright pointed out that "generalized assumptions that
191. Id. at 235.
192. Id at 239. The court seemed surprised at Adams' objection to this "common
sense" standard and said that, after all, "appellant is not being sent to jail." Id.at 239 &
n.7.
193. Id.at 239.
194. Id at 242.
195. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court here required a showing that the
efficiency of the federal government was impaired by an employee's homosexual status
before the employee could be dismissed. See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra for
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all homosexuals are'196security risks cannot outweigh almost eight years
of faithful service.
Three years later in Finley v. Hampton,197 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia again avoided the due process
implications of a security-clearance denial, by holding that the
aggrieved employee had suffered no cognizable legal injury. While
undergoing a security clearance examination Finley was confronted
by his supervisor with reports that two of his friends had "homosexual
mannerisms." Thus it was not merely the employee's own sexuality
that came into play, but the sexual preference of his or her friends
and acquaintances. Shortly after this conversation with his supervisor,
Finley's position was removed from the sensitive category and he was
declared acceptable for the now-nonsensitive position. Finley then
began a long and frustrating battle with the Civil Service Commission
to discover the source and nature of the information. When efforts in
the bureaucracy proved to no avail, Finley petitioned the court to
expunge the information. The court of appeals upheld the lower
court's summary judgment for the government on the ground that
Finley had not demonstrated any cognizable legal injury, and
observed that while "Finley may be unhappy about the presence in
his file of adverse and perhaps untrue comments,"' 98 the material
could not be expunged unless there was a real threat of injury caused
by government action. According to the court, the potential for future
use of the material was too speculative to justify the issuance of an
order removing the material from the government's files.
Once again Judge Skelly Wright dissented. In the first place, he
questioned the government's reluctance to expunge information that
had unanimously been deemed irrelevant 99 unless it intended to use
that information in the future. Secondly, he concluded that if this was
the government's intention then "the harm to appellant is obvious
and continuing." 200
The courts' apparently superficial approach to the due process
interests of homosexual employees did not persist. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia as well as other federal courts
a discussion of Norton.
196. 420 F.2d at 241.
197. 473 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
198. Id. at 185.
199. The district court judge called the material "silly," id. at 184 n.7, and the majority
for the court of appeals recognized that such information derived by the government from
informants "has never been given a hallmark of significance," id. at 188.
200. Id. at 190.
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adopted, at least in principle, Judge Wright's position in Adams v.
standard should apply to the denial of
Laird that the rational-nexus
20
security clearances. '
A diluted version of the rational-nexus standard was applied by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Gayer v.
Schlesinger,202 which represented the consolidation of three security
clearance cases. 20 3 In two of the three cases, the court affirmed
respective findings that security clearances had been improperly
refused or revoked. The distinction drawn by the court involved the
degree to which the government could permissibly question the
security-clearance applicant about his private sex life, rather than
upon the substantive connection between the employee's alleged
homosexuality and his ability to protect classified information.
The contention that the government had failed to establish a
rational connection between the applicant's homosexuality and ability
to protect sensitive information was effectively disposed of with
respect to Wentworth, one of the three aggrieved employees.
First, the court disagreed diametrically with the district court and
found that Wentworth was not denied his security clearance on a
finding of homosexuality per se.20 4 However, the court did conclude
that the criteria20 5 used were intended to consider sexual perversion
as relevant to a determination of eligibility and that homosexuality
was clearly sexual perversion. Relying on the rational-nexus analysis
of Norton v. Macy,20 6 the court pointed out that homosexuality
"might" affect national security just as it "might" affect the efficiency
of the service.
Moreover, the court concluded that "[w]ith respect to the
sufficiency of proof of a nexus between the conduct involved and
201. See text accompanying notes 194-96 supra.
202. 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
203. In Gayer v. Laird, 332 F. Supp. 169 (D.D.C. 1971), the lower court in a short opinion found that the government had failed to show a nexus between Gayer's homosexuality
and his ability to effectively protect classified information. Moreover, the court held that
questions asked by the government during the investigation of Gayer violated Gayer's
right to privacy. In Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153 (D.D.C. 1972), the same court
and the same judge again held that no nexus was shown and that Wentworth's right to
privacy also had been violated. Moreover, since Wentworth had clearly "come out"
(acknowledged his sexual preference to himself and/or divulged that preference to others),
the judge was not persuaded that he was likely to be blackmailed. Lastly, in Ulrich v.
Laird, No. 203-71 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1971), the lower court held that Ulrich's security
clearance was improperly revoked because the nature of the questions asked by the
government also violated Ulrich's fight to privacy.
204. 490 F.2d at 747.
205. See the criteria listed at text accompanying note 186 supra.
206. See note 195 and accompanying text supra.
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security clearance, Adams does not require, as we construe it,
objective or direct evidence."20 7 According to the court, each case must
be considered or its particular facts and involves'208 basically a
judgmental decision based on "over-all common sense.
Despite the court's conclusion that a rational nexus had been
established, the court affirmed the district court's holding with respect
to Wentworth on the specific grounds that the questions asked the
employee went too far. Although the government had a right to ask
homosexual applicants and employees about their sex life "to develop
the kind of deviant sexual life the applicant lives so to fully consider
the application in terms of national security," 20 9 the court held that
the homosexual applicant "is not required to suffer such a severe
invasion of personality. ' 210 The court, however, failed to make
explicit the fine line between the two types of questions.
The court similarly affirmed the district court's holding with
respect to Mr. Ulrich 21 ' on the grounds that the questions asked
"went beyond the boundaries permissible. '212 However, the denial of
a clearance with respect to the third employee, Gayer, was found to
be proper because the questions he refused to answer were, in the
court's opinion, permissible. The court nevertheless ordered that
Gayer be given a chance to answer those questions. However, if he
failed to do so, the court would consequently conclude that the denial
21 3
of his security clearance should be permitted to stand.
Another example of a superficial application of the
rational-nexus standard is found in the Ninth Circuit's brief opinion in
McKeand v. Laird2 4 upholding the denial of McKeand's security

207. 490 F.2d at 750 (emphasis added). A similar conclusion was reached by the district
court in Rock v. Secretary, Department of Defense, No. C-74-1128 (N.D. Cal., March 21,
1975), in upholding the revocation of a Top Secret industrial security clearance, held by a
deputy manager of a large defense corporation for eighteen years. The district court
agreed with the conclusion of the appeals board that, since Rock chose to participate in
acts of sexual perversion, in the face of strong social condemnation and criminal penalties,
he was a potentially untrustworthy person.
208. 490 F.2d at 750.
209. Id. at 752.
210. IL
211. Messrs. Wentworth's and Ulrich's security clearances were reinstated but the court
gave the government the "go-ahead" to initiate new proceedings against them consistent
with its opinion. By this time, however, Ulrich was not in a job requiring security
clearance. Id. at 754 & n.32.
212- Id at 754.
213. Id.
214. 490 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1973).
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clearance. After McKeand had held a security clearance for seven
years, an investigation to raise the level of the clearance from Secret
to Top Secret revealed that he was a homosexual individual. The
court said that because the hearing examiner below had found that
McKeand feared disclosure of his homosexuality, such fear made him
a potential target for blackmail. This, according to the court,
constituted a sufficient "rational nexus" between McKeand's conduct
and the government's denial of his security clearance.
In a dissenting opinion, district court Judge Peckham pointed out
that since McKeand initiated the suit under review, his fear of
disclosure could not have been very great. In addition to objecting to
the majority's finding of a rational nexus, Judge Peckham suggested a
novel solution to the problem: "[T]he Department of Defense can
easily cure the danger to national security allegedly posed by all
homosexuals. It can abandon its arbitrary system of revoking security
clearances, solely on a finding of homosexuality and, thus, end
homosexuals' fears that public exposure will cost them their security
'215
classifications.
The attitude of the court in the subsequent decision of Marks v.
Schlesinger 16 illustrates the unrealistic naivete and idealism of Judge
Peckham's suggestion. The court in Marks upheld the denial of a
federal employee's request for a higher level of security clearance
required in conjunction with his civilian job, despite the fact that he
had previously held a Top Secret clearance for four years while in the
Navy.2 1 7 When confronted with allegations concerning his sexual
preference, Marks cooperated with the investigation, answering part
of the interrogatories put to him. However, he refused on the grounds
that such questions violated his right to keep his intimate sex life
private1 8 to answer questions regarding the names of his sexual
partners, the types of sexual acts performed, the number of such
sexual acts with each partner, the states in which the acts were
performed, and whether he intended to continue engaging in
homosexual acts.
The court pointed out that persons seeking federal employment
have a greater obligation to furnish information about themselves
than the average private employment applicant. By failing to answer
the questions, Marks made it impossible for the government to make
a determination regarding his eligibility. Nevertheless, the court
noted that if Marks had answered and had then been denied a
215. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
216. 384 F. Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
217. Id. at 1375.
218. Id. at 1376.
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security clearance, the burden would have been on the government to
show a rational nexus between Marks' homosexual conduct and his
ability to safeguard classified material. However, if McKeand219 is the
standard for finding a nexus, the outcome would presumably have
been much the same even if Marks had answered.
The most disconcerting common element in the security
clearance cases is that not one of the persons denied a clearance had
ever abused his privilege and most had held their clearances for a
considerable number of years. The equally disheartening result is that
the services of many extremely qualified employees were lost to the
government or to government projects.
Despite the unquestionably grave results of security clearance
denials or revocations, the courts have failed to rigorously defend
constitutionally protected interests. Although the applicant's right to
be free from intrusions into the privacy of his or her sex life has been
recognized to a limited extent, the courts have been considerably less
protective of an applicant's due process rights.
V. Military
In no area of employment has the homosexual individual been
more rigidly discriminated against in the last three decades than in the
United States armed forces. 220 The current highly repressive policy
had its genesis in a Department of Defense directive to all branches
of the armed services which stated that "known homosexual
individuals were military liabilities and security risks who must be
eliminated." 221 Two methods of "eliminating" homosexuals from the
military that have been consistently used are court-martial and
administrative discharge.
Courts-martial are regulated and governed by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (hereinafter U.C.M.J.) which became effective on
May 31, 1951.222 Under the U.C.M.J., homosexual behavior is found
to be criminal through the application of any of three articles: Article

219. See text accompanying notes 214-15 supra.
220. This is in marked contrast to ancient cultures in which homosexual soldiers were

prized. For example, "[t]he famous 'sacred band of Thebes' was a force of elite shock
troops composed of pairs of lovers." A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HoMoSExuALrrY 27
(1971).
221. Note, Homosexuals In the Military, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 465, 468 (1969). For a
concise history of U.S. military attitudes prior to this directive, see i. at 465-67.

222. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(1976)).
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125 which prohibits sodomy,223 Article 80 which covers attempts to
commit a punishable offense, 224 and Article 134, entitled "General
Article," which covers "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces." 225 Violation of any of these Articles by
homosexual behavior will subject the offender to a maximum
sentence of five years at hard labor coupled with either a
dishonorable
or bad-conduct discharge and forfeiture of all pay and
226
allowances.

At the time of its enactment, the U.C.M.J. was considered a
remarkably progressive code which provided new and expanded due
process safeguards for military persons. Further protection was
presumably afforded when, at the same time the U.C.M.J. was
enacted, Congress established the Court of Military Appeals for
direct review of court-martial decisions. 227 This court, which is made
up of civilians, "has demonstrated deep concern for the constitutional

rights of servicemen.

'228

Perhaps because of these developments, as

223. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1976).
224. 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1976).
225. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1976).
226. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1976); U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 25-14 (rev. ed. 1969).
227. Courts-martial were for years sacrosanct from judicial review. However in 1953,
shortly after the U.C.M.J. became effective, the Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137 (1953), also approved a limited standard of judicial review of convictions by
courtsmartial. The Court affirmed the right of lower federal courts to review such
proceedings, particularly in habeas corpus cases, upon a showing that the petitioner's
rights were not fully protected. However, the Court noted that "when a military decision
has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that [habeas corpus] application, it is
not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence." Id. at
142.
228. Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-ThePendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 41, 68. Since the emphasis in the 1960's and 1970's has been on administrative
discharges, this Article will not deal with judicial review of courts-martial. However, the
interested reader might read the following cases to see how homosexuality was and is
handled under the U.C.MJ.: United States v. Lovejoy, 41 C.M.R. 777 (N.C.M. 1969)
(naval lieutenant convicted on the testimony of an enlisted man with whom he had lived as
his lover and who was granted immunity from prosecution); United States v. Yeast, 36
C.M.R.890 (A.C.M.), petition for review denied, 36 C.M.R. 541 (1966) (upholding search
and seizure of homosexual photographs and literature); United States v. Hooper, 9
C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417, (1958) (former Rear Admiral Hooper convicted ten years
after his retirement on three charges of homosexual conduct that occurred after he had
retired); United States v. Vaughn, 20 C.M.R. 905 (A.C.M. 1955), petitionfor review denied,
21 C.M.R. 340 (1956) (serviceman convicted of "'an indecent, lewd and lascivious act by
placing his hands upon the private parts' of [a named boy]" during an expedition with a
group of boy scouts and sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and one year at hard
labor); United States v. Jones, 13 C.M.R. 420 (C.M. 1953) (serviceman convicted of
sodomy and sentenced to a dishonorable discharge (suspended), total forfeiture of pay
and confinement at hard labor for two years); United States v. Knudson, 7 C.M.R. 438
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one commentator has suggested,
a pronounced trend developed [in the armed services] to substitute
administrative discharge action for trials by court-martial in
instances where a major objective was to eliminate a troublemaker
from the service. The administrative discharge was speedy, and
apparently [at that time] it was not subject to judicial review.
Moreover, an undesirable discharge given administratively could
subject the recipient to many of 229
the same consequences that would
accompany a punitive discharge.

At present, there are five types of discharges from the armed
forces, honorable, general, undesirable, bad conduct, and

dishonorable. 230 The type of discharge given may have serious effects

on the individual's subsequent civilian life and career. Since over
ninety percent of all service personnel leave with honorable
discharges, 231 anything less is unusual and calls attention to the holder
veteran's benefits are
of such a discharge.232 Moreover, various
3
dependent upon the type of discharge23
While bad conduct and dishonorable discharges may only be
given as a result of a court-martial, 234 the other three types of
discharges may be given as a result of an administrative process. An
honorable discharge is a "separation from the service with honor" 235
and may be awarded to an enlisted person on the grounds of
convenience to the government or unsuitability. 236 A general
discharge is similarly a "separation from the service under honorable
(N.C.M. 1951) (a sailor acquitted by a California court of sodomy but retried by Navy and
found guilty).
229. Everett, Military Administrative Discharges-ThePendulum Swings, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 41, 96.
230. There are separate regulations governing administrative discharges for each
branch of the service. However, the content is basically the same. Except when reference
is made to a particular case, for the purposes of this Article all general references will be
to the Navy regulations because the largest number of administrative discharges for
homosexuality are issued by the Navy. See C. WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG,
HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY

52 (1971).

231. Id at 38.
232. The armed forces are evidently well aware of the stigma attached to any discharge
other than honorable. "Both officers and enlisted men who resign or accept an undesirable
discharge must sign a waiver recognizing... that they expect to find difficulty in civilian
life due to the character of their separation. E.g., SEC NAV Instruction
1900.9(6)(c)(2)(b)(1)(2), 20 April 1964." Note, Homosexuals in the Military,37 FORDHAM
L. REV. 465,469 n.36 (1969).
233. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 310,331 (1970).
234. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d)-(e) (1978).
235. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a) (1978).
236. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a)(1)(iv), (vii) (1978).
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conditions issued to an individual.., whose military record is not
sufficiently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge" 37 and
may be issued on the grounds of convenience to the government,
unsuitability, unfitness or misconduct.P 8 An undesirable discharge, on
the other hand, is an administrative "separation from the service
under conditions other than honorable" 39 and may be issued on the
grounds of unfitness or misconduct. 24
Homosexuality or sexual perversion is specifically included as
grounds for discharge for unsuitability, 241 unfitness,242 and can be
inferred to be grounds for a separation for the convenience of the
government 243 and for misconduct. 244 These current regulations are
predated by special policy statements issued by each service regarding
the separation of homosexual military personnel. 245 In general, these
directives classified homosexual personnel into three or four classes
and specified how each class was to be treated. A Class I homosexual
is a person who, while under military jurisdiction, has engaged in a
homosexual act involving force, fraud, or intimidation of a minor.
Such a person is usually separated from the armed services by a courtmartial under the U.C.M.J. A Class II homosexual is a person who,
while under military jurisdiction, has engaged in, or attempted to
engage in, or solicited under aggravated conditions, a homosexual act.
A Class IH homosexual is a person who exhibits, professes or admits
homosexual tendencies or who solicits a homosexual act in the
absence of aggravated circumstances. Lastly, a Class IV homosexual
is a person who engaged in homosexual behavior before entry into
the service or who failed to admit his or her homosexuality at the time
of entry and thus entered the armed services fraudulently.
Administrative separation is considered to be generally appropriate
for Classes II through V.246 Most persons separated under Classes II
through IV receive general discharges, although some receive
undesirable discharges and a few receive honorable discharges. 247
237. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(b) (1978).
238. Id.
239. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(c) (1978).
240. Id.
241. 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(b)(7) (1978).
242. 32 C.F.R. § 730.12(b)(5)-(6) (1978).
243. 32 C.F.R. §730.6(a)(11) (1978) provides for separation in the case of
"[s]ubstandard personal behavior which reflects discredit upon the service or adversely
affects the member's performance of duty."
244. 32 C.F.R. § 730.13(b)(1) (1978) provides for separation when a member of the
armed forces is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
245. Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FoRDHAM L. REV. 465,468 (1969).
246. SEC NAV Instruction 1900.9A (20 April 1964).
247. This review has not dealt with officers, who must be court-martialed to be
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Two commentators conclude that between 2000 and 3000
individuals each year are separated from the armed forces with less
2 48
than honorable discharges for reasons involving homosexuality.
This figure, however, does not accurately reflect the number of
homosexual individuals in the armed services because "most
homosexuals remain undiscovered by military authorities and
complete their service with honor." 249 Various studies show that
seventy-five percent to eighty percent of all homosexual soldiers,
many of whom are officers,250 successfully complete their terms of
service.
The administrative discharge is considered by the armed services
to be "one of the indispensible tools of quality control in personnel
management."25' The original popularity of this device stemmed from
its apparent insulation from civil court review. However, in Harmon
v. Brucker, 52 in 1958, the Supreme Court allowed judicial review of
an administrative discharge and opened the door to further attacks.
Such attacks are usually brought in the Court of Claims with respect
to claims for back pay or in a district court when the plaintiff wishes
to enjoin2 53
a threatened discharge or seek a judgment voiding a
discharge.
The published federal court cases challenging administrative
separations fall into two broad categories. The first category
encompasses a series of similar cases spanning the years 1960 through
1975. In these cases, the persons challenging their separation from the
military did not voluntarily admit their homosexuality and, in fact, all
but one person consistently denied it. Moreover, all of the cases were
basically premised on procedural due process grounds such as failure
to follow regulations, insubstantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious
government actions, improperly placed burden of proof, or
improperly obtained evidence. Finally, many of the cases remained
separated. However, Class II through Class IV homosexuals who are officers are generally
given the opportunity "to resign 'for the good of the service' and avoid trial. C.
WILLIAMS & M. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALS AND THE MILITARY 28 (1971).

248. Id. at 53.
249. Id. at 60.
250. Id.
251. Semeta, Administrative Discharge of Officers and Airmen, AIR FORCE L. REv.,
Summer 1975, at 79.
252. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
253. See Meador, JudicialDeterminationsof Military Status, 72 YALE L.J. 1293 (1963),
for a general discussion of the function of the Court of Claims and the district courts in
reviewing military status.
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unresolved in the sense that they were dismissed or stayed pending
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The second category of cases runs through the years 1973 to
1977, slightly overlapping the first category of cases chronologically.
In marked contrast to the earlier cases, the persons more recently
challenging separation from the military are all admitted "gays."
Furthermore, these later cases are generally premised on substantive
constitutional grounds, such as the impropriety of certain treatment
based on a person's status, the protection of private consensual adult
acts by a right of privacy, the requirement of a "rational nexus"
between behavior and the reasons for punishment, and the first
amendment right of association. Although most of the court
decisions hold against the challenger, each contains important liberal
changes in military policy.
254
Only two years after the Supreme Court's decisions in Brucker,
permitting judicial review of administrative discharge, Fannie Mae
Clackum, an Air Force enlisted woman, brought an action in the
United States Court of Claims to recover back pay disallowed as a
result of an allegedly invalid '' 255administrative discharge under
"conditions other than honorable.
When charges of homosexuality
were brought against her, Ms. Clackum refused to resign as requested
and demanded a court-martial. The Air Force refused to
court-martial her and instead discharged her under an Air Force
regulation that provided that if the evidence indicated that conviction
of the Air Force
by a generalcourt-martialwas unlikely, the Secretary
6
could order her administratively discharged2
In validating the discharge in Clackum v. United States, the court
took specific note of the consequences of such a discharge, noting the
Air Force's own regulations which observed that "the person so
discharged may be deprived of many rights as a veteran under both
and may expect to encounter substantial
Federal and State legislation,
' ' 57
prejudice in civilian life. 2
While the court admitted that the Air Force could discharge Ms.
Clackum at will and without cause, it nevertheless stated that "it is
unthinkable that it [the Air Force] should have the raw power,
without respect for even the most elementary notions of due process
254. See text accompanying note 252 supra. In Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958),
the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Army had exceeded his authority in
issuing less than honorable discharges to two soldiers based on their activities prior to
their induction. A serviceman's discharge, the Court felt, should be an accurate reflection
of the nature of the service rendered.
255. Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
256. Id. at 227.
257. Id.
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of law, to load her down with penalties. '' 258 In particular, the court
castigated the Air Force for not informing Ms. Clackum of the nature
of the evidence against her and for not giving her a meaningful
hearing.
Equally arbitrary proceedings were challenged with less success
in Beard v. Stahr.259 In that case Beard, a Regular Army officer,
sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from removing him from
the active list, pursuant to a determination by a review board of

261
officers 260 that Beard was unsuitable for continued service.
In support of his request for an injunction, Beard claimed that
requiring the officer under review to sustain the burden of proving

that he should be retained was unconstitutional. The court, however,

rejected this contention and observed that "supervision and control
over the selection, appointment and dismissal of officers are not
judicial functions ...[and] dismissals of officers are not limited or

controlled by the Bill of Rights. ''262 Lt. Col. Beard was ultimately
denied an injunction on the ground that he should have first

exhausted all his administrative remedies. Until the Secretary had
list of officers, the court
actually removed his name from the
263
premature.
action
Beard's
considered
Members of the armed forces have been somewhat more
successful in obtaining a stay of administrative discharge proceedings.
Such a stay is important because the person in question remains in the
258. d at 228.
259. 200 F. Supp. 766 (D. D.C. 196 1), vacatedpercuriam, 370 U.S. 41 (1962).
260. The Secretary of the Army is authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 3781 (1976) to convene
a board of officers to review the record of an active commissioned officer and to
determine whether he should be required to show cause for his retention on the active list.
Such a board might be convened because the officer had allegedly fallen below standards
in his performance of duty, because of moral or professional dereliction, or because his
retention would not be clearly consistent with the interests of national defense. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 3781, 3791 (1976).
261. The plaintiffs alleged homosexuality was not really an issue before the court,
because the court apparently accepted the proposition that the Army could remove a
homosexual soldier. 200 F. Supp. at 769 n.1. Moreover, the court did not question the
quantum of evidence in support of the Board's conclusion, even though plaintiff's
behavior with an undercover policeman in a YMCA bathroom was ambiguous and the
Army's own psychiatrist testified that the plaintiff was not a homosexual and should be
retained.
262. Id. at 773.
263. The Supreme Court agreed per curiam. 370 U.S. 41 (1962). Justice Douglas,
however, dissented, indicating that the discretion of the Army to dismiss at will should be
limited where the dismissal is clearly stigmatizing. Moreover, Justice Douglas argued that
Beard was entitled to a hearing that comported with due process. Id at 42-43.
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service, continues to be paid and retains all his or her benefits until a
review and final decision. The armed services always argue against
such stays on the grounds that if the Board of Correction finds for the
service man or woman, he or she will get rank and pay returned.
However, the court in Schwartz v. Covington264 apparently believed
that the temporary stigma of an undesirable discharge was greater
than the need to terminate immediately, and consequently granted a
stay of administrative proceedings against Covington, an Army
enlisted man. The court applied a four point test under which the
moving party must establish: (1) a likelihood of probable success on
appeal, (2) irreparable injury unless the stay is granted, (3) an absence
of substantial harm to other
interested persons and (4) absence of
harm to the public interest.265
In concluding that the test had been satisfied, the court first
determined that the findings of the review board would probably be
over-turned turned on appeal. The court suggested that the board
had exceeded its authority by giving an undesirable discharge without
substantial evidence of homosexual acts committed during the
accused's present enlistment or proof that the accused was a Class II
homosexual. 266 Secondly, the court found irreparable harm to the
soldier because of the "stigma" attached to undesirable discharge.
Lastly, the court found that there was no substantial harm either to
the government or to the public. To the contrary,
the soldier's service
as an orderly in a hospital had been exemplary. 267
In Unglesly v. Zimny, 268 decided later the same year, the court
applied the Schwartz269 test but arrived at a different result. In that
case, an enlisted man asked for an injunction to prevent his
separation from the Navy. The petitioner had been given a general
discharge under honorable conditions by reason of "unfitness,"
namely, his homosexuality. He argued that his due process rights had
been violated because his request that three witnesses be present at
his hearing was denied.
264. 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965), modifying and affig 230 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
265. Id. at 538. This four-factored test was first articulated in a different context in
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921,925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), and has since
been applied with respect to a variety of administrative proceedings. See Associated
Securities Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960); Eastern Air Lines v. CAB, 261 F.2d
830, 830 (2d Cir. 1958). However, the lower court in the instant case was first to apply the
test to armed forces discharge proceedings. Covington v. Schwartz, 230 F. Supp. 249, 252
(N.D. Cal. 1964).
266. See text accompanying note 246 supra.
267. 341 F.2d at 538.
268. 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
269. See note 265 & accompanying text supra.

April 1999]

THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS

In applying the Schwartz test, the court agreed that Unglesly
would suffer irreparable harm if given a general discharge, noting that
"[iln our modem society where the vast majority of the nation's
young men must pass through the military services, discharge with
anything less than a record of honorable service constitutes a stigma
of tremendous impact which will have a lifelong effect." 270 The court
further concluded that Unglesly's continued presence in the Navy did
not pose a threat of substantial harm either to other interested
persons or to the public interest.27' However, Unglesly's petition for
an injunction failed because the court was not satisfied that Unglesly
was likely to prevail on appeal. In fact, the court found substantial
admissible evidence to sustain his separation.
Unglesly was equally unsuccessful with respect to his due process
challenge. While admitting that the military must conform to
"minimal requirements of constitutional due process ' 272 and that "it
would be a better practice for the military to require the presence of
witnesses at administrative discharge hearings, '273 the court
nevertheless concluded that an administrative body performing an
adjudicatory function is not required to follow all the procedural
requisites required of a judicial proceeding. 274
The Schwartz test was again applied in Crawford v. Davis275
where an Army sergeant of eighteen years service sought to enjoin his
276
discharge under honorable conditions as a Class II homosexual.
While the court quickly found that Sgt. Crawford would suffer
irreparable harm, it nevertheless denied the injunction because the
petitioner had failed to establish the three remaining elements of the
Schwartz test.
The court found that the retention of Sgt. Crawford pending final
administrative action would cause substantial harm to the Army and
hence to the public interest. The court observed that "it would be
clearly inappropriate to hobble the Army by forcing it to retain even
one soldier, for an indefinite period of time, when there are serious

270. 250 F. Supp. at 716-17.
271. ld. at 717.
272. Id. at 718.
273. Id. at 719.
274. Id.
275. 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966).
276. Sergeant Crawford admitted his homosexuality, which he characterized as a
"problem," after being accused in an anonymous letter of participating in homosexual
acts. Id. at 944.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

questions concerning his emotional health. 2 77 Because there was
nothing in the record about Crawford's emotional health, the court,
presumably, characterized homosexuality as equivalent to emotional
sickness. 278 The court also found that Crawford was unlikely to
prevail on appeal. Even though the court admitted that some of
Crawford's constitutional rights had been violated, it concluded that
those violations were basically irrelevant in the face of plaintiff's
admission of homosexuality and the Army's authority to discharge its
personnel.27 9
A similar disregard of a petitioner's constitutional rights was
evidenced by the court in Courtney v. Secretary of the Air Force,280 in
which Courtney, a second lieutenant in the Air Force, sought to have
a discharge under conditions other than honorable281 upgraded to a
more favorable discharge. Lt. Courtney asserted that the Air Force's
refusal to comply with his request was arbitrary and capricious in light
of his record, that he was not afforded the right of cross-examination,
and that his fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights had been
violated. The court rejected these arguments and held that the
procedural guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments were not
necessarily applicable to administrative hearings. 282 Deferring to the
discretion of the Air Force, the court observed the mandate of the
Supreme Court in Orloff v. Willoughby283 that "[o]rderly government
requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
intervene in judicial matters."m
With respect to the four Schwartz criteria, Messrs. Covington,
Unglesly and Crawford were all successful in establishing that
irreparable harm would result from a discharge on the grounds of
homosexuality. While this might suggest that the courts are not totally
insensitive to the plight of the homosexual service man or woman, the
adverse decisions in Unglesly and Crawford nevertheless indicate that
277. Id. at 947.
278. This was not a particularly astonishing viewpoint in its day. For a typical view of
homosexuality in the late 1960's see Slovenko, Sexual Deviation: Response to an
AdaptationalCrisis,40 U. COLO. L. REv. 222 (1968).
279. 249 F. Supp. at 951.
280. 267 F. Supp. 305 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
281. Courtney was asked to resign when confronted with accusations of homosexuality.
He resigned and was given a less than honorable discharge but then rescinded his
resignation. He did not deny his sexual orientation but wanted to obtain a better level of
discharge. After various administrative hearing he was still discharged under conditions
other than honorable.
282. 267 F. Supp. at 308.
283. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
284. Id. at 94.
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the courts will continue to give considerably more weight to the
policies of the armed forces in balancing the respective interests.
Moreover, the "harm" often perceived by the courts is the
mischaracterization of a heterosexual person as a homosexual person,
rather than the involuntary discharge from the armed forces for
reasons unrelated to an individual's ability to perform.
Thus, in Bray v. United States,285 the court found that the Air
Force had not followed its own regulations and that Sergeant Bray
had not been treated with "basic fairness.' 8 6 The court observed that
"[a] most severe stigma attaches in our culture to male
homosexuality; error in weighing the substantiality of the evidence
287
that supports the Air Force findings could result in grave injustice."'
On the other hand, at least two homosexual servicemen were
unable to establish that irreparable harm would result from their
separation simply because they had received "honorable,"' 288 but
89
a ten-year
nonetheless involuntary discharges. In Nelson v. Miller,2
Navy enlisted man was denied an injunction restraining the Navy
from giving him an honorable discharge (for the convenience of the
government) because of alleged homosexuality. The appeals court
found that the plaintiff had not suffered irreparable harm since the
discharge was "honorable" and since he could also be reprieved290 by a
positive decision of the Board for Correction of Naval Records.
Similarly, the court in Benson v. Holloway291 concluded that

serviceman Benson suffered no irreparable harm because his
discharge was under honorable conditions. Moreover, in refusing to
enjoin Benson's separation from the Air Force the court concluded
that his temporary retention would cause substantial harm to the Air
Force and observed that "[t]he problems of morale, as well as other
problems that may arise by having a now known homosexual present
in the military, which may confront the Air Force are sufficient to
285. 515 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
286. Id. at 1395. Bray, an Air Force Staff Sergeant who was discharged after eighteen
years of service, sued for active duty pay and for the retirement pay of a staff sergeant,
based on twenty years of active service. The sergeant asserted that if he had not been
discharged, he would have re-enlisted until he had completed his twenty years of service.
287. Id. at 1391.
288. Honorable discharges may be awarded on the grounds of convenience to the
government or "unsuitability." See text accompanying notes 235-36 supra.
289. 373 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967).
290. Id. at 479-80. Subsequent to discharges, all the services have a civilian board of
final appeal, which corrects records. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1976).
291. 312 F. Supp. 49 (D. Neb. 1970).
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restrain this Court from in any way interfering with the military

authority at this juncture. "292
The second category of military cases marks the beginning of a
strong movement by gay persons in the military to challenge the then
accepted dogma which is illustrated by many of the preceding cases
and is succinctly summed up in a Navy policy statement:
Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who
can not be tolerated in a military organization. In developing and
documenting cases involving homosexual conduct, commanding
officers should be keenly aware that members involved in
homosexual acts are security and reliability risks who discredit
2 93
themselves and the naval service by their homosexual conduct.

Without questioning the basic principle of the Navy's policy, the

court in Doe v. Chafee294 nevertheless imposed, for the first time with
respect to military proceedings, a requirement similar to the Norton

"rational nexus" standard. 295 Unless a "nexus" between the
serviceman's homosexuality and the quality of his military service
could be established, the court refused to sustain the separation of an
avowed homosexual individual.

However, in a feat of circular reasoning, the court found such a

"nexus." Because of his early release from the service, which had
been compelled by his homosexuality, the court concluded that the

quality of the petitioner's military service was affected adversely and
was consequently inferior to the service of those who fulfilled their
enlistments. 296 In addition, the court suggested that the quality of his
service might be affected because of the tension created by having a
shipmate lover.
The constitutionality of the Navy's policy was directly challenged
in Champagne v. Schlesinger 297 by two women who were given

292. Id at 51.

293. SEC NAV Instruction 1900.9(4)(a) (20 April 1964).
294. 355 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The Navy enlisted man in question voluntarily
disclosed to his superior officer that he was having a homosexual relationship with a
shipmate. He was told he would have to be separated from the Navy, but was promised
no less than a general discharge. Despite that promise, he was given an undesirable
discharge. When he found that he could not find work and that he was denied veteran
benefits, he appealed to the Board for Correction of Naval Records. When the Board had
not acted on his request after nine months, he brought suit. During the pendency of the
suit, the Board upgraded his discharge from undesirable to general. The plaintiff then
pressed the court for an honorable discharge. Id&at 114.
295. See notes 106-18 & accompanying text supra.
296. The court does not consider the fact that Doe may have been willing to fulfill his
enlistment. 355 F. Supp. at 112.
297. 506 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1974).
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general discharges

under honorable

1067

conditions.298 The women

challenged their discharges on the grounds that Navy policy as it
homosexual conduct between adults was
related to private consensual
299
unconstitutional.
as
void
The court never reached this constitutional question, 3°° however,

because the Navy adopted the surprising position that Navy
301
regulations do not require mandatory discharge of homosexuals.
Consequently, the court left the women to seek administrative review
to the court
of their discharges but guaranteed their right to return
3°2
when their administrative remedies were exhausted.

The constitutionality of a similar Air Force policy was squarely
faced by the court in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force.303 Sgt.
Matlovich, an avowed homosexual, 304 sought a declaratory judgment
that the Air Force regulation providing for the discharge of
homosexuals was an unconstitutional abridgment of his rights to
privacy and equal protection. In the alternative, Matlovich alleged
that since the decision to discharge him was arbitrary and capricious
and constituted a denial of305due process, he was entitled to
reinstatement in the Air Force.

298. Id. at 981. One of the board members dissented, however, on the ground that the
women "'have demonstrated their ability to perform in a military environment without
conflict from their private sexual beliefs."' Id.
299. Id While both admitted their sexual preference, all the evidence indicated that
they engaged in sexual relations only off duty and off the base.
300. The court in Heisel v. Chalbeck, 405 F. Supp. 361 (M.D. Fla. 1976), also failed to
resolve the question of whether it was unconstitutional for the Navy to discharge the
serviceman in question solely because of his status as a homosexual. Leaving the
petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies, the court refused to issue an injunction
under the Schwartz criteria on the grounds that, since his discharge was honorable, he
suffered no irreparable harm.
301. 506 F.2d at 984. Regulation 3420220 states: "Members may be recommended for
discharge. ... " Id
302. Id. As of November 9, 1976, two years after the court's decision, the Board for
Correction of Naval Records had not disposed of the Champagne case. See Plaintiff's
Reply to Supplemental Submission of Defendant Regarding Summary Judgment, at 2,
Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
303. No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976), reported in 2 SEx. L. REP. 53 (1976) and 45
U.S.L.W. 2074-75 (Aug. 17, 1976), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6,1978).
304. Sergeant Matlovich submitted a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force in which he
declared he was a homosexual. The Secretary of the Air Force honorably discharged
Matlovich after Matlovich had completely and thoroughly exhausted his administrative
remedies. Statement of Material Facts at 1-4, Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, No.
75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976).
305. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Matlovich v.
Secretary of the Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976).
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Judge Gesell delivered an oral opinion in the Matlovich case and,
with apparent reluctance,1 6 found for the Air Force. On the issue of
privacy, Judge Gesell said he was bound by the recently decided case
of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond 3°7 which clearly
indicated that "there is no constitutional right to engage in
homosexual activity. ' 30 8 The court similarly disposed of Matlovich's
claim that he was denied equal protection because the military had
failed to adopt a policy, similar to that of the civil service, which
required that a "rational nexus" between conduct and efficiency be
shown in order to dismiss a federal civil servant.309
Neither did the failure to extend the "rational nexus" standard to
military proceedings constitute a violation of due process. Again
Judge Gesell felt constrained by recent Supreme Court opinions, in
particular Kelley v. Johnson,310 and observed that:
[T]he Armed Forces... have a legitimate interest in assuring full
readiness for combat and can, of course, act to protect recruitment,
security of military information where applicable and over-all

306. Judge Gesell in his opinion described Matlovich as follows: "He had had a most
commendable, highly useful service in the military over a long period of time, starting with
the Air Force in 1963 ....Here is a man who volunteered for assignment to Viet Nam,
who served in Viet Nam with distinction, who was awarded the Bronze Star while only an
Airman First Class, engaged in hazardous duty on a volunteer basis on more than one
occasion, wounded in a mine explosion, re-volunteered, has excelled in the Service as a
training officer, as a counseling officer... and has at all times been rated at the highest
possible ratings by his superiors in all aspects of his performance, receiving in addition to
the Bronze Star, the Purple Heart, two Air Force Commendation Medals and a
Meritorious Service Medal." 2 SEX. L. REP. 53,56 (1976).
307. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). In Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, two homosexual men challenged the constitutionality of a
Virginia statute that criminalized sodomy. The court held that the constitution did not bar
the Virginia statute, concluding that the constitutionally protected right of privacy must be
narrowly drawn to include only marital privacy. Id at 1202.
308. 2 SEx. L. REP. 53 (1976). Judge Gesell also noted two other recent cases which
supported this position: Singer v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), which upheld the dismissal of a
federal civil servant because he publicly flaunted his homosexuality and State v. Bateman,
113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that statutes
forbidding sodomy and lewd conduct as applied to consenting adults did not violate
defendants' first amendment right to freedom of expression. At the time of Judge Gesell's
opinion, Singer had not yet been remanded by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying
notes 134-47 supra.
309. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 106-48 & accompanying
text supra.
310. In Kelly v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the test of
the validity of an Air Force's regulation is "not... whether the [State] can 'establish' a
'genuine public need' for the specific regulation. It is whether respondent can demonstrate
that there is no rational connection between the regulation.., and [the end served by the
affected agency]." Id. at 247.
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efficiency. It may establish standards of acceptable behavior when
conduct impinges directly or indirectly on discipline and the fullest
achievement of appropriate military objectives.3
Given these considerations, Judge Gesell concluded that the Air
at issue was not so "irrational that it may be branded
Force regulation
312
arbitrary."
Lastly, while the Air Force admitted that it was possible to make
rare exceptions, 313 the Air Force argued that the decision as to
whether such an exception should be made "is a completely
subjective judgment which depends on the facts of each case" 314 and is
solely within the discretion of the military. Judge Gesell found that all
issues had been presented openly and fairly to the Air Force
authorities and, consequently, did not question the Air Force's
315
decision not to make such an exception in Matlovich's case.
Having concluded that Matlovich could not prevail, Judge Gesell
embarked on a remarkable speech, addressed to the Air Force:
This is a distressing case. It is a bad case. It may be that bad cases
make bad law. Having spent many months dealing with aspects of
this litigation, it is impossible to escape the feeling that the time has
arrived or may be imminent when branches of the Armed Forces
need to reappraise the problem which homosexuality
unquestionably presents in the military context.
The Services are admittedly involved in matters of immediate and
clear importance. They not only have problems with respect to
performing the obvious military task but there are moral, religious
and privacy overtones that cannot and should not be overlooked.
We all recognize that by a gradual process there has come to be a
much greater understanding of many aspects of homosexuality.
Public attitudes are clearly changing. Some state legislatures have
already acted to reflect these changing public attitudes, moving
311. 2 SEX. L. REP. 53,56 (1976).

312 Id.
313. "Exceptions to permit retention may be authorized only where the most unusual
circumstances exist and provided the airman's ability to perform military service has not
been compromised." Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative for Summary Judgment, and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Discovery at 1, Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16,
1976).
314. Id. at 25.
315. On December 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. 47 U.S.L.W. 2361 (Dec. 12, 1978). The court questioned "the absence of
articulated standards" and "the absence of any reasoned explanation" that would make it
possible for the court "to decide whether or not there has been an abuse of discretion in
this instance or whether improper factors have played a material role." Id.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

more in the direction of tolerance. Physicians, church leaders,
educators and psychologists are able now to demonstrate that there
is no standard, no preconceived stereotype of a homosexual which,
unfortunately, some of the Air Force knee-jerk reaction to these
cases would suggest still prevails in the Department....
The Armed Forces have been in many ways leaders in social
experimentation and in their adaptability to changing community
standards.... Here another opportunity is presented. While the
Court has reached its conclusions, as a judge must do, on the law, I
hope it will be recognized that after months of intense study of this
problem, matters within and without the record, the Court,
individually, for what it is worth, has reached the conclusion that it
is desirable for the military to reexamine the homosexual problem,
316
to approach it in perhaps a more sensitive and precise way.

The results of such a reexamination were apparently approved of
by Judge Gesell in Berg v. Clayton, 317 in which he upheld the
honorable discharge of Vernon Berg, graduate of Annapolis, Ensign
in the United States Navy and an avowed homosexual. The opinion
reveals a significant shift in Navy policy. Instead of contending that it
is attempting to maintain moral standards or that acknowledged
homosexuals are security risks, the Navy now adopted the position
'318
that "homosexuals present an obstruction to efficient operations.
The court concluded that "[g]iven the extreme deference" courts pay
to military procedures, "the regulation has not been shown to be
'319
unconstitutionally irrational.
Shortly after the Matlovich decision, the District Court for the
Northern District of California handed down a decision in Saal P.
MiddendorP20 representing the first clear-cut victory for gay persons

316. 2 SEx. L. REP. 53, 56-57 (1976).
317. 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977).
318. Id at 80. The court considered the Navy's rationale for this new policy and
observed: "First, [the Navy] contends that in a confined situation, such as aboard ship,
enlisted men would react to a homosexual officer in such a way as to destroy the officer's
credibility and his ability to command. The officer would be subject to ridicule and lack of
respect, thus making him an ineffective leader. Second, this situation would compound the
already severe pressures faced by all officers aboard ship, putting the homosexual officer
in an unusually difficult position, thus further decreasing his effectiveness." Id.
319. The court was not unaware that if sexual preference constituted a "suspect class"
or was considered a "fundamental right" its decision might have been different. See id. at
80 n.1. "The Court is aware of the claim that the Navy is acting unlawfully in even
considering the reactions of others toward homosexuals. There are problems inherent in
burdening a class of people because of the reactions they engender. However, where the
class that is burdened is neither 'suspect' nor engaged in constitutionally protected
behavior, the Government may take the reactions of third parties into account in setting
its policies." Id.
320. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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in the military. 321 After successfully obtaining an honorable discharge
in lieu of a general discharge, 322 Navy enlisted woman Saal was
assigned a reenlistment code which effectively precluded
reenlistment. Saal argued that she was deprived of due process by

being made ineligible for reenlistment because of her homosexuality.
323
She alleged that Navy policy as enunciated in SEC NAV 1900.9A
was unconstitutional on its face because it presumed every
homosexual unfit, and that 1900.9A as applied specifically to her was
ability to reenlist
unconstitutional because it deprived her of her
3 24
despite demonstrated fitness for military service.
While the court agreed with the Navy that homosexual acts are

not a constitutionally protected activity and that the plaintiff had no
constitutional right to continued employment by the Navy, the court
held that, because of the indisputably stigmatizing effects of the
Navy's actions, Saal was entitled to due process protections. 325 The
court paid deference to the Navy's discretion with regard to personnel
matters, but pointed out that a person does not surrender his or her
constitutional rights upon entering the armed services.
The court rejected the Navy's rationale for the mandatory
exclusion of homosexuals 326 observing that the same rationale could
321. Other recent cases indicate an inconsistent attitude toward homosexuals on the
part of the armed forces. Following the establishment of President Carter's special Viet
Nam discharge-review program, former Radioman Third Class Robert Martin, an
acknowledged homosexual, was granted an honorable discharge from the Navy. Martin
had originally been separated from the service in 1971 with a general discharge despite a
vigorous court battle. The Advocate, Nov. 30, 1977, at 12. A Wave Petty Officer, accused
of "homosexual tendencies," was not discharged from the Navy despite an alleged affair
with a female airman; the airman, however, was discharged. Lesbian Connection, Aug.
1976, at 9.
322. Saal sought and obtained a preliminary injunction, preventing her separation from
the Navy with a general discharge on the basis of her admitted homosexuality. Meanwhile,
Saal's enlistment period was running out. Her application for an extension was denied by
the Navy and at the end of her enlistment period she was honorably discharged. Id. at 194.
323. See notes 245-47 & accompanying text supra.
324. The transparency of the Navy's justification for precluding Saal's reenlistment, her
alleged "unfitness," was revealed by the consistently outstanding service evaluations which
she attached to her pleadings. The last evaluation, dated 1 Mar. 1975-31 July 1975,
concluded: "Highly recommended for advancement and reenlistment." Saal v.
Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. at 204 app. A.
325. Id. at 198-99.
326. The Navy's reasons for mandatory discharge without an individualized
determination were stated as follows: "it is considered that administrative processing is
mandatory. This is because it is perceived that homosexuality adversely impacts on the
effective and efficient performance of the mission of the United States Navy in several
particulars.
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equally apply to persons other than homosexuals. Yet, the court
noted, only homosexuals were classified as "intolerable" and singled
out for prompt separation. Moreover, Navy policies provided no
procedure for determining if the particular homosexual person did in
fact present the problems perceived by the Navy. 327 Therefore, the
court concluded that "[p]laintiff's showing in this casedemonstrating a record of service judged outstanding by Navy
command even during the period of the pending litigationestablishes that at least as applied to her, the mandatory exclusion

policies and regulations are irrational and capricious." 328

The court emphasized that it was not requiring the Navy to enlist

or retain gay persons or precluding the Navy from excluding
homosexual individuals if their homosexuality renders them unfit for

service. Rather, it held that "due process requires plaintiffs fitness to
serve to be evaluated in the light
of all relevantfactors and free of any
' '329
policy of mandatory exclusion.
Despite the decision in Saal, homosexual members of the armed
forces have been substantially less successful in achieving job security
and recognition of their constitutionally protected rights than
homosexual employees of the federal or state governments. Even the

Saal decision does not represent unqualified progress in that
direction. The holding is narrowly formulated to prohibit only
mandatory exclusion of homosexual service men and women.
"(a) Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between known homosexuals and
the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality, especially in the
unique close living conditions aboard ships.
"(b) An individual's performance of duties could be unduly influenced by emotional
relationships with other homosexuals.
"(c) Traditional chain of command problems could be created, i.e., a proper
command relationship could be subverted by an emotional relationship; an officer or
senior enlisted person who exhibits homosexual tendencies will be unable to maintain the
necessary respect and trust from the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest
homosexuality, and this would most certainly degrade the individual's ability to
successfully perform his duties of supervision and command.
"(d) There would be an adverse impact on recruiting should parents become
concerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapable of
maintaining high moral standards.
"(e) A homosexual might force his desires upon others or attempt to do so. This
would certainly be disruptive.
"(f) Homosexuals may be less productive/effective than their heterosexual
counterparts because of: (1) Fear of criminal prosecution; (2) Fear of social stigmatization;
(3) Fear of loss of spouse and/or family through divorce proceedings as a result of
disclosure; (4) Undue influence by a homosexual partner." Id. at 201 n.10.
327. Id. at 202.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 203.

April 1999]

THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS

Moreover, the continued validity of that holding remains
questionable since the decision is currently being appealed by the
330
Navy.
In addition, neither the Saal court nor other courts have
unequivocally adopted the "rational nexus" due process test with
respect to military proceedings. 331 Although the courts in Doe v.
Chafee332 and Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force3 33 purported to
require some connection between the homosexuality of the
serviceman and the quality of his military service, those courts clearly
accepted the military's determination that such a connection existed.
Consequently, until the courts prove less willing to defer to the
traditional autonomy of the military's quasi-judicial proceedings,
homosexual service men and women can presumably expect little
relief from the courts in their battle to enter and remain in the armed
services.
VI. Professional and Occupational Licensing
Laws requiring a license to practice a particular profession or
occupation abound in the United States today and "embrace most of
the activities that come readily to mind, running the length of the
alphabet from abattoir operators to yacht salesmen. ' '334 Three states
list over 164 licensed occupations and five states list between 130 and
164. Among the remaining
states, the number of licensed occupations
33
range from 60 to 129. 336
The ostensible purpose of such licensing is public protection.
330. Phone conversation of July 13, 1978 with Mary C. Dunlap, Saal's attorney,
confirmed that the case is in the Ninth Circuit, consolidated with two other cases involving
administrative discharges of homosexual service personnel.
In one of these cases, Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court
followed Saal, but went further in protecting the rights of homosexual service men and
women by requiring the showing of a nexus between homosexual conduct and
unsuitability for service. Id. at 212.
331. One court explicitly adopted the "rational nexus" standard. That decision,
however, is being appealed along with Saal. See note 330 supra.
332. See notes 294-96 & accompanying text supra.
333. See notes 303-16 & accompanying text supra.
Occupational Licensing-A Nationwide Dilemma, 109 J.
334. Gellhorn,
ACCOUNTANCY 39 (1960).
335. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER ADMIN., MANPOWER RESEARCH
MONOGRAPH No. 11, Occupational Licensing and the Supply of Nonprofessional
Manpower (1969).
336. Note, Entrance and Disciplinary Requirements for Occupational Licenses in

California,14 STAN. L. Rev. 533,533 (1962).
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In theory, the imposition of various regulations guarantees that only
qualified practitioners will exist and the public will be protected.
However, the theoretical justification belies less admirable reasons
for licensing. Many commentators feel that licensing that limits supply
is more protective of the practicioner's economic well-being than of
the public's welfare. Moreover, license fees are often a source of

income to the state.
Two professions traditionally subject to such regulation are law
and medicine. Because these practitioners are at least in theory
subject to high ethical standards, an inherently subjective and
arbitrary inquiry into the private morality of the applicant
occasionally occurs.337 The denial of entrance into a profession toward
which time and money have been invested or the revocation of a
license to practice is a severe penalty, especially when the denial or
revocation is based upon an administrative determination, which is
predictably arbitrary and arguably irrelevant to the individual's ability
to practice his or her profession. Applicants to the medical or legal
professions, who face charges that their homosexuality renders them
unsuitable to practice, are particularly subject to this kind of
administrative treatment.
In McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 338 the court

sustained the disciplining of a homosexual doctor who had been
convicted of the misdemeanor of disorderly conduct for soliciting or
engaging in lewd or dissolute conduct in a public place.339 In
concluding that the medical board's decision was correct, the court
considered the appellant-doctor's contention that the alleged conduct

bore no relation to his practice of medicine. While distinguishing both

Norton v. Macy 340 and Morrison v. State Board of Education341 on the

337. Teachers, of course, are also licensed in a sense. Their certification is discussed in
section on Teaching in Public Schools at text accompanying notes 367-449 infra.
338. 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973). Seventeen years before
McLaughlin a similar issue reached the California Supreme Court in Lorenz v. Board
Medical Examiners, 46 Cal. 2d 684, 298 P.2d 537 (1956). The court overturned the lower
court opinion and the recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners and restored
the license of an allegedly homosexual doctor. However, the license revocation was
overturn because of a procedural error, rather than on substantive grounds. Id. at 687,298
P.2d 539.
339. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1978). The doctor was arrested by a plain-clothes
police officer when the doctor allegedly touched the officer's pants around his "private
parts."
340. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Norton held that a reasonably foreseeable
connection must exist between an employee's "potentially embarassing conduct and the
efficiency of the [civil] service" before he may be dismissed. See text accompanying notes
106-18 supra.
341. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). The court, in an opinion
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grounds that those cases involved private, noncriminal acts while this
act was both public and criminal,342 the court nevertheless sought to
establish some connection between the appellant's conduct and the
potential effect upon his practice:
[A]s an internist he is in intimate physical contact with his patients,
and while he may be dedicated to treating them in an exemplary
professional manner, the opportunity to falter and his frailty in
exercising restraint exist. Unfortunately, appellant's problem
apparently stays with him most, if not all of the time; and in light of
be relegated
his present conduct, there is little assurance that it will 343
to isolated places and occasions away from his patients.
The court gave great weight to the determination by the licensed
physicians on the medical board that his problem might affect his
practice. 344
In his dissent, Presiding Justice Kaus emphatically attacked the
majority, arguing that the record contained no substantial evidence
on the vital question of whether this act of "moral turpitude" affected
the appellant's ability to practice his profession. 345 Justice Kaus
suspected "that the problem of the oversexed physician-'gay' or
'straight'-is as old as medicine itself." 34 6 While he interpreted the

majority's opinion to mean that any doctor who violated acceptable
standards of sexual behavior could be disciplined without proof that
his deviation affected his professional competence, he also detected a
double standard:
Yet, I cannot bring myself to believe that the court would justify
disciplining a doctor on no evidence at all except proof that he
violated § 647(b) of the Penal Code by propositioning a
policewoman in 'plain clothes,' though we could say with just as
much substance that a doctor who seeks sexual gratification by way
of a sidewalk pickup, is never without his 'problem' and that his
intimate contact with patients of the opposite sex provides him with
347
opportunity to falter.m
Lawyers also must deal with professional disciplinary bodies. In

authored by Justice Tobriner, ruled that a school teacher could be dismissed for
homosexual activities only if those activities would adversely affect his students or fellow

teachers. See text accompanying notes 377-84 infra for a discussion of Morrison.
342. 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1014-16, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353, 356-57 (1973).
343. Id. at 1015, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (emphasis added).

344. Id. at 10 17, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
345. The only evidence Justice Kaus found indicated that the appellant was a fine
physician. Id. at 1018, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 359.

346. Id. at 10 19, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
347. Id.
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most states, possession of a "good moral character" and lack of
evidence of crimes of "moral turpitude" are prerequisites to
admission to the Bar. 48 Many states have special screening
committees to pass on a candidate's character. However, because
these committees operate far out of the public eye, relatively little is
known about how they operate4 9
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Florida, in its per curiam opinion
in State v. Kimball,350 approved the disbarment of Harris L. Kimball.
The opinion does not mention homosexuality but only alludes to an
act "contrary to the good morals and law of this State. ' 351 However,
examination of the cases 352 arising out of Kimball's subsequent
application to the New York bar reveal that Kimball had been
convicted of sodomy, a felony under Florida law.
With respect to that subsequent application, the New York
Supreme Court ruled that, despite a favorable recommendation by
the Committee on Character and Fitness, Kimball could not be
admitted in New York because of his conduct in Florida sixteen years
earlier. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed in a one
paragraph per curiam decision, concluding that since Florida's
disbarment was not controlling, the recommendation of the
Committee was dispositve.
In 1970, Florida again disbarred an attorney on grounds of his
conviction of a crime involving homosexual conduct. In FloridaBar v.
Kay,353 the Supreme Court of Florida in a per curiam opinion
affirmed the disbarment of a man convicted of indecent exposure
while participating in a homosexual act with a consenting adult in a
public lavatory. The court did not discuss how his homosexual
conduct affected his legal practice but merely agreed with a lower
court that "respondent's conduct was blatantly contrary to good
354
morals."
Chief Justice Ervin concurred in the decision on the grounds that

348. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
349. In 1971, a graduate of the Ohio State University Law School who was an avowed
homosexual sought admission to the Ohio Bar. To make that determination the Supreme
Court of Ohio appointed a special committee which ultimately admitted the person in
question. However, since the issue was dealt with by special committee, the fact that in
Ohio homosexuality is not a reason for denial of admission to the Bar was not made a
matter of public record.
350. 96 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957).
351. Id.
352. In re Kimball, 40 App. Div. 2d 252, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, rev'd per curiam, 33 N.Y.2d
586,301 N.E.2d 436,347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
353. 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1970).
354. Id. at 379.
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disciplinary proceedings were the exclusive responsibility of the
Board of Governors of The Florida Bar, but expressed concern as to
the absence of a showing that a substantial nexus existed between
Kay's "antisocial355act" and a manifest permanent inability to practice
law responsibly.
Perhaps Chief Justice Ervin's publicly expressed concern
prompted the Florida Board of Bar Examiners to request guidance
from the Florida Supreme Court with regard to the admission of
Robert Eimers.356 Although Eimers admitted his homosexual
status, 357 there was no record of any criminal convictions for
homosexual activity nor did Eimers admit any homosexual conduct.
The court in Florida Board of Bar Examiners v. Eimers358 ordered
Eimers admitted, but specifically limited its ruling to persons having
the "status" of homosexual. Despite the narrow holding, the court
explicitly recognized the homosexual applicant's due process rights by
requiring a showing of a "rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice law." The Florida Court's significant
change of attitude in the eight years since Kay is reflected in the
court's statement that "[g]overnmental regulation in the area of
private morality is generally considered anachronistic" without a
showing of a rational nexus between private behavior and public
359
welfare.
In 1976 an American Bar Association subcommittee asked bar
associations across the country whether sexual preference was a
factor considered in their respective admission procedures. No state
bar admitted seeking such information from an applicant. Forty-five
state bar associations denied having any policy, formal or informal,
with respect to the admission of homosexual individuals. Six state bar
associations, including Florida, did not indicate whether or not they
adhered to such a policy.36° Such a report would seem to indicate that
355. The chief justice called attention to the "substantial nexus" requirement of Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and a similar line of cases. In addition, Chief
Justice Ervin also indirectly criticized the circumstances of Kay's arrest, noting that
"[e]vidence of antisocial behavior ferreted by peeping has never enjoyed widespread legal
approval." 232 So. 2d at 380.
356. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978). The court cited
Chief Justice Ervin's previous statements. Id. at 10.
357. While Eimers admitted his preference upon questioning, the matter initially was
brought to the board's attention when an informer wrote to the board as a form of
blackmail. N.Y. Times, March 21,1978, at 20, col. 1.
358. 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
359. Id. at 10.
360. Florida High Court Upholds Right of Homosexuals to Practice Law, N.Y. Times,
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try to avoid the issue and only react when forced to
bar associations
3 61
events.
by
As previously indicated, the legal and medical professions are
only two among many professions and occupations which are state
licensed. Not all require good moral character, 36z but many require
other qualifications that implicate the homosexuality of the applicant.
For example, in Doe v. Department of Transportation,363 the court
upheld the finding of the National Transportation Safety Board that
the applicant had a "character or behavior disorder severe enough to
have repeatedly manifested itself by overt acts."' 364 Such a disorder
constituted statutory grounds for denial of the medical certificate
necessary for a pilot's license. In reaching its decision, the court
considered the testimony of an Air Force psychiatrist 365 that the
applicant was a "constitutional psychopathic personality," as well as
the applicant's conviction of sodomy and several traffic violations.
as a necessary incident
The court justified the severity of the penalty
3 66
airways.
the
of
safety
the
concern,
main
its
to
The extent to which homosexual persons are denied licenses on
the basis of their sexual preference is simply not clear. Since there are
few published decisions, it is most likely that homosexual individuals
in licensed professions keep a low profile for fear of potential
dismissal or discipline. From those cases which have been published,
however, it is evident that the homosexuality of a prospective licensee
is often a dispositive factor. While at least one court has adopted the
"rational nexus" due process requirement to a limited extent, the
courts have generally been less willing to recognize the due process
rights of homosexual applicants for licenses than those of their
counterparts who are already gainfully employed.
VII. Teaching in Public Schools
Public school teaching is probably the most controversial

March 21, 1978, at 20, col. 1.
361. See note 357 supra.
362. It is surprising how many licensed occupations have morals requirements. In 1962
in California, gross immorality was a ground for disciplinary proceedings against barbers,
cosmetologists, funeral directors, embalmers, and pharmacists. Note, Entrance and
DisciplinaryRequirementsfor OccupationalLicensees in California,14 STAN. L. REV. 533,
548 (1962). For the current statute, see CAL. Bus. & PROF..CODE § 4350 (West 1978).
363. 412 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1969).
364. Id. at 675.
365. The psychiatrist's conclusions were drawn exclusively from the applicant's medical
and service records. The psychiatrist did not personally examine the applicant. Id. at 679.
366. Id. at 680.
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employment area for the homosexual person.367 Three factors
complicate the employment status of the public school teacher.
Teachers are public employees and thus are entitled to the same type
of due process protections afforded other government employees. At
the same time, teachers are also licensed and are, therefore, subject to

licensing requirements similar to other professions. Lastly, teaching is
generally singled out as a particularly sensitive and important
profession because of its impact on the lives of young persons.
In all fifty states, a teaching certificate, granted by the state, must
be obtained in order to teach in a public school system at the

elementary or secondary level.3 68 The homosexuality of an individual

teacher may be raised on application for the teaching certificate 369 or
on application for a particular teaching position. It can also become
an issue as a cause for dismissal from a particular job and, more
severely, as a cause for the revocation of the license to teach.
The main legal issues confronting the homosexual teacher are
dismissal from a current position and revocation of his or her teaching

367. While 56% of a population sample agreed that homosexuals should have equal
rights in terms of job opportunities, 65% of the population sample felt homosexuals
should not be hired as elementary school teachers. Homosexuals Mope Toward Open Life
As Tolerance Rises, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, at 34, col. 1. See also LaMorte, Legal Rights
and Responsibilities of Homosexuals in Public Education, 4 J. LAw-EDUC.. 449 (1975).
Much of the objection to homosexual persons as teachers is based on a popular though
mistaken belief that homosexual individuals are child molesters. Child molestation is not a
homosexual phenomenon. See Richards, supra note 25, at 988.
Pedophilia, a sexual preference for children, is distinct from homosexuality. See D.J.
WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 212-17 (1977); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY

118-19 (1967); Comment, Private Consensual Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its
Enforcement, 70 YALE LJ. 623, 629 (1961). Homosexual men primarily prefer men of
their own age rather than children. INSTrrUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, SEX OFFENDERS 639
(1965), M. SCHOFIELD, SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 147-55 (1965),

cited in W. BARNETr, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 129-30 n.51 (1973). In
fact, child molesters tend to be heterosexual in orientation. SCHOFIELD, supra;INSTITUTE
FOR SEX RESEARCH, supra at 277-79, 303-34, 332-34. Moreover, child molesters are
almost never female, either heterosexual or homosexual. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY, supra
at 115; Institute for Sex Research, supra at 9.
368. This section of the Article will focus entirely on the public elementary and
secondary school systems.
369. While it is well established that states have the power to set the standards for
teaching certificates, Vogulkin v. State Bd. of Educ., 194 Cal. App. 2d 424, 15 Cal. Rptr.
335 (1961); People v. Flanigan, 347 Ill. 328, 179 N.E. 823 (1932); Marrs v. Matthews, 270
S.W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), there is no case law and little data on any initial exclusion
of homosexual persons from the teaching profession. See Horenstein, Homosexuals in the
Teaching Profession, 20 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 125 (1961) for interviews with school officials
as to school policy with respect to the applications of homosexual teachers.
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certificate. While dismissal from a current position is certainly
injurious to the teacher, revocation of his or her teaching certificate is
a personal catastrophe. Without proper credentials a teacher cannot
be hired anywhere in that state and is thus essentially banned from his
or her profession. All states have statutes that permit the revocation
of teaching certificates (or credentials) for immorality, moral
turpitude, or unprofessionalism. 370 Homosexuality is considered to
fall within all three categories. Dismissals of homosexual teachers, as
differentiated from loss of credentials, have also usually been based
on charges of "immorality."
Revocation of credentials and dismissals under other applicable
provisions of the California Education Code have been frequently
and often successfully challenged. Two provisions in the California
Education Code have been used to remove homosexual teachers.
Section 13207371 requires mandatory revocation of teaching
credentials of anyone convicted of certain sex offenses including rape,
molestation, sodomy, oral copulation, indecent exposure and lewd
conduct in a public place. 372 Actual conviction is unlikely because
quite often sex offenses are plea bargained and the offender pleads
guilty to a much lesser offense such as disorderly conduct. In such
cases, section 13202 required the State Board of Education to revoke
or suspend a teaching credential "for immoral
or unprofessional
'373
conduct.., or for evident unfitness for service.
The California courts first applied section 13202 to a teacher's
homosexual conduct in Sarac v. Slate Board of Education.374 Sarac, a
male teacher pleaded guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct for
allegedly soliciting two undercover policemen to engage in a
homosexual act. Since this conviction for disorderly conduct did not
fall within the purview of section 13207, the State Board sought to
remove Sarac's credentials to teach under section 13202 for "immoral
and unprofessional conduct."375Observing that homosexual behavior is
"clearly" immoral behavior
and thus, in effect, declaring that
370. Horenstein, Homosexuals in the Teaching Profession, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125,
125 (1961).
371. Former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13207 (currently codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
44425, 87335 (West 1978)).
372. These offenses were listed in former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12912 (currently
codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44010 (West 1978)).
373. Former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13202 (currently codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
44421, 87331 (West 1978)).
374. 249 Cal. App. 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
375. Id. at 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The court stated: "Homosexual behavior has long
been contrary and abhorrent to the social mores and moral standards of the people of
California as it has been since antiquity to those of many other peoples. It is clearly,
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homosexual conduct per se constitutes unfitness to teach, the court
upheld the Board's decision to revoke Sarac's credentials. The court
noted that there was an "obvious rational connection" between
Sarac's homosexual behavior and the revocation of his credentials
because of his "statutory duty to 'endeavor to impress upon the minds
of the pupils the principles of morality' and his necessarily close
association with children. '376 The court apparently was less impressed
with the testimony of the twenty-three character witnesses who
testified as to Sarac's fitness to teach than it was with the testimony of
the two arresting officers.
Two years after the Sarac decision, the California Supreme
Court, in Morrison v. State Board of Education,377 sought to clarify
the murky standards surrounding teacher credential revocation.
Morrison resigned from his teaching position after his homosexuality
was disclosed to his superior by a former sexual partner. 378 The State
Board of Education subsequently conducted a hearing and as a
consequence revoked Morrison's license to teach. In his appeal to the
courts, Morrison claimed that the standard of section 13202"immoral and unprofessional conduct"'-was vague and thus legally
infirm. While the California Supreme Court said that the statute was
not vague as long as it was narrowly construed to relate specifically to
the particular profession involved, the court observed:
"The private conduct of a man, who is also a teacher, is a proper
concern to those who employ him only to the extent it mars him as a
teacher.... Where his professional achievement is unaffected,
where the school community is placed in no jeopardy, his private
379
acts are his own business and may not be the basis of discipline."

The court held that the Board of Education could not "abstractly
characterize" conduct as "immoral," "unprofessional" or "involving
moral turpitude" within the meaning of the Education Code unless
the conduct indicated that the person in question was unfit to teach 80
therefore, immoral conduct..." Id. For a view challenging this assertion see Richards,
supra note 25, at 988-99.

376. Id. at 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
377. 1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
378. Morrison engaged in private consensual homosexual acts with another teacher for
a one-week period. Id. at 218-19,461 P.2d at 377,82 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
379. Id. at 224, 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Jarvella v.
Willoughby-Eastlake City School District, 12 Ohio 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (C.P. Lake Cty.
1967)).
380. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The court also pointed out that
different professions will have different standards of professional conduct: "A particular
sexual orientation might be dangerous in one profession and irrelevant to another.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, specified factors which
should be considered in making such a determination:
[T]he likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected
students or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity

anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct, the
type of teaching certificate held by the party involved, the

extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the
conduct, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives
resulting in the conduct, the likelihood of the recurrence of the
questioned conduct, and the extent to which disciplinary action may
inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect upon
381the constitutional
rights of the teacher involved or other teachers.
Applying this standard to Morrison's particular situation, the
court found that the record contained no evidence that his conduct
indicated unfitness to teach and, consequently, the revocation of his
teaching license was improper. In arriving at this conclusion, the court
specifically disproved the simplistic equation, found in Sarac, that
homosexuality equals unfitness to teach. Moreover, the court noted
that "[i]n determining whether discipline is authorized and
' '38
reasonable, a criminal conviction has no talismanic significance, 2
and rejected the idea that conviction of a sex crime automatically
indicated unfitness to teach.
The Morrison court was sensitive to the severe consequences of
the revocation of a professional license and apparently wished to
the vicissitudes of popular notions of
protect the licensee from
3 83
morality and immorality.
The standard for revocation of teaching credentials developed by
Justice Tobriner in Morrison closely resembles the due process
standard of Norton v. Macy,384 requiring a demonstrated connection
between a person's homosexuality and the purported inability to
properly perform his or her job. The California courts, however, have
not consistently applied that standard. In Moser v. State Board of

Necrophilism and necrosadism might be objectionable in a funeral director or embalmer,
urolagnia in a laboratory technician, zooerastism in a veterinarian or trainer of guide dogs,
prolagnia in a fireman, undinism in a sailor, or dendrophilia in arborist, yet none of these
unusual tastes would seem to warrant disciplinary action against a geologist or shorthand
reporter." Id. at 227 n.1, 461 P.2d at 385, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
381. Id. at 229, 461 P.2d at 386, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (footnotes omitted).
382. Id. at 218-19 n.4, 461 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
383. Id. at 239, 461 P.2d at 394, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
384. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This case held that a reasonably foreseeable
connection must exist between a federal government employee's homosexual conduct and
the efficiency of the service before he or she can be dismissed. See notes 106-18 &
accompanying text supra.
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Education,3 5 the court upheld the revocation of Moser's teaching
credentials under section 13202 on the grounds of immorality.386 The

court distinguished Morrison, observing that in Morrison the
petitioner's behavior was private and noncriminal while in Moser it
was public and criminal. As a result the court left undisturbed the
essential holding of Sarac, namely, "that evidence of homosexual
behavior in a public place constitutes sufficient proof of unfitness for
service in the public school system.

'387

The Moser court ignored the

specific standards enumerated in Morrison as well as the admonition
that the criminality of the act was not to be the deciding factor in
3s
determining unfitness to teach.

8

The Morrison standard was once again circumvented by the
court in Purifoy v. State Board of Education.389 Purifoy argued that
section 13207 violated his due process rights because the provision for
mandatory revocation upon conviction of certain crimes conclusively
presumed that a person was unfit to teach, without evidence, notice or

a right to be heard.
In what appears to be a blatant misconstruction of Purifoy's
constitutional argument, the court concluded that Purifoy had his day

in court when he was convicted of the crime in question and,
therefore, was not deprived of his due process rights upon the
385. 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1972). Moser was not the first case to reach
the courts after the articulation of the Morrison standard. In Amundsen v. State Bd. of
Educ., Civ. No. 37942 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Dec. 17, 1971), an unpublished case, the
court held "that the Board could not revoke the credentials of a teacher convicted of a
crime based on a homosexual encounter without evidence relating that act to fitness to
teach." Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAw. 839, 849 (1974).
For a discussion of the problem of unpublished cases, see text accompanying note 28
supra; notes 516-28 & accompanying text infra. See also To Publish or Not To PublishThat is the Question, 2 SEX. L. REP. 18 (1976).
386. Moser was convicted of a homosexually related offense not covered by § 13207 and
hence his credentials were challenged under § 13202 for "immorality."
387. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
388. Another California case, contemporaneous with Moser, dealt with the revocation
of teaching credentials but did not involve a homosexual teacher. Consistent with the
Morrison decision, this case held that mere conviction of a crime without more, was not
proof of unfitness to teach. Comings v. State Bd.of Educ., 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal,
Rptr. 73 (1972). The Supreme Court of California refused to review either Moser or
Comings. This refusal may be a result of the fact that the complexion of the court had
changed. Two months after Morrison, Chief Justice Traynor, part of the Morrison
majority, retired. Thus the four-person Morrison majority became a three-person minority
who voted to hear Moser and Comings. See Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14
SANTA CLARA Law. 839,851 nn.88 & 89 (1974).
389. 30 Cal. App. 3d 187,106 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973).
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subsequent revocation of his credential. According to the court, proof
of unfitness required in Morrison was unnecessary in Purifoy because
section 13207 required only a conviction of a specified crime. The
court further noted that persons convicted of such crimes "constitute
a class which the Legislature identified as constituting a dangerous
element in the school community and which in its discretion it put
under appropriate controls." 39°
In 1973 the California Supreme Court decided Pettit v. State
Board of Education,391 apparently in an attempt to clarify the proper
standards to be applied with respect to revocation of teacher
credentials. The Board of Education sought to revoke Ms. Pettit's
teaching license under section 13202 on the grounds of
"immorality" 392 and was consequently required, under the Morrison
standard, to prove that her conduct rendered her unfit to teach. The
court upheld the revocation of Pettit's professional license,
distinguishing Morrison in three ways. First, it pointed out that
Morrison's behavior was not criminal while Pettit's was. Second,
while Morrison's behavior was private, the court considered Pettit's
behavior public. 393 Finally, the court found that the testimony of three
school administrators, suggesting that Pettit might attempt to inject
her unorthodox views of sexual morality into the classroom and
would be unable to act as a moral example for the children she
taught 394 constituted sufficient evidence of her unfitness to teach.
Justice Tobriner, author of the majority opinion in Morrison,
wrote a vigorous dissent. Not only did he criticize the apparent
disregard of the Morrison direction that a criminal conviction is not
ipso facto the basis for revocation, but he disagreed strongly with the
majority's characterization of Pettit's behavior as public. 395 Moreover,
Justice Tobriner questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of Pettit's
unfitness particularly since the three alleged experts only expressed
390. Id. at 197, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
391. 10 Cal. 3d 29,513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
392. Pettit did not involve homosexual conduct but rather heterosexual fellatio.
Moreover, Pettit was not convicted of the crime of oral copulation, which would have
brought her automatically under the mandatory revocation provision of § 13207, but was
convicted of conduct outrageous to public decency. For a review of all types of sexual
behavior that have been held to affect teachers, see Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 19 (1977).
393. The court's characterization of Pettit's conduct as "public" is arguable since the
conduct in question took place in a private home among consenting adults. The behavior
became known only as a result of police surveillance.
394. Pettit had been a teacher of the mentally retarded in an elementary school for 13
years. The dissent notes that throughout her career her competence had been
unquestioned. 10 Cal. 3d at 35, 513 P.2d at 893, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 669 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
395. See note 393 supra.
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their opinions, without presenting any reasons for their conclusions.396
Justice Tobriner pointed out that none of the experts knew
Pettit, "none considered her thirteen year record of competent
teaching; none could point to a single instance of past misconduct
with a student, nor articulate the nature of any possible future
misconduct. '397 The experts, according to Justice Tobriner, were
working under an unproven premise that plaintiff's behavior at the
"swingers" party in and of itself demonstrated she could not set a
good example to her students and that she was, therefore, unfit. Such
assumptions, he felt, were unsupported and invariably led to the
conclusion that proof of immoral conduct, whatever it may be, would
always justify revocation.3 98 The Morrison standard, which the court
in Pettit evidently chose to ignore, was designed 399
precisely to avoid
such arbitrary and discriminatory decision making.

In conclusion, Justice Tobriner suggested that "the majority
opinion is blind to the reality of sexual behavior. Its view that
teachers in their private lives should exemplify Victorian principles of
sexual morality and in the classroom should subliminally indoctrinate
' '4°°
the pupils in such principles is hopelessly unrealistic and atavistic.
401
The Pettit decision, which has been severely criticized, seems to
have removed some of the legal obstacles to the revocation of a
California teacher's license by seriously undermining the Morrison
standards. In fact, subsequent cases have upheld dismissals on the
grounds that the teachers in question had been accused of sex-related
crimes even though the charges had been dropped or, in one case, the
accused had been acquitted.
In Board of Education v. Calderon,402 Mr. Calderon, a male
homosexual teacher, challenged his dismissal by the school board,
contending that his acquittal of a sex-related offense 4 3 precluded the
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

10 Cal. 3d at 41-43, 513 P.2d at 898-99,109 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
Id. at 43, 513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44,513 P.2d at 899, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 675.

401. See Note, Unfitness to Teach: Credential Revocation & Dismissal for Sexual

Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1442 (1973); 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 404 (1974); 1973 Utah
Rev. 797.
402. 35 Cal. App. 3d 490,110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1973).
403. Calderon was accused of and acquitted of oral copulation with another man.
Caldeton was put on a compulsory leave of absence from his school while the criminal
issue was resolved and subsequent to his acquittal, was notified that he was being
dismissed. The trial court upheld his dismissal and found that the defendant had engaged
in oral copulation as charged by the schoolboard and that such behavior was depraved,
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Board from using that charge as a grounds for dismissal. The court
disagreed and asserted that under the Education Code the legislature
intended to permit school boards to shield children of tender years
from possible detrimental influence of teachers who commit the sex
offenses described in the Education Code "even though they are not
found guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt."' 4°4 The court cited Pettit for
the proposition that the risk of having Calderon in a classroom was
not that he might engage in the act again, but that he could not act as
an example for his pupils or teach them moral principles. 4 0 5
Moreover, the court reasoned that neither the Board's dismissal
of Calderon nor the resolution of the instant civil action was barred
by Calderon's prior acquittal in the criminal case. The different
degree of proof required in criminal and civil or administrative
of res judicata principles
actions effectively precluded application
40 6
with respect to Calderon's dismissal.
In Governing Board of Mountain View School District v.
Metcalf °7 the court similarly upheld the dismissal of a homosexual
408
teacher, despite court dismissal of the underlying criminal charge.
The school board dismissed Metcalf, concluding that the act of oral
copulation of which he had been accused was evidence of "immoral
conduct." Metcalf argued that the improperly obtained evidence
should have been excluded from the dismissal hearing. The court
observed that whether the exclusionary rule could be invoked in an
administrative hearing depended on the purpose of the statute
authorizing the hearing and determined that where the purpose of the
statute was to protect children the rule did not preclude admission of
such evidence. Citing Pettit, the court concluded that Metcalf's
conduct indicated "a serious defect of moral character, normal
prudence and good common sense" 40 9 and therefore evidenced an
unfitness to teach.410 Thus. the conduct itself, once labeled immoral,
established the unfitness to teach.
Such a facile application of the Morrison standard was
dissolute, corrupt, indecent, shameless, and hence constituted "immoral conduct." Id. at
493,110 CA. Rptr. at 918.
404. Id. at 496, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (emphasis added).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974).
408. Metcalf was charged with engaging in homosexual prostitution and, specifically, in
an act of oral copulation. However, evidence supporting that charge had been improperly
obtained and was excluded from the criminal proceeding, which was subsequently
dismissed.
409. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 55 1,111 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
410. Id.
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unequivocally rejected by the California Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Jack M.411 In that case, the school board sued a teacher,
who had been arrested for homosexual solicitation but never charged
with that offense in order to establish its right to discharge him from a
tenured position on the grounds of "immoral conduct" and "evident
unfitness for service. '412 The court concurred in the finding of the
lower court that this conduct did not demonstrate unfitness to teach.
Justice Tobriner, writing for the majority, pointed out with approval
that the trial court had framed its findings in terms of fitness to teach
and had examined the conduct against the standards suggested in
Morrison. The trial court found that the defendant's conduct had not
come to public attention, that he was not likely to repeat such
behavior, and that he did not present a threat to fellow teachers or
considered defendant's sixteen
students. Moreover, the trial court
413
year record of competent teaching.
Having determined that the trial court's findings were supported
by credible evidence, 414 the court considered the board's alternative
argument, namely that proof that the defendant committed a public
sexual offense demonstrates unfitness to teach per se. Justice
Tobriner pointed out that automatic dismissal by statute only applies
to persons convicted of a specified crime. He observed that Morrison
established the right of a person not so convicted to a fitness hearing
and that "proof of the commission of a criminal act does not alone
demonstrate the unfitness of a teacher, but is simply one of the factors
to be considered."' 415
In Jack M., the Supreme Court of California reaffirmed the
Morrison standard and emphasized that a California teacher should
not he dismissed nor lose his or her license under section 13202, even
where the person has engaged in unorthodox sexual conduct, unless
his or her unfitness to teach can be demonstrated. Consequently, the
requirement of a nexus between conduct and teaching fitness seems
well-established in California. Moreover, mandatory revocations of
411. 19 Cal. 3d 691,566 P.2d 602,139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
412. Id. at 694, 566 P.2d at 603,139 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
413. Id. at 694-96, 566 P.2d at 603-04, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
414. Although the Board of Education argued that defendant might be unable to fulfill
his duty to set an example and instruct students in good morals and that his act evidenced
a lack of judgment and discretion, Justice Tobriner disposed of these arguments by saying
that they were "really no more than disputable inferences which the trial court rejected in
favor of other inferences more favorable to defendant." Id. at 669, 566 P.2d at 606, 139
Cal. Rptr. 704.
415. Id. at702 n.6, 566 P.2d at 608,139 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
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credentials of homosexual teachers under section 13207 will probably
become less common now that California has decriminalized private
consensual adult sex .416
Decisions in other states, however, do not reveal equally
optimistic prospects for the homosexual teacher. 417 Acanfora v. Board
of Education,418 one of the first cases involving an admitted
homosexual that gained national attention, produced some impressive
rhetoric but in effect did little to advance the position of homosexual
teachers. Joseph Acanfora sought reinstatement to his position as a

junior high school teacher, after being transferred to an
administrative position with no student contact upon public disclosure

of his sexual preference. 419 While the district court observed that
"private, consenting adult homosexuality should enter the sphere of

constitutionally protectable interests," 420 and concluded that
discrimination among teachers on the basis of homosexuality was not
permissible,4 21 the court nevertheless found against Acanfora.
The court reasoned that the instruction of children carries with it
special responsibilities whether a teacher be heterosexual or
homosexual and that every teacher has to scrupulously keep private
his or her personal life. The court observed that since homosexuality
is a sensitive, emotion-laden subject, that tends to "breed
misunderstanding, alarm and anxiety, a sense of discretion and
self-restraint" must guide the homosexual teacher to "avoid speech or
activity likely to spark the added public controversy which detracts
416. 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1, 1976). Continued equitable treatment
of homosexual teachers in California was assured by the defeat of the Briggs Initiative in
the November 7, 1978 election. That measure would have amended the State constitution
to allow school boards to dismiss or refuse to hire school teachers, teacher's aides, school
administrators or counselors for "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or
promoting private or public sexual acts between persons of the same sex."
417. See also Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1963). In this case, the Supreme Court
of Florida reviewed the revocation of the teaching certificates of three Florida teachers,
two women and a man, who admitted to participation in homosexual activities. The court
set aside the revocations on procedural grounds because the board of education failed to
follow its own regulations with regard to revocation.
418. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
419. Joseph Acanfora, while in college, had joined a gay student organization and had
been an active participant. His "openness" caused his college, Penn State, to forward his
application for a teaching certificate to the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education without a
favorable recommendation. While his Pennsylvania certification was pending, Acanfora
was hired as a junior high school science teacher in Maryland by the Board of Education
of Montgomery County. After the Maryland school year had begun, the Pennsylvania
Secretary of Education called a widely publicized press conference and announced that
Acanfora would indeed be given his Pennsylvania certificate.
420. 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973).
421. Id. at 856.
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from the educational process. '422 The court concluded that Acanfora
had failed to exercise such discretion by making "repeated,
unnecessary appearances on local and especially national news
media." 423
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit overruled portions of the lower
court's opinion, holding that Acanfora's public statements were
protected by the first amendment, 424 but found against Acanfora on
the question of his reinstatement. The court concluded that Acanfora
could not prevail on appeal because he had deliberately omitted his
membership in the gay student group from his Maryland job
application. Because the Maryland school officials would not have
hired Acanfora had they known about his membership, the court
concluded that he had obtained his position through fraud and could
not "now invoke the process of the court to obtain a ruling on an
issue that he practiced deception to avoid." 4z5
A year later, a lesbian school teacher won what one
commentator terms a "Pyrrhic victory. ' 426 In Burton v. Cascade
School District Union High School No. 5,427 Peggy Burton won her
battle when the court found the statute under which she was fired
unconstitutionally vague, but she lost the war when the court refused
to reinstate her. Ms. Burton's contract was terminated on the grounds
of "immorality" after she acknowledged that she was a practicing
homosexual. The district court found the relevant statute void for
vagueness, noting that "immorality means different things to different
people and its definition depends on the idiosyncracies of the
individual school board member." 428 However, the court only
awarded monetary damages and refused to reinstate Burton to her
teaching position. 429
The issue of reinstatement was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.430
422. Id.
423. Id. Subsequent to the initiation of the suit, Acanfora became an object of media
interest and appeared on several local and national radio and television shows to discuss
his case.
424. 491 F.2d at 501.
425. Id. at 504. The court felt Acanfora had "bootstrapped" himself into the issue and
thus lost standing to raise the constitutional issue. See 48 TEMPLE L.J. 384 (1975).
426. Comment, Remedial BalancingDecisions and the Rights of Homosexual Teachers:
A PyrrhicVictory, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1080 (1976).
427. 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), affd, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975).
428. Id. at 255.
429. See 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 781 (1976).
430. 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denie, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
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Although the court ultimately upheld the lower court's remedy, it
nevertheless recognized the difficulty of balancing Burton's interest in
completing her wrongfully terminated contract against the competing
interest in avoiding the disruption which her reinstatement would
inevitably cause. 431 Burton argued that a similar antagonism would
arise if she were fired because of race or religion and subsequently
reinstated. The court refused to equate being fired for homosexuality
with a dismissal in violation of other constitutional rights and
concluded that "the nature of the constitutional right sought to be
vindicated is not such as to compel reinstatement frequently ordered
in response to racially motivated dismissals, or to those aimed at
punishing the exercise of free speech. ' 432 The dissenting judge
considered reinstatement proper, noting that "if community
resentment was a legitimate factor to'433consider, few Southern school
districts would have been integrated.
Many such constitutional issues remain unresolved as a result of
the Supreme Court's failure to grant certiorari in Gaylord v. Tacoma
School District No. 10.434 James Gaylord had been a high school
teacher for twelve years and had received excellent evaluations on all
occasions. When a student reported to a vice-principal that he
thought Gaylord was a homosexual person, Gaylord admitted his
homosexuality. The Tacoma School Board discharged Gaylord for
"immorality," an enumerated ground for dismissal under Washington
law and Gaylord sued.
On appeal from the second of two lower court decisions, 435 the
Washington Supreme court first reviewed the trial court's findings
that Gaylord "admitted his status as a homosexual" and therefore
"from appellant's own testimony it is unquestioned that homosexual
acts were participated in by him, although there was no evidence of
any overt act having been committed. '436 Applying general principles
of evidence and construction, the supreme court held that in
interpreting Gaylord's admission that he was a homosexual person,
437
"the construction must be adopted which is least favorable to him.'
The least favorable construction in the court's estimation was to
431. Id. at 853.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 855 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
434. 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
435. The trial court's first decision was remanded by the Washington Supreme Court in
Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 85 Wash. 2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975) because
the trial court had improperly applied the statutory burden of proof by giving special
emphasis to the testimony of school officials.
436. 88 Wash. 2d at 294,559 P.2d at 1344.
437. Id.
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consider him an overt, practicing homosexual person. The court noted
that Gaylord had the opportunity "to explain that he was not an overt
homosexual and did not engage in the conduct the court ascribed to
438
him."
Next, the court concluded that "homosexuality is widely
condemned as immoral and was so condemned as immoral during
biblical times. 439 The court assumed that Gaylord knew
homosexuality had "serious consequences" because he had kept his
own sexual preference secret from his parents and that Gaylord felt
comfortable with his homosexuality because he apparently desired no
change. Consequently, the court concluded that Gaylord "made a
voluntary choice for which he must be held morally responsible.' 440
Having decided that Gaylord was an overtly homosexual person,
that homosexuality was immoral, and that Gaylord had chosen this
immoral conduct voluntarily, the court turned to the issue of whether
Gaylord's performance as a teacher was impaired. The lower court
found that while Gaylord's status as a homosexual person was
unknown, his efficiency was not affected; but that when this fact was
publicly disclosed, his efficiency was impaired. Although the school
board had been responsible for making that disclosure, the supreme
court said Gaylord had taken the risk of public disclosure by seeking
out homosexual company. As evidence that Gaylord's ability to teach
would be impaired, the court relied on the testimony of three fellow
teachers and one student who objected to Gaylord remaining on the
staff. In addition, the principal, vice-principal, and retired
superintendent all testified that Gaylord's continued presence would
create problems. Last, but hardly least, the court concluded that if
Gaylord were retained it would indicate adult approval of
homosexuality. Moreover, the court felt that if Gaylord were
retained, his ability to teach principles of morality to his students
would be impaired. 441
The dissent took issue with the majority on all points, contending
that Gaylord was discharged because of his status not his conduct and
that the Board had failed to prove that Gaylord's performance as a
teacher was impaired. Noting that much of the testimony was purely
speculative, the dissent argued that "[m]ere speculation coupled with
438. Id.
439. Id. at 295, 559 P.2d at 1345. The court referred to Jewish and Catholic
encyclopedias among others as authority for this conclusion.
440. Id. at 296, 559 P.2d at 1346.
441. Id. at 298, 559 P.2d at 1347.
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status alone is not enough to establish a detrimental effect upon
Gaylord's teaching ability." 442
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 443 in Gaylord leaves
standing the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, a decision
which arguably gives school boards carte blanche to fire homosexual
teachers on the basis of status alone.444 Certiorari also was denied on
the same day in Gish v. Board of Education.445 Gish was a New Jersey
high school teacher of seven years when he assumed the presidency of
the New Jersey Gay Alliance (N.J.G.A.). Shortly thereafter the board
of education adopted a resolution directing Gish to undergo a
psychiatric examination pursuant to a New Jersey statute which
allows such a direction whenever "an employee shows evidence of
deviation from normal physical or mental health." 446 While the board
purported not to question Gish's right to participate in the N.J.G.A.,
it nevertheless determined that Gish's activities displayed evidence of
deviation from normal mental health that might affect his ability to
teach and, therefore, directed him to be examined. The New Jersey
Superior Court upheld the board's right to order such an
examination, saying the board's determination was fair and
reasonable and was the logical decision of reasonable and fair-minded
men who had evaluated Gish's behavior and who were concerned
with his fitness as a teacher.447 On the other hand, the448court felt that
the examination required nothing of Gish but his time.
The refusal of the Supreme Court to review these two decisions
has given state school administrators unfettered power 49 over gay
teachers.
Family Issues
VIII.

Marriage

At the present time, the ability to marry is regulated by the state.
Once validated, the marriage relationship confers upon its
442. Id. at 305, 559 P.2d at 1350.
443. 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977).
444. See 53 WASH. L. REv.. 499 (1978); 14 WILLAMETrE L.J. 101 (1977).
445. 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (1976), petition for certificationdenied, 74 N.J.
251, 377 A.2d 658, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 233 (1977).
446. Id. at 99, 366 A.2d at 1339.
447. Id. at 105, 366 A.2d at 1342.
448. At last report the school board had transferred Gish to an administrative position
with a $4,000 annual raise. The Advocate, Feb. 8. 1978, at 11.
449. This power is somewhat more restricted with respect to university professors. See
Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977), discussed at text
accompanying notes 832-38 infra.
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participants preferential tax treatment, a right of action with regard to
a fatal accident of the spouse, social security benefits, and the
protection of the law of intestate succession. Moreover, the married
couple benefits from innumerable nongovernmental benefits such as
employee family health care, group insurance, lower automobile
insurance, family memberships in various organizations, and the
ability to hold real estate by the entirety. Beyond these legal and
economic benefits, marriage is generally viewed as psychologically
beneficial to the participants by strengthening the stability, emotional
health, and societal respectability of the relationship.450
Given the legal, economic, and psychological benefits of
marriage, it is not surprising that homosexual couples who live in
committed relationships would also wish to procure these benefits. A
number of homosexual couples have tried to effectuate a legal
marriage but to date no court has recognized such a union.451
to
In Baker v. Nelson452 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused 453
allow the marriage of Richard Baker and James McConnell,
concluding that the Minnesota statute governing marriage did not
authorize same-sex marriages. Although the Minnesota statute did
the term
not specify the sex of the parties, the court decided that
454
marriage was to be construed according to common usage.
450. For an excellent discussion of the societal purposes of legally recognized
marriages, see Veitch, The Essence of Marriage-A Comment on the Homosexual
Challenge,5 Anglo-Am. L. REV. 41 (1976).
451. This section will not deal with the validity of marriage of transsexuals. For
discussions of this subject, see M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982,325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 197 1); Corbett v.
Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (P. Div'l Ct.); Comment, The Law and Transsexualism:A
Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1974); 8 AKRON L.
REV. 369 (1975).
452. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
453. McConnell sued the University of Minnesota in McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F.
Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046
(1972), for refusing to hire him as a librarian. It was this attempted marriage with Baker
which prompted the University of Minnesota's refusal to hire McConnell. See text
accompanying notes 156-68 supra for a discussion of McConnelL
454. The court referred to Webster's Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary to
determine the meaning of the term "marriage." 291 Minn. at 311 n.1, 191 N.W.2d at 186.
Webster's defines marriage as "the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as
husband or wife." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1384 (1966).

Black's provides the following definition: "Marriage... is the civil status, condition, or
relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, for the discharge to each other
and the community of the duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded
on the distinction of sex." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th ed. 1951).
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The two men argued that such an interpretation was
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection because restricting
marriage to opposite sex couples was an irrational and invidious
discrimination that infringed upon their fundamental right to marry.
While the court did not deny that marriage was a fundamental right, it
rejected the contention that the state's classification of persons
authorized to marry was irrational. The court characterized the
institution of marriage "as a union of man and woman, uniquely
involving the procreation and rearing of children. '455 When the gay
men pointed out that some heterosexual couples often do not want or
cannot have children but are nevertheless permitted to marry, the
court observed that the classification by the state of who may or may
not marry is "no more than theoretically imperfect" and that
"abstract symmetry is not demanded by the Fourteenth
456
Amendment."
The court also rejected the analogy to Loving v. Virginia,457 in
which the Supreme Court overturned an antimiscegenation statute.
The court in Baker found there to be a clear commonsense, as well as
constitutional, distinction between a restriction based on race and one
458
based on sex.
While their appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court was
pending, Jack Baker and Jim McConnell received a marriage license
from a Minnesota court clerk and were married by a minister. Baker
then applied, by virtue of his veteran's status, for an increase in
benefits for his dependent spouse. When the Veterans'
Administration denied the claim on the grounds that McConnell was
not his spouse, Baker and McConnell sued. In McConnell v.
Nooner,459 the court of appeals upheld the decision of the Veterans'
Administration on the grounds that, pursuant to regulations of the
Veterans' Administration, 460 the validity of a veteran's marriage is
determined in accordance with the law of the state where the veteran
resides.
In Jones v. Hallahan,461 two lesbians sued the county clerk to

455. 291 Minn. at 312, 191 N.W.2d at 186. This procreational model of sexual love has
been challenged. See Richards, supra note 25, at 978-81, wherein the author argues that
rejection of the procreational model was the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
456. Id. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
457. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
458. 291 Minn. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
459. 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976).
460. 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1970).
461. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
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compel the issuance of a marriage license. 462 The women claimed that
they were deprived of their constitutional right to marry, to associate,
and to freely exercise their religion.
Like Minnesota's statute, the Kentucky statute neither specified

the sex of those eligible for marriage nor defined marriage. The
Kentucky court, like the Minnesota court in Baker, resorted to the

popular definition of marriage 463 and took judicial notice of the fact

that "marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to
issue licenses. ' '464 The court decided that the women were not

prevented from marrying by the statute of Kentucky, but "rather by
their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined.' '465 Citing with approval Baker v. Nelson, the court concluded
that the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not impinge upon any
constitutionally-protected interests, including the guarantee of
religious freedom under the first amendment. The court cited
Reynolds v. United States,466 which sanctioned the prohibition of
polygamy, for the proposition that the interest in the free exercise of

religious beliefs can be outweighed by the greater interest in an
orderly society.
A more comprehensive discussion of the constitutional
implication of prohibitions against homosexual marriage is found in
Singer v. Hara,467 in which two homosexual men sued to compel

issuance of a marriage license. 468 The petitioners claimed that the

statutes of the State of Washington did not prohibit same-sex
marriages; but that if such a prohibition did exist, it violated the
Washington State Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as well as the
462. A similar action was dismissed by the court in Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626
(E.D. Wisc. 1972), because plaintiffs had failed to submit an answering brief in response to
defendant's supporting brief. The court said that the absence of plaintiffs' memorandum
would require the court "to speculate on the plaintiffs' arguments in this relatively novel
area of the law." Id. at 626.
463. The court referred to Webster's New InternationalDictionary, Century Dictionary
& Encyclopedia and Black's Law Dictionary.501 S.W.2d at 589.
464. Id.
465. Id. (emphasis added).
466. 98 U.S. 145 (1978).
467. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). For a similar case arising in a Canadian
court, see Re North and Matheson, 52 D.L.R.3d 280 (1974).
468. John Singer, one of the two plaintiffs in this case, was the plaintiff in Singer v.
United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 1034
(1977). Singer's attempted marriage helped spark the controversy which resulted in his
being fired by the EEOC. See notes 13448 & accompanying text supra for a discussion of
Singer.
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 469 The court
summarily dismissed the petitioners' first argument, concluding that
"it is apparent from a plain reading of our marriage statutes that the
legislature has not authorized same-sex marriages." 470
The impact of the newly enacted state ERA was not clear. The
petitioners argued that a law that permits a man to marry a woman
but will not permit him to marry a man creates a classification based
on sex and, therefore, is impermissible under the ERA. The
petitioners further claimed that the fact that marriage licenses are
denied equally to both male and female couples does not cure the
discrimination. They observed that a similar argument was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia,471 namely, that
antimiscegenation statutes did not violate constitutional prohibitions
against racial classification because the statutes affected both racial
groups equally.472 The court concluded that the two cases were not
analogous. Unlike the parties in Loving, who were barred from
marrying because of an impermissible racial classification, the
petitioners in Singer were not being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of their sex but because, by definition, that
relationship can only be entered into by persons of opposing sex .473
The court noted a generally recognized exception to an
"absolute" interpretation of the ERA where differentiation between
sexes is based on unique physical characteristics of a particular sex
rather than upon a person's membership in a particular sex. Thus,
since the fundamental reason that the state refuses to recognize
same-sex marriages is founded upon "unique physical characteristics
of the sexes," namely, the "impossibility of reproduction," 474 that
classification falls within the exception to the strict interpretation of
the ERA and is not unconstitutional. 475
The court similarly rejected the petitioners' argument that
prohibition of same-sex marriages constituted a denial of equal
protection. First, the court concluded that it was not compelled to
469. 11 Wash. App. at 248,522 P.2d at 1188-89.
470. Id. at 249, 522 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added). The meaning of the statute is not
quite as "plain" as the court would like to convey. A 1970 amendment to the statute
substituted the word "persons" for men and women. Although this change is subject to
several interpretations, the court concluded that the revision was implemented solely to
eliminate the different age requirements for the respective sexes.
471. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
472. 11 Wash. App. at 252-53,522 P.2d at 1191.
473. Id. at 254-55, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
474. Id. at 260, 522 P.2d at 1194-95.
475. Id. For a different conclusion, see Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage,82
YALE L. J. 573 (1973).
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apply strict scrutiny to this classification because neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right was involved. While the court
admitted that a classification based on sex may be inherently suspect,
the court nevertheless reiterated its conclusion that the prohibition
against same-sex marriages does not discriminate on the basis of sex
but is a logical consequence of the commonly understood nature of
the marriage relationship. 476 In addition, the court summarily rejected
the petitioners' alternative argument that homosexuals constituted a
suspect class .477
The court's reasoning with respect to the second ground for
applying strict scrutiny is less clear. While recognizing that marriage is
a fundamental right, the court evidently defined that right narrowly to
478
exclude same-sex marriages.
After determining that strict scrutiny was not required, the court
used the less exacting "rational basis" standard. The court concluded
that the public interest in affording a favorable environment for the
growth of children constituted "a rational basis for the state to limit
the definition of marriage to exclude same-sex relationsips." 479
Until legislatures change the statutory definition of marriage or
until the courts recognize that prohibition against same-sex marriages
violates constitutionally protected interests, two homosexual
individuals cannot marry one another. However, as long as financial
and legal benefits accrue to heterosexual marital units, it seems likely
that many homosexual family units will continue to seek legal
recognition through marriage480 or will pressure legislatures to create
another new status with the same legal and financial benefits.
IX. Divorce
A large number of homosexual persons enter into traditional
481 Some of
heterosexual marriages despite their sexual preference.
476. 11 Wash. App. at 862,522 P.2d at 1196.
477. Id. For petitioner's argument that homosexuals constitute a suspect class, see id. at
262 n.12, 522 P.2d at 1196. See also Chaitin & Lefcourt, Is Gay Suspect?, 8 LINCOLN L.
REV.24 (1973).
478. 11 Wash. App. at 260,522 P.2d at 1195.
479. Id. at 247, 522 P.2d at 1197. The court admitted that married persons are not
required to have children and conceded that it was within the power of the legislature to
change the definition of marriage without harm to the Constitution.
480. One lesbian couple was jailed for staging a sit-in demonstration at the office of the
county clerk when the license bureau denied them a marriage license. Lesbian
Connection, Sept. 1977, at 8.
481. Here, as elsewhere, the definition of homosexuality becomes confusing. Many
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these marriages survive until the death of one of the spouses; others
end in divorce. Whether or not the homosexuality of one of the
partners is the actual reason for the divorce, it is highly likely that the
48
issue of homosexuality will not be mentioned in the pleadings. 2
Because few divorces involve homosexuality and few divorce cases
are appealed, there are few published cases dealing with
homosexuality as grounds for divorce.483 In states that have limited
grounds for divorce the element of homosexuality has caused
problems of characterizations.
The earliest reported divorce proceeding in which homosexuality
clearly was the issue 48m is Poler v. Poler.485 Although the court of
appeals conceded that sodomy was not among the enumerated
grounds for divorce, and despite the fact that it was not clear whether
sodomy should be considered adultery or cruelty, or even an
independent ground,486 the court nevertheless upheld the decree
awarded on that ground. The court noted that the divorce statute
persons who have had a single or limited homosexual experience undoubtedly enter into
heterosexual marriages. For example, according to Kinsey 37% of all males after puberty
have had a homosexual contact to orgasm. A. Karlen, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY
444 (1971). Probably the heterosexual drive of these persons is stronger than their
homosexual drive. However, given societal pressures, it is fair to assume that many
persons who are predominantly homosexual marry. It may be a marriage of convenience
where the other party willingly provides a "cover." More likely the predominantly
homosexual individual marries because he or she really has not faced up to his or her
sexual preference or, perhaps, because he or she thinks marriage will effect a "cure." The
actual number of such persons is impossible to estimate. In Tearoom Trade, a sociological
study of male homosexual sex in public restrooms, Humphreys found that 54% of his
subjects were married men currently living with their wives. L. HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM
TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC PLACES 105 (1970).
482. There are a variety of reasons why homosexuality will not be mentioned in the
pleadings. The homosexual spouse may have hidden his or her preference completely. On
the other hand the nonhomosexual spouse may not wish to stigmatize his or her ex-spouse
or may not wish the homosexuality of his or her spouse to become a matter of public
record. Given the existence of such broad grounds for divorce as "mental cruelty", the
subject often can be avoided.
483. In 1960, there were 393,000 divorces and annulments in the United States. In 1970,
there were 708,000 and in 1975, there were 1,026,000. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC,
ATLAS, AND YEARBOOK 707, 712 (31st ed. 1977). Divorces are generally heard in lower
courts with the judge acting as the finder of fact. In divorce and custody cases, "the facts"
rather than "the law" often decide the case. Appellate courts pay great deference to the
judge's findings of fact. As most domestic relations lawyers know, trial judges are seldom
reversed.
484. There are other divorce cases, earlier in time, which deal with sodomy with
animals and other acts characterized as "unnatural." This section only deals with divorce
proceedings in which sexual acts between persons of the same sex are at issue. See
generally Annot,, 79 A.L.R.2d 807 (1961).
485. 32 Wash. 400,73 P. 372 (1908).
486. Id. at 402, 73 P. at 373.
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allowed a court to grant a divorce for any other cause deemed
sufficient and that sodomy had been regarded, at common law and in
the ecclesiastical courts, as a ground for divorce.
In Crutcher v. Crutcher,487 the Mississippi Supreme Court
decided that pederasty, 488 like sodomy, should be classified as "cruel
and inhuman" treatment and consequently within the statutory
grounds for divorce. The court observed that "unnatural practices of
the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and...
would make the marriage relation... revolting." 489
A Florida court in Currie v. Currie490 also found that the
homosexual conduct of the husband was one of several factors that
together constituted extreme cruelty to the wife and thus provided
grounds for divorce. In this case, the husband not only had refused to
have sexual relations with his wife for over five years but also took a
young man into their home with whom he491"gave expression to
unnatural love.., even before his wife's eyes."
While some courts were willing to consider homosexuality as
"extreme cruelty," others adhered to a more literal approach. In
Cohen v. Cohen,492 the wife sued for divorce based on sodomy even
though, at that time, the only ground for divorce under the applicable
New York statute was adultery. As a part of her proof the wife
provided the court with the record of her husband's conviction for
that crime. While the court's sympathies were clearly with the wife,
because sodomy did not
the court refused to grant the divorce 493
constitute adultery as defined by the court.
Another court avoided a similar problem of statutory
construction in Santos v. Santos.494 The court rejected "gross
misbehavior and wickedness" as grounds for divorce but nevertheless
declared the marriage void from its inception. On the day of their
marriage, the wife refused to have "normal sexual intercourse" with

487. 86 Miss. 231, 38 So. 337 (1905).
488. "[Piederasty: Homosexual anal intercourse between men and boys as the passive
partners. The term is used less precisely to denote male homosexual anal intercourse."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, A PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 115 (4th ed. 1975).

489. 86 Miss. at 235, 38 So. at 337.
490. 120 Fla. 28, 162 So. 152 (1935).
491. Id. at 34,162 So. at 154.
492. 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
493. The court defined adultery as "sexual intercourse of two persons, either of whom is
married to a third person." Id. at 19-20, 103 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
494. 80 R.I. 5, 90 A.2d 771 (1952).
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'495
her husband and instead wanted only "unnatural intercourse.
left to live with a girl friend of
Three days later, the wife
"questionable reputation. '496 According to the court, this behavior
clearly indicated that the wife had fraudulently concealed her tastes
and intentions. Although the trial court considered this behavior

analogous to adultery, it did not give a divorce on those grounds

because the husband had failed to meet the requisite burden of proof.
More recently courts have considered the homosexuality of one
spouse as part of a pattern of conduct, sufficient to constitute grounds
for divorce. 497 In A.B. v. C.D.498 the court awarded a divorce to the
husband on the ground of indignities. Evidence showed that the

husband returned home one day and found his wife and her woman
friend engaged in an act of sodomy. 499 In granting the divorce, the
court observed that one act of sodomy alone was insufficient to
establish grounds for divorce, a continuous course of conduct was
required. The court found the requisite course of conduct in the fact
that the wife had left home to live with her woman friend.
In H. v. H.,500 a husband was similarly granted a divorce on the
ground of "extreme cruelty. ' 501 The wife had maintained an active
homosexual relationship and eventually began living with her female
lover. In granting the divorce, the court spoke harshly about
lesbianism.
It is difficult to conceive of a more grievous indignity to which a
person of normal psychological and sexual constitution could be
exposed than the entry by his spouse upon an active and continuous
495. Id. at 7, 90 A.2d at 772.
496. Id.
497. The opinion in Gilmore v. Gilmore, 45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955), suggests
that the alleged homosexual conduct of the wife was not the determining factor. While the
exact nature of the sexual conduct is not really clear, it appears that the wife and another
woman engaged in sexual conduct in the presence of the husband, apparently with his
approval. Because the husband also was sexually active outside the marriage, the trial
court concluded that the parties were in pari delicto with respect to sexual matters. Id. at
149, 287 P.2d at 773. The fact that the husband was nevertheless granted a divorce on the
grounds of "extreme cruelty" suggests that the court must have considered factors other
than the wife's homosexuality.
498. 74 Pa. D. & C. 83 (1950).
499. In most jurisdictions sodomy laws apply to homosexual acts by persons of either
sex. But see Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939) (crime of sodomy as
defined by Georgia statute cannot be accomplished by two women); Comment,
ConstitutionalProtection of Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another
Look At Sodomy Statutes, 62 IOwA L. REv. 568, 568 n.6 (1976).
500. 59 N.J. Super. 227, 157 A.2d 721 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
501. The husband also received custody of the two children. Id. at 232, 157 A.2d at 727.
For a discussion of custody cases in which one parent is a homosexual person, see section
on custody at text accompanying notes 513-631 infra.
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course of homosexual love with another. Added to the insult of
sexual disloyalty per se (which is present in ordinary adultery) is the
natural revulsion arising from knowledge of the fact that the
spouse's betrayal takes the form of a perversion....
... Few behavioral deviations are more offensive to American
mores than is homosexuality. Common sense and modem
psychiatric knowledge concur as to the incompatibility of
homosexuality and the subsistence
of marriage between one so
5°2
afflicted and a normal person.
In Richardson v. Richardson,50 3 a wife sought divorce on the
grounds of "constructive desertion" claiming that she had to leave
home because of her husband's alleged homosexuality. While the
court indicated that "a pattern of homosexual activity on the part of
one spouse could be so demeaning to the self-respect of the other that
the latter would be justified in leaving the household, ' '5°4 the court
refused to grant the divorce because there was not sufficient evidence
of such activity. 0 5
The issue of divorce on the grounds of homosexuality was
similarly disposed of on a point of evidence in Luley v. Luley, 50 6 in
which the wife sought divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman
treatment because her husband was a "sexual pervert." 5 7 As
corroboration of his propensities, the trial court allowed the wife to
introduce evidence of an attempted homosexual act that allegedly
took place five years prior to their marriage. The court of appeals
50 8
concluded that the admission of such evidence was prejudicial error
and vacated the decree awarded by the trial court.
Admission of evidence in support of the homosexual spouse was
uphe Feuti v. Feuti.5° 9 When the wife filed for divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty and neglect, the husband cross-petitioned for
divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and gross misbehavior. The
wife's alleged gross misbehavior was an "illicit sexual relation" with

502. Id. at 236-37, 157 A.2d at 726-27.
503. 17 Md. App. 665,304 A.2d 1 (1973).
504. Id. at 670,304 A.2d at 5.
505. Id. at 671,304 A.2d at 5.
506. 234 Minn. 324,48 N.W.2d 328 (1951).
507. She claimed that during their marriage he had made "improper" requests for
masturbation and fellatio. Id. at 325,48 N.W.2d at 329.
508. The court observed, "It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt on the ground
that, having committed one wrongful act, the depravity it exhibits makes it likely he would
commit another." Id. at 326, 48 N.W.2d at 329.
509. 92 R.I. 219,167 A.2d 757 (1961).
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"Miss R."510 The trial court granted Mrs. Feuti the divorce and denied
Mr. Feuti's cross-petition. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed
concluding that the trial court's admission of the testimony of certain
witnesses that they had "observed nothing immoral" in Mrs. Feuti's
relationship with Miss R.511 was not an abuse of discretion.
While neither homosexuality, lesbianism, nor sodomy seems to
be grounds for divorce in and of itself, most courts are willing to
consider homosexual behavior as part of a pattern of cruelty or
misconduct and thus as adequate grounds for divorce.512 This
approach often leads to arbitrary results as courts attempt to
conceptualize homosexuality in terms of the traditional statutory
grounds for divorce. If the courts instead objectively examined the
alleged misconduct and its effect upon the marriage relationship,
wholly apart from whether the misconduct involved homosexual or
heterosexual activity, the results would presumably reflect more
rational adjudicating.
X. Custody
The exact number of children who have homosexual parents is
unknown. However, an approximation of that figure is possible.
Various experts estimate that there are between eight million and
sixteen million lesbian women inthe United States 513 and that among
these women, 1.5 million to 5 million may be mothers. 5 4 Assuming

each mother has an average of two children and assuming, according
to the most conservative estimate, that 1.5 million lesbian women are
mothers, approximately three million children may have lesbian
mothers. There are fewer estimates on the number of gay fathers.
Since gay men are presumed to outnumber gay women significantly,
510. Id. at 221, 167 A.2d at 758.
511. Id. at 222, 167 A.2d at 759.
512. In Towend v. Towend, No. 639 (Ohio Ct. C.P., Portage County 1975), which is
discussed with the custody cases at notes 621-28 & accompanying text infra, the court
granted the husband a divorce from his lesbian wife on the grounds of extreme cruelty. Of
course, in the new no-fault divorce states such issues are largely irrelevant. Traditional
"faults" may nevertheless play an important part in property, alimony, and custody
decisions. See Kretzschmar v. Kretzschmar, 48 Mich. App. 279, 210 N.W.2d 352 (1973).
See section on Custody at text accompanying notes 513- 631 infra.
513. D. ROSEN, LESBIANISM-A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALrrY 63 (1974); Trial Brief
for Plaintiff at 1, Stamper v. Stamper, No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County
1975).
514. Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and
Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 691 (1976); Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Stamper
v. Stamper, No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County 1975); see Law Note, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A ConstitutionalChallenge that
Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799,820 (1975).
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515
there may well be a comparable number of children of gay men.
Obviously, not all of these children are the subjects of custody
battles. First, some homosexual parents stay married until their
children are no longer minors. Second, some parents split amicably
and work out custody arrangements without any discussion of the
homosexuality of one or both of the spouses. Some of these parents
may hide their sexual preference from their former spouse so that
homosexuality never becomes an issue. Finally, there are other
homosexual parents whose former spouse has disappeared, died, or in
the case of an illegitimate birth, never participated in the childrearing
process. Therefore, millions of homosexual parents are raising their
children without any state intervention. Other parents have not been
so fortunate.
Gathering material on how homosexual parents fare before the
courts in custody battles is extremely difficult. All the methodological16
problems previously discussed with respect to gay issues in general
are present to an even greater extent with respect to child custody
cases. A commentator notes that "few cases are reported where the
mother's lesbianism is an issue, and even where reported, the factual
bases of the decisions are often omitted or truncated. '517 For example
in Spence v. Durham,518 the majority opinion never mentions the
a
parent's homosexuality, but indicates that it will not discuss' '519

situation that "was beyond the pale of the most permissive society.

the fact that the mother allegedly engaged
Only the dissent discloses
520
in homosexual activity.
Another commentator suggests, "The statement of facts found in
the cases may be misleading in that they are conservatively drawn in
deference to the privacy of the parties and the sensibilities of the
v.
public. '521 For example, the only published decision in O'Harra523
O'Harra22 is the brief opinion of the Court of Appeals of Oregon,
515. Gay men make up approximately 13.95% of the male population. Letter from Paul
H. Gebhard, Institute of Sex Research, Inc. (Mar. 18, 1977).
516. See notes 26-29 & accompanying text supra.
517. Harris, Lesbian Mother Child Custody: Legal and Psychiatric Aspects, V BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCH. AND L. 75 (1977).
518. 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973).
519. Id. at 678, 198 S.E.2d at 541.
520. Id. at 698, 198 S.E.2d at 552.
521. Lauerman, Non-Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. REv..
647,649 (1977).
522. No. 73-384E (Or. Cir. Ct. 13th Jud. Dist. June 18, 1974), affd, 530 P.2d 877 (Or.
App. 1975), reported in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 24 (1974).
523. In re 0 and 0,20 Or. App. 201, 530 P.2d 877 (1975).
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affirming the lower court's decision: "We have examined the record
in this case and are satisfied that the trial court made the correct

decision. Because there is a potential for harm to persons involved,
we conclude that no useful purpose would be served in publishing a
detailed opinion." 524
Many cases are not published at all.525 As one author observed:
"[T]he issue is rarely mentioned above the level of a whisper, and the
few cases that reach the appellate level are526almost always ordered
excluded from official and unofficial reports.

Not only are appellate cases often unpublished, but trial court
records are often sealed. In fact a Michigan circuit judge, in a recent
article, recommended this procedure.52 7 These judicial practices
create a dearth of precedent in the area, obscuring judicial

discrimination against gay parents and depriving attorneys and
52
scholars of valuable and needed materials.
Suits in which gay parents fight to keep their children have been
524. Id. at 202, 530 P.2d at 877. Similarly, in Spence v Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d
537 (1973), in which a mother successfully obtained custody of her children, the majority
opinion does not refer to the mother's alleged homosexuality. The court apparently felt
that the mother had "reformed" and that "[t]o perpetuate this evidence ... would perhaps
put a stumbling block in the way of [the] mother's continued restoration." Id. at 678, 198
S.E.2d at 541. Only the dissent alludes to the fact that the mother had perhaps engaged in
homosexual behavior. The dissent felt that the children should be left with their
grandparents to guard them "against the then clear and present danger of corrupt moral
teaching, by example, by the mother and her chosen associates." Id. at 693, 198 S.E.2d at
549. In this case, it is extremely unclear whether the mother in fact was a homosexual
person in any sense of the word. However, it is apparent that at the time of the case she
had established a lifestyle that seemed to include no erotic or emotional attachments with
either sex and thus won the court's approval.
525. The nonpublication issue is so real and so controversial that noted scholar Herma
Hill Kay, in her extremely well-regarded text, K. DAVISON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY,
SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION (1975), discusses unreported lesbian mother cases. Professor
Kay applies the California standards with respect to certification for nonpublication to
determine whether many of the child custody cases were properly denied publication. Id.
at 275.
526. Armanno, The Lesbian Mother: Her Right to Child Custody, 4 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 1, 5 (1973).
527. Campbell, Child Custody: When One ParentIs Homosexual, 17 Judges' J.,
No. 2, at
52 (1978).
528. For example, in O'Harra v. O'Harra, No. 73-384E (Or. Cir. Ct. 13th Jud. Dist.
June 18, 1974), affd, 530 P.2d 877 (Or. App, 1975), an Oregon court awarded the custody
of three boys to their father and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the
court did not spell out the basis of its decision, the mother's lesbianism was apparently at
issue. Even though the trial was long and the appellate argument extensive, the court
refused to publish a detailed opinion which might have provided guidance to subsequent
litigants and their attorneys. Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal
Theory and LitigationStrategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691,696 n.21 (1976).
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few in number until quite recently. The great majority of cases have
occurred in the last five years. The reason for the increase in cases can
be attributed to a number of factors. First, a gay parent often
refrained from contesting custody for fear that his or her spouse
might reveal his or her sexual preference to parents, employer, and
friends. Second, when gay parents sued for custody, they generally
lost. Losing the fight over custody often meant losing their jobs as
well and, consequently, the financial wherewithal to continue the
legal battle. The recent upsurge in the number of cases is probably
caused by a growing pride on the part of most gay parents and a
growing support system to help them fight for the custody of their
52 9
children.
Disputes concerning the custody of children of homosexual
parents usually arise in two contexts, in divorce proceedings between
the spouses and in "neglect" proceedings between one spouse and the
state. In divorce proceedings, the grandparents often intervene and
seek custody of the children while in neglect suits, state social workers
usually seek to deprive the homosexual parent of the custody of his or
her child. This latter type of dispute usually only arises when the
parent is receiving welfare or has a criminal record, and a zealous
social worker becomes interested in the parent's life-style.
In theory, when a court decides, in the context of a divorce
proceeding, which parent should be given custody of a child, it
considers only the "best interests of the child." This theory was
originally advanced by Justice Cardozo, who observed that "[The
judge] is not adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to
compose their private differences. He is not determining rights 'as
between a parent and a child' or as between one parent and
another.... Equity does not concern itself with such disputes .... Its
concern is for the child. ' 530 Other issues, such as the morality of the
parent, are relevant only to the extent they affect our concern for the
child. 531 However, the gap between theory and practice is great and
529. A number of organizations have been formed to give legal and emotional aid to
lesbian mothers in custody battles. Lesbian Mother's Defense Fund, located at 2446
Lorentz Place North, Seattle, Washington 98109, is the best known.
530. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-44, 148 N.E. 624, 626, 211 N.Y.S. 429, 434
(1925).
531. Quoting Cardozo, one court observed: "'The law will not hold the crowd to the
morality of saints and seers."' S. v. J., 81 Misc. 2d 828, 831, 367 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408, (Sup. Ct.
1975). This court then ruled: "The criterion to be applied to determinations of custody is
not whether the court condones the mother's mode of living or considers it to be contrary
to good morals, but whether the child is best located with the mother and there well
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the "morality" of the parents is often at issue.
Consider, for example,
532
the court's statement in Bunim v. Bunim.
Defendant here, in open court, has stated her considered belief in
the propriety of indulgence...
in extramarital sex

experimentation. It cannot be that 'the best interests and welfare'
of those impressionable [children] will be 'best served' by
awarding their custody to one who proclaims, and lives by, such
extraordinary ideas of right conduct.5 33
In a neglect proceeding the standard is not the "best interests of
the child." Instead, a child can be removed from a parent if and only
if that parent is found to be unfit. Accordingly, in 1973 a California
juvenile court in In re Tammy F.,534 removed four children from the
custody of their mother when she was convicted of possession of
marijuana. Two of the children were subsequently returned to the
mother and two were placed in foster homes. When the court
discovered that the mother was a lesbian, the two children living at
home were again removed from the mother.5 35 "The court of appeals
sustained the juvenile court's order in an unpublished opinion,
concluding in part that "[t]he continuous existence of a homosexual
relationship in the home where the minor is exposed to
it involves the
5 36
necessary likelihood of serious adjustment problems."'
Approximately a year later the same lesbian mother sought to
regain the two children originally placed and still living in foster
homes. The lower court concluded that it was in the best interest of
the children to leave them in a foster home because "the mother
freely concedes that she has been, is, and intends to continue living in
a lesbian relationship with another woman. '537 The case was appealed
and subsequently remanded for further proceedings. 538 On remand,
the juvenile court again found that it would be detrimental to the
children to return them to their mother and reaffirmed the order
behaved and cared for." Id. at 833,367 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
532. 298 N.Y. 391,83 N.E.2d 848,86 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1949).
533. Id. at 394, 83 N.E.2d at 849, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The author is indebted to N.
Lauerman, author of Non-Marital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. GIN. L. REV.
647 (1977), for calling attention to this quotation as well as to the quotation cited at note
531 supra.
534. 1 Civ. No. 32648 (Cal. App. Aug. 21, 1973), petition for hearing denied Nov. 7,
1973, reportedin 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 19 (1974).
535. Id. at 21.
536. Id.
537. In re Deana P., No. 10747-1 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sonoma County July 12, 1973),
reportedin 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 21-22 (1974).
538. 1 Civ. No. 3400 (Cal. App. July 2, 1974), reported in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at
22 (1974). The unpublished appellate opinion does not mention the mother's
homosexuality.
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539
placing them in an out-of-state foster home.
In deciding these two related cases, the lower court used the
"best interest of the child" test and the appellate court sustained the
application of this standard. 540 As previously indicated, this is an
improper standard in a neglect hearing. In a neglect hearing, the state
or moving party must generally show harm to the child in order to
justify removal of a child from its parent. With respect to Tammy and
her siblings, the homosexuality of their mother, without evidence of
harm, was considered sufficient cause to remove them from the
custody of their natural mother and place them in foster homes.
In People v. Brown,541 a Michigan court reached an entirely
opposite conclusion from that reached by the California court in the
two previously discussed proceedings. A neglect proceeding was
initiated in a Michigan probate court by a petition alleging that the
home in which the Brown and Smith children were living was "unfit
because the mothers were living together in a state of lesbianism
which created an immoral atmosphere." 542
After a series of hearings and a variety of placements, the
probate court ordered that the children be placed in foster homes.
The appellate court reversed and remanded, saying: "There was
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the women were
engaged in a lesbian relationship. However, there is very little to
support the conclusion that this relationship rendered the home an
unfit place for the children to reside." 543 On remand, the probate
court granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss and allowed the
children to return to their mothers. 544 The Brown decision is generally
recognized for the proposition that a lesbian relationship is not a
sufficient finding to render a home an unfit place for children to
reside. Thus, a nexus between parental homosexual conduct and harm
to the children must be shown, at least in Michigan neglect cases.
The most recent neglect case may also be the most unusual. At
issue in In re Hatzopoulos545 was the custody of Candace

539. 2 WOMEN's RIGrrs L. REP. at 22 (1974).
540. Id.
541. 49 Mich. App. 358,212 N.W.2d 55 (1973).
542. Id. at 360,212 N.W.2d at 57.
543. Id. at 365, 212 N.W.2d at 59.
544. The probate court was clearly reluctant to return the children to their mother. The
court believed that the appellate court had ignored the fact that "this type of relationship
between the parties [is] illegal, and thus creates an immoral atmosphere in the home." In
re Brown 2 (Mich. P. Ct., Lapeer County Oct. 12, 1973).
545. Colo. Juv. Ct., Denver County July 8, 1977, reported in 4 FAMILY L. REP. at 2076
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Hatzopoulos, whose mother, Jeannette, had committed suicide.
Jeannette Hatzopoulos had lived in a committed relationship with
Donna Levy, another lesbian woman, for thirteen years. During that
relationship, Candace was born. Her biological father never had any
relationship or contact with her. In 1974 Donna and Jeannette broke
up because of Jeannette's serious mental problems. However, Donna
continued to have constant and continuous contact with Candace.
When Jeannette commited suicide, Jeannette's sister and
brother-in-law took Candace but refused to let her see Donna Levy.
The court examined the two custodial alternatives and chose to give
Donna Levy custody of the child.
Donna's sexual preference has not affected the child in the past and
is not related to her ability to parent the child. Her strengths as a
parent to the child are her sensitivity, her ability to empathize with
the child, her warmth and her dependability. When sexual
preference would become significant to the child, Donna
546 has the
ability to deal with it intelligently, openly and honestly.
The fitness standard, properly applied in neglect cases, is often
incorrectly applied in divorce proceedings. Thus, some courts have
denied custody to a homosexual parent not only because the child's
best interest presumably was served thereby, but also because the
parent's homosexuality was considered proof of parental unfitness.
One of the earliest published cases dealing with child custody
and a homosexual parent is Commonwealth v. Bradley.5 47 At the time
of the divorce between the mother and the homosexual father, the
court gave general custody to the mother and temporary custody to
the father, which included alternate weekends and two weeks in the
summer. In what turned out to be a tactical error, the father appealed
these limitations. The appeals court not only took away his temporary
custody but gave the mother exclusive custody with the right to grant
the father such limited visitation as she deemed best for the children.
The court's decision was apparently precipitated by the fact that
Mr. Bachman, the father, was a homosexual individual. After
reviewing the evidence, the court said that Bachman's lifestyle
revealed an "erotic engrossment. ' 548 Although there was no evidence
that Bachman allowed his propensities to be known by his children,
the court warned that "the absence of harmful influences in the past
does not eliminate the probabilities of the future. '549 The court said
(1977).
546.
547.
548.
549.

Id.
171 Pa. Super. Ct. 587, 91 A.2d 379 (1952).
Id. at 591, 91 A.2d at 381.
Id. at 593, 91 A.2d at 381.
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that the applicable standard was "the best interest and welfare of the
child;" but nevertheless considered the fitness of the parent, noting
that "[i]n the custody of [the father], [the children] may be exposed to
improper conditions and undesirable influences .-550
The homosexuality of the mother similarly influenced the court
in Immerman v. Immerman.5 51 Although the lower court ruled that
evidence of the mother's sexual proclivities was inadmissible 552 and
awarded custody to the mother, the appeals court reversed. The court
concluded that the exclusion of that evidence was erroneous and
prejudicial because "[t]he moral character, acts, conduct and
disposition of one who seeks the custody of a child are relevant
matters. '553 Thus, in effect, the court held that the sexual orientation
of the parent was relevant in and of itself whether or not it affected
the child adversely.5 54
The court in Nadler v. SuperiorCourt,555 reached a similar result,
but was nevertheless more sympathetic to the lesbian mother seeking
custody of her child. The California Court of Appeal rejected the
lower court, holding that homosexuality per se is conclusive of
parental unfitness and instructed the lower court to consider all the
evidence in making its decision.
On remand, the lower court once again granted custody to the
father. The lesbian mother was given Sunday visitation rights, on the
condition that another adult- "a relative who has no problems" and
who was presumably not a homosexual person-be present at the
time.556 As to Mrs. Nadler's future visitation rights the court said: "I
want this child protected, and if the lady takes therapeutics (sic) and
550. Id. at 593, 91 A.2d at 381-82. Another early Pennsylvania case, Leonard v.
Leonard, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 424, 98 A.2d 638 (1953), was resolved in favor of a
homosexual father. However, the court upheld the father's visitation rights on the ground
that his ex-wife's allegations as to his "sexual perversion" and its alleged effect on their
children was not supported by the evidence. Id. at 426, 98 A.2d at 638-39.
551. 176 Cal. App. 2d 122, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1959).
552. The father wished to testify to the fact that he had discovered his wife in a
compromising position with another woman. Id. at 126, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
553. Id. at 127,1 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
554. A Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Cortes, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 515, 234
A.2d 47 (1967), in which a grandmother sought custody of her daughter's five children,
similarly excluded testimony with regard to the mother's homosexuality. Also, as in
Imniler, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, noting that the excluded testimony

may well have answered questions vital to the welfare of the children.
555. 255 Cal. App. 2d 523,63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967).
556. Nadler v. Nadler, No. 177331, unpublished op. at 67 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento
County Nov. 15, 1967).
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the psychiatrist can assure me, then I will look for unrestrained
visitation." 557 Nadler illustrates two common results. First, the
homosexual parent is allowed to see his or her own child only in the
company of another adult, usually a hostile relative. 558 Second, future
visitation or custody rights are predicated on either a "cure" or
"giving up" of the parent's homosexuality. 559 Such restrictions
undoubtedly impair the parent's ability to build or maintain a truly
meaningful relationship with a child. Moreover, conditioning the
parent's right to see his or her child upon a fundamental change in the
parent's very nature, leaves the parent with no real alternative.
Several years later, courts were still imposing restrictions upon
the visitation rights of homosexual parents. In 1974, a New Jersey
court in In re J.S. & C.560 restricted the visitation rights of a
homosexual father, 561 after determining that the father was an avowed
and publicly known homosexual, that he associated with other
homosexuals and was currently living with a homosexual "lover", and
557. Id. at 68.
558. Another common restriction upon the visitation rights of the homosexual parent
was imposed in Nelson v. Nelson, No. 951,546 (Tex. Ct. Dom. Rel. No. 2, Harris County,
May 24, 1973). The court awarded custody to the father without stating the basis for its
determination. However, earlier, the court alluded to the mother's lesbianism, observing
that "[tihis gay liberation business, not bad of itself, does raise questions for us." The court
allowed the mother visitation but on the condition that "all visitations are to take place
outside of the presence of Claudia [Mrs. Nelson's life-partner] or any other lesbian-type
person."
Nelson v. Nelson is unreported and is not cited in any other articles. Lesbian Mothers
Defense Fund provided a copy of the proceedings to the author.
559. There is deep conflict among medical and psychiatric authorities over the issue of
"curing" homosexual individuals. Some authorities insist that "cure" is impossible; others
claim a "cure" rate of one-third among their homosexual patients. Belief in such a "cure"
is a direct function of whether homosexuality is considered an illness or merely a variation
of sexual behavior. Some authorities question the ethics of trying to inculcate a
homosexual person with an alien sexual pattern, particularly when such treatment is
administered for the sake of conformity to social convention. See A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY
AND HOMOSEXUALITY 572-606 (1977); D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED
241-75 (1977); J.D. Frank, Treatment of Homosexuals, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE
BACKGROUND PAPERS 63-68 (1972).

ON

HOMOSEXUALITY

FINAL

REPORT

AND

560. 129 NJ. Super. 486,324 A.2d 90 (1974).
561. The court analogized the father to a bank robber who is allowed visitation rights
only on the assumption that he will not expose his child to his "unacceptable line of
endeavor." Id. at 497-98, 324 A.2d at 97. A homosexual parent who advocates breaking
New Jersey's sodomy laws can, the court reasoned, be similarly restricted. Accordingly,
the court imposed the following restrictions on the father's visitation rights: (1) during
visitation the father may not cohabit or sleep with any individual other than a lawful
spouse; (2) during visitation the father may not involve the children in any homosexual
related activities or publicity; (3) during visitation the father may "not be in the presence of
his lover." Id. at 498, 324 A.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
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that the children associated with his "lover" and other acquaintances
562
during their visits.
The court nevertheless expressed some idealistic sentiments,
observing that:
The parental rights of a homosexual, like those of a heterosexual,
are constitutionally protected. Fundamental rights of parents may
not be denied, limited or restricted on the basis of sexual
orientation, per se. The right of a parent, including a homosexual
parent, to the companionship and care of his or her child, insofar as
it is for the best interest of the child is a fundamental right protected
by the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. That right may not be restricted without a
showing that the parent's activities may tend to impair the
emotional or physical health of the chid. 563
After reviewing all the very favorable testimony about the father
the court concluded that granting the father visitation rights would be
in the best interests of the children. However, the court also
concluded that unrestricted visitation would not be in their best
interests and observed: "The lack of understanding and controversy
which surrounds homosexuality, together with the immutable effects
which are engendered by the parent-child relationship, demands that
the court be most hesitant in allowing any unnecessary exposure of a
' 564
child to an environment which may be deleterious.
Equally stringent restrictions were imposed upon a lesbian
mother in Mitchell v. Mitchel5 65 despite the fact that she was awarded
custody of her children. Mrs. Mitchell had three children and planned
to live with another lesbian mother who had already won custody of
her three children. 566 Mr. Mitchell, however, chose to fight custody
and sought to make lesbianism the central issue. In what was at that
time a new strategy, Mrs. Mitchell stipulated to her lesbianism in
order to focus the court's attention on parental fitness and the child's
best interests rather than on the sexual preference of the mother.
At trial, the probation officer, a court conciliation counselor, and
a psychologist testified that Mrs. Mitchell should be appointed as the
562. Id. at 489, 324 A.2d at 92.
563. Id. (emphasis added).
564. Id. at 497, 324 A.2d at 97.
565. No. 240665 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County June 8, 1972). The facts of this
unpublished case are drawn from two sources, K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 276-77 (1975) and 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 20-21
(1974). Both sources derived their information from Mrs. Mitchell's attorneys.
566. This case was uncontested and that mother's lesbianism was never an issue. San
Francisco Chronicle, July 12, 1972, at 34, 37, col. 1.
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children's custodian. Moreover, the children, ages fourteen, nine, and
twelve, all wanted to stay with their mother. The only testimony to

the contrary was that of the father who claimed that Mrs. Mitchell's
immoral conduct567rendered her unfit and that he could provide a good
Christian home.
While the court, faced with such overwhelming evidence of Mrs.

Mitchell's fitness, gave Mrs. Mitchell custody, it also imposed
restrictions which destroyed the possibility of establishing a new

family unit. The court prohibited Mrs. Mitchell from living with her
"lover" 568 and from associating with her unless the children were in
school or visiting their father. Thus, the price Mrs. Mitchell was
required to pay to keep her children was the destruction of a loving
adult with whom she could share the burdens of
home with another
569
child rearing.

Similarly, in A v. A., 570 a gay father was allowed to keep his two
sons but his life was considerably restricted. First, the court ordered

the Clackamas County Juvenile Department 571 to supervise the

father. Second, to protect the boys from "possible pernicious
influences" 572 the trial court prohibited the defendant father from

living with any man in the family home. The appellate court
specifically approved that restriction.
The court was influenced by Nadler573 and by the fact that there
was no evidence that the boys were exposed to deviant sex acts or

that their welfare was being adversely affected in any substantial
567. See Hunter & Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and
LitigationStrategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691,698 (1976).
568. The author abhors the use of the word "lover." Lover connotes that the
relationship between the parties is short term and solely erotic. "Friend" is cute but hardly
encompasses a loving relationship with a lifelong commitment. "Partner" sounds like a
business arrangement. "Spouse" is technically incorrect and "husband" and "wife" are
traditional roles inappropriate in a homosexual relationship. In order to avoid the use of
the word "lover," which the author sees as pejorative in this context, the term
"life-partner" will be used.
569. Recent studies have shown that the greatest problems faced by the children of
homosexual parents stem not from the parents' sexual orientation but rather from the
difficulties inherent in all single parent households. Dr. Richard Green, who is in the
process of completing a study of matched pairs of children of homosexual and
heterosexual parents, says that "one is not seeing so far anything remarkable about these
children [of lesbian mother families]." In Re Ransom, unpublished op. at 41, No. 477051-8
(Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Nov. 9, 1977).
570. 15 Or. App. 353,514 P.2d 358 (1973).
571. Id. at 359, 514 P.2d at 361.
572. Id. at 356, 514 P.2d at 359.
573. Nadler v. Nadler, 255 Cal. App. 2d 523, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967). Nadler held that
homosexuality on the part of one parent does not make that parent unfit as a matter of
law to have custody of children.

April 1999]

THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS

way. 574 While this suggests that the court adopted a more favorable
attitude towards the homosexual father, the facts suggest the court
may not have had any choice but to give the father custody. The
mother had not had any contact with the boys for over ten years. She
only decided to initiate the custody suit after her third marriage.
The irrationality of judicial decision-making in child custody
cases is clearly illustrated in the cases of two lesbian mothers, Nancy
Driber and Marilyn Koop, who decided to live together. In Driber v.
Driber,575 the court apparently focused on the stability of the
and awarded Ms. Driber
relationship between the two women
576
custody of all three of her children.
Nancy Driber's life-partner was not so fortunate. Another judge
577
in the same county heard Ms. Koop's case, and in Koop v. Koop
removed custody of two of her three children. Subsequently, the two
children ran away from their father and refused to return to live with
him. Marilyn Koop filed a petition seeking to have the children
returned to her. When brought before the court, the children, ages
eleven and thirteen, told the judge that they would not continue to
live with their father. Consequently, the judge directed the sheriff to
place the children in a juvenile detention home and ordered that the
children be made wards of the juvenile court. After three months in a
juvenile home the children were temporarily placed with their older
half-sister.
After a lengthy hearing, in which a psychiatrist and a court social
worker testified in favor of the mother, the judge talked to the
children, both of whom expressed a desire to be with their mother. In
addition, the temporary custodian, the half-sister, thought the
children would be better off with their mother. Nevertheless, the
court ordered placement with the half-sister.5 78 The court was
evidently impressed by the father's testimony that the mother's
574. 15 Or. App. at 358-59,514 P.2d at 360.
575. No. 220748 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County Sept. 17, 1973), reported in 2
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. at 23 (1974).
576. During that trial, Ms. Driber introduced into evidence a documentary film on
lesbian parenting. The film, Sandy and Madeleine's Family, was a result of the
Schuster-Issacson cases, see text accompanying notes 605-08 infra. The fathers in those
cases argued that the making of the film was one reason why Sandy and Madeleine should
lose their children.
577. No. 221097 (Wash. Super. Ct., Pierce County, Sept. 17, 1973), affd mem., 16 Wash.
App. 1006 (1976).
578. Petition for Writ of Review from the Superior Court for Pierce County,
Washington, Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, In re Koop, No. 2315-11 (Wash. App. June
19,1976).
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relationship with Nancy Driber was "immoral." The mother's
"immorality" rather than the "best interests of the children" was
apparently the deciding factor.
Equally ambiguous notions of "immorality" prompted a Georgia
Court in Bennett v. Clemens579 to award to the paternal grandparents
custody of their nine-year-old granddaughter. The mother wanted to
retain custody and the father testified that he was in favor of such an
arrangement. While there was no evidence of any sexually atypical
behavior by the mother, on at least one occasion the mother allegedly
left the child with four female friends who "smoked 'pot' on
occasions, engaged in sexual acts with men and with each other in the
presence 580 of the child and otherwise taught the child about 'the gay
life."'' 58 ' In upholding the award of custody to the grandparents the
had exercised sound
court of appeals found that the trial court
582
discretion to protect the welfare of the child.
The dissent, on the other hand, pointed out that there was no
evidence in the record that the child's physical needs were not being
cared for or that the child was neglected, abused, or mistreated in any
way. Moreover, a psychiatrist testified that the child had been living
in a "healthy environment." 58 3 According to the dissent, the
grandparents' only complaint was that the child was being brought up
in an "immoral, hippy-type environment." 584 The dissent felt the trial
court clearly abused its discretion by imposing its own moral
judgment instead of considering the best interests of the child.
Where neglect, abuse, or mistreatment in some manner is absent,
the state has no right to inquire into what a parent teaches his child,
or with whom a parent allows his child to associate, or the type of
environment a parent permits his child to inhabit.... Within this
relationship the family or parent adopts a moral standard for the
members' conduct and associations, and the state cannot intrude
moral
upon or disrupt this relationship by asserting a different
585
standard, conceived by judges, that must be adhered to.

Occasionally, the homosexuality of a parent is unnecessarily
made an issue. In Chaffin v. Frye,586 in which a lesbian mother lost
579. 230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
580. Quite often, when courts allude to acts "in the presence of the child," it is unclear
in most contexts whether the courts mean in the same residence or actually in the presence
of the child.
581. 230 Ga. at 319,196 S.E.2d at 843.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 320, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
584. Id. at 321, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
585. Id. at 321-22, 196 S.E.2d at 844.
586. 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
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custody of her two daughters to her own parents, many factors other
than the mother's lesbianism could have led to the same result. Ms.
Chaffin had a record of five arrests and two convictions. She was
characterized as unstable socially and financially by a probation
officer. She had in addition, some serious physical disabilities.
Moreover, the children at issue had lived with their grandparents
most of their lives and were then fifteen and thirteen.
Aside from these matters, which could have been determinative
in and of themselves, the court made Ms. Chaffin's homosexuality a
major issue. The appellate court concluded that the trial court was
correct in denying the mother custody of her children, observing that
''58 7
"homosexuality is a factor which the trial court could consider.
[Tihis factor is not merely fortuitious or casual, but rather it
dominates and forms the basis for the household into which the
children would be brought if custody were awarded to appellant.
Appellant does not merely say she is homosexual. She also lives
with the woman with whom she has engaged in homosexual
conduct, and she intends to bring up her daughters in that
environment. The trial court was not required to believe appellant's
self-serving statements about the present nature of her homosexual
relationship .... 588
After noting that certain homosexual acts were then criminal in
California and that children should not be exposed to homosexuality
in their most formative and impressionable years, the court concluded
that "[i]n exercising a choice between homosexual and heterosexual
households for purposes of child custody a trial court could conclude
that permanent residence in a homosexual household would be
59
detrimental to the children and contrary to their best interests."
The court consequently upheld the trial court's decision 590 and
awarded custody to the grandparents who ironically had already
587. Id. at 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
588. Id. at 46-47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26 (emphasis added).

589. Id. at 47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
590. Justices Tobriner and Mosk dissented from the supreme court's denial of the
petition for a hearing. Justice Tobriner wrote the majority opinion in Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969), see notes 377-84 &
accompanying text supra,and the dissenting opinion in Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal.
3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973), see notes 391-400 & accompanying text

supra.
According to one commentator, the custody order in Chaffin was subsequently
reversed to allow the daughters to remain with their mother after three psychologists
testified that it would be detrimental to the children to be taken away from their mother.
Law Note, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional
Challenge That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 799,864 n.2 (1975).
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raised two homosexual children.5 91
In In re Jane B. ,92 a lesbian mother was similarly unsuccessful in
obtaining custody of her child, even though at the time of divorce,
custody of the child was given to the mother. The child, who was ten
at the time of the decision, had been continuously with the mother
from the age of three. The mother began a homosexual relationship
with another woman when the child was nine and the two women and
the child lived together. The father, upon learning of the homosexual
arrangement sought a change of custody.
The court rejected the mother's constitutional arguments,
observing that while an adult's lifestyle is constitutionally protected
that protection does not extend to situations where "innocent
and emotionally
bystanders or children... may be affected physically'593
by close contact with homosexual conduct of adults.
The court examined a report that indicated that both parents
were physically and financially able to care for the child and heard the
testimony of two psychiatrists, introduced by the mother and father,
respectively, Although the court said it was not finding the
homosexual mother unfit per se, it nevertheless concluded that a
"home environment with [a] homosexual partner in residence is not a
proper atmosphere in which to bring up this child or in the best
interest of this child. ' 594 The court also specifically found that the
child was emotionally disturbed by virtue of this environment and
that the total circumstances warrant a change in custody. ' 595 The only
testimony which supported this conclusion was that of a school
that the divorce
psychologist who admitted under cross-examination
596
itself could be causing the child stress.
After taking the child from the mother's custody, the court
circumscribed the mother's visitation rights. The child would not be
allowed to remain overnight with the mother or to visit the mother
when the mother's life-partner or any other homosexual persons were
at home. The mother also was ordered not to take the child to any
place where known homosexual individuals were present or to
involve the child in any homosexual activities. 597 The last two
admonitions seem gratuitous because the mother in this case led a
very private life and apparently had no connection with gay activist
591.
43 Cal.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.

The probation report indicates that Ms. Chaffin's brother is a homosexual person.
App. 3d at 43, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
85 Misc. 2d 515,380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
Id. at 524, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
Id. at 525, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
Id. at 527,380 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
Id. at 518,380 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
Id. at 528, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61.
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politics. 59
Some of the more recent cases indicate a growing trend among
homosexual parent-litigants to aggressively assail the courts'
conventional attitudes about "morality" and homosexuality. Hall v.
Hall,599 in which a lesbian mother was allowed to retain custody of her
daughter, 6°° marks the beginning of the use of experts on

homosexuality 6°1 and the beginning of an aggressive position by many
homosexual parents in defending their parental rights.

The case is also interesting because the issue of lesbianism and
the impact of a lesbian home were fully discussed. Dr. Richard Green,
probably the best known authority on homosexuality, was an expert
witness for the mother.at2 The transcript of Dr. Green's testimony
illustrates a common occurrence in lesbian mother cases. After being
examined by counsel for both sides, Dr. Green was examined by the
judge who asked how "the sex act between lesbians [was]
accomplished?"603
A close examination of trial transcripts in cases involving lesbian
mothers reveals either an incredible ignorance on the part of judges
or, more likely, extremely distasteful voyeurism. If a woman has
admitted her lesbianism and if sexual acts in front of the child or
children are not at issue, the discussion of the explicit acts of the
lesbian mother seems highly irrelevant.

598. After citing with favor to In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974),
see notes 560-64 & accompanying text supra, where similar restrictions had been used to
control a gay activist father, the court presumably copied the order in that case.
599. No. 55900 (Ohio C.P. Div. Dom. Rel., Licking County Oct. 31, 1974).
600. In Hall, all of the testimony was extremely favorable to Sarah Hall, the mother,
and her life-partner. "All David Hall, [the father,] did was to come into court and shout
'Lesbian'." Plaintiffs Post Trial Memorandum of Law & Fact, at 2. In this case that
approach did not work.
601. For example, extensive expert testimony was used in Ranson v. Ranson, No.
477051-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Nov. 9, 1977), in which the court ultimately
awarded the lesbian mother custody of her two children. The Advocate, Jan. 1, 1977, at 12.
During the trial, the mother introduced the testimony of Wardell Pomeroy, who
coauthored the Kinsey report, and Dr. Richard Green, an expert on homosexuality who
also testified at the trial of Hall v. Hall, see text accompanying note 602 infra. Dr. Green
testified that in his study of lesbian mothers he had found their children "unremarkable,"
that is, not significantly different from children of heterosexual mothers. Court Hearing
Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceeding Examination of Dr. Richard Green at 21,
Ranson v. Ranson, No. 477051-8 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County Nov. 9,1977).
602. See Transcript at 2-51, Hall v. Hall, No. 55900 (Ohio C.P. Div. Dom. Rel., April 26,
1974).
603. Id. at 46.
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In what is probably the most famous lesbian mother case,6°4 the
6°5
consolidated case of Schuster v. Schuster and Isaacson v. Isaacson,
two lesbian women won at the trial court level the right to live and
raise their children together. At the time of their original contested
divorces the lesbianism of Sandy Schuster and Madeliene Isaacson
was thoroughly discussed. While the court awarded custody to the
mothers, it ordered that the family of two women and eight children
split up. Subsequently, the fathers petitioned for a change of custody
based on a change of circumstances. Both fathers argued that since
they had remarried they could provide adequate homes, that the
mothers were in fact living together against court orders, and that the
two women had publicized their relationship.
After a lengthy trial in which twenty-one witnesses were
introduced, including eleven psychiatrists and psychologists, the court
found that the change in circumstances was not sufficient to require a
change in custody from the mothers to the fathers. The court noted
that "almost all of the testimony of all of the people who actually saw,
was that the children are healthy,
examined, or talked to the children
'6°6
happy, normal, loving children.
With regard to the homosexual orientation of the women, the
court was persuaded that the only predictable effect would be "that
these children will grow up knowing more about homosexuality and
human sexuality than most children [but]... that this knowledge
need not predispose them to become homosexuals. ' '60 7 However, the
court did warn the mothers not to put the children on exhibition for
the cause of homosexuality. On the other hand, the court found that

604. The relationship at issue in Schuster-Isaacsonhas produced a film and a book on
lesbian parenting.
Perhaps In re Risher (Tex. Dom. Rel. Ct., Dallas County April 16, 1976) is the most
infamous lesbian mother case. That child custody case involving a homosexual parent
went before a Texas jury which removed a nine-year-old boy from his mother and gave
custody to the father. The boy had lived with his mother, the mother's life-partner and the
life-partner's minor daughter, since the divorce five years earlier. Because the decision was
made by a jury, no formal opinion is available. It seems quite clear, however, that Ms.
Risher's lesbianism was the main issue. On appeal, the Texas Fifth District Court of Civil
Appeals ruled that it could not decide on the merits because it lacked jurisidiction. Do It
Now, Feb. 1977. The case generated an extreme amount of national publicity, see TIME,
Jan. 10, 1976, and eventually even a book on the subject, G.G. GIBSON, BY HER OWN
ADMISSION (1977).
605. Nos. D-36867, D-36868 (Wash. Super. Ct., King County Dec. 22, 1974), affid in
part, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978). On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that
part of the opinion that allowed the mothers to retain custody but ruled that the lower
court had erred in modifying the custody order to allow the mothers to live together.
606. Id. at 5.
607. Id. at 6,
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two living units were a hardship on the children and not in their best
interest. Although reversed on appeal, the court removed the
restriction that the families live in two separate households. At the
conclusion of its opinion the court stated:
I don't think this case should be regarded as any landmark decision
or as any stamp of approval by the Court on homosexuality. I think
it is a case just like cases that we decide every day where we look to
the individuals to try and determine what is the best
608 interests of the
children, and that is what I have attempted to do.
In Whitehead v. Black,w a lesbian mother again won custody
without any of the usual restrictions. However, that case really
represents a personal victory for the mother rather than for lesbian
mothers in general. One commentator attributed Carol Whitehead's
victory to the fact that she did not "flaunt" her lesbianism and was not
too far "out of the closet.1610 Moreover, while the court admitted that
the most unique and unusual feature of the case was the lesbianism of
that it was not
the mother,61 ' the court clearly indicated at the outset
'612
concerned with "any so-called rights of the mother.
The court observed that although the State of Maine had
decriminalized all private consensual sexual activity between adults,
the court was not precluded from considering the sexual activities of
parents. The sexual activity of the parent, according to the court,
"becomes a relevant consideration, not for the purpose of censuring
or criticizing the manner in which the parent lives, but for the purpose
of determining
the impact of the parent's lifestyle upon the minor
613
child."

Despite its examination into the mother's sexual activity, the
judge awarded custody to the mother, observing that courts could not
always attain the "ideal" home and often had to settle for a "custodial
arrangement which adequately meets the.., needs of these
children. '614 The court's decision was apparently influenced by a
highly favorable report by a child psychiatrist, the fact that the child
had lived continuously with the mother for over five years, and the
mother's attitude toward her lesbianism. The court noted that "[s]he
608. Id. at 11.
609. Nos. CV-76-422, CV-76-426 (Me. Super. Ct., Cumberland County June 14, 1976).
610. 2 FAMILY L. REP. at 1138 (1976).
611. Unpublished opinion at 7, CV-76-422 & CV-76-426 (Me. Super. Ct., Cumberland
County June 14, 1976).
612. Id.
613. Id. at 8.
614. Id. at 11.
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was aware that her homosexual lifestyle could have an impact on her
seeking to minimize, if not totally
children and was intelligently
'61 5
eliminate, that impact.
Another recent case, Stamper v. Stamper,616 resulted in an

unusual order of joint custody. The court used the criteria in the
Michigan Child Custody Act617 to evaluate the custodial possibilities.
On the question of the moral fitnesses of the parents, the judge noted
there "is very little to choose between the parents. '61 8 In discussing
the home lives of the parties, the court used the neutral phrase

"live-in associate" to refer to both the father's and mother's current
life-partners, evidencing little concern regarding the gender of the
mother's sexual partner. The court gave physical custody to the
mother who was permitted to continue living with her life-partner.
and joint
The father was awarded extensive visitation rights
619
responsibility for making decisions concerning the child.
In Jullion v. Ceccarelli,620 the court demonstrated an equally
indifferent attitude towards the sexual preference of the mother. The

lesbian mother had custody of her younger son for two years during a
separation from her husband, while the older son resided with the
father. At the full custody hearing the court would not allow the
introduction of any evidence on the issue of sexual preference,
concluding that the only relevant issue was the fitness of the parents.
Since the court found both parents fit, the court concluded that the

younger son's need for nurturing from his mother was dispositive and
615. Id. at 10.
616. No. 75-054-550-DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County June 15, 1977).
617. Child Custody Act of 1970, Mich. Comp. Laws ANN. §§ 722.21-722.29 (West Supp.
1978-79).
618. Unpublished opinion at 6.
619. Another Michigan court, applying the same Custody Act in S. v. S., No.
75-16125DM (Mich. Cir. Ct., Washtenaw County 1975), reached a similar result. After a
careful review of the factors incorporated in the Act, the court found for the mother and
allowed the children to reside in a home with both the mother and her life-partner.
Commenting on the relationship of the two women, the court observed that "[s]tripped of
natural revulsion against their private homosexual interaction, Mrs. S. and Mrs. K. do
appear mutually to compliment each other and to have love, trust, understanding and
respect for each other as human beings."
This case is unpublished and the records suppressed. However, the opinion and order
in this case are in the files of the author by permission of the court. It is unfortunate that
this opinion was not published because of the careful, systematic method in which the
court evaluated the respective custodial alternatives against the criteria embodied in the
statute.
The judge in this case was so impressed by this and another case he tried, that he
wrote an article to help other judges. See Campbell, Child Custody: When One Parent Is
Homosexual, 17 JUDGES' J., No. 2, at 52 (1978).
620. No. 490874-4 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County June 8,1977).
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permitted the mother to retain custody of the younger son.
Although the foregoing cases suggest the development of a trend
in favor of awarding custody to the gay parent, two recent cases
indicate that many of the conventional attitudes and misconceptions
regarding homosexuality still pervade the reasoning of some courts.
In Towend v. Towend, 621 an Ohio court of appeal upheld an
order removing three young children from the custody of their lesbian
mother and placing them in the custody of their sixty-five-year-old
paternal grandmother. The lower court decided the issue of the
parties' divorce as well as the issue of child custody. 622 The court
awarded the husband a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty
observing that the lesbianism of the wife was not technically a ground
for divorce in Ohio. In discussing Lorraine Towend's lesbianism in
the divorce context the court made the following observations:
There is no question in the court's mind, of course, that society as a
whole disapproves of sexual aberration of any kind, particularly
homosexualism, [sic] and that is a very ancient disapproval. You
read in the Old Testament of Sodom and Gomorrah .... An
overwhelming majority of the people in this country strongly
disapprove of homosexualism [sic], regard it as a very wide
aberration from what they do approve as indicated by various cant
appelations they give to it, such as "Queer" "Fagot," and so forth,
so there can be no question in the court's mind that the conduct
revealed here is against the mores of our
present day society, even
63
this society that grows more permissive. 2
In addition the court awarded custody of the three children to
the paternal grandmother after having found both the mother and the
father unfit. As to the mother, the court concluded:
Ordinarily, children of these years would be given to the mother.
The question arises 'should the court do that,' notwithstanding the
lesbianism of the defendant. I don't say that a mother cannot be fit
to rear her children even if she is a lesbian, but I wonder if she is fit
when she boldly and brazenly sets up in the home where the
children are to be reared, the lesbian practices which have been
current 624
there, clearly to the neglect of supervision of the
children.
621. No. 639 (Ohio Ct. App., Portage County Sept. 30, 1976).
622. Towend v. Towend, No. 639 (Ohio C.P., Portage County March 14, 1975).
623. Unpublished opinion at 1 (Ohio C.P., Portage County March 14,1975).
624. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). In its opinion, the court of appeals explained the trial
court's conclusion: "There was testimony that considerable time was spent in sexual acts
between appellant and Mrs. Dickinson and that they made love as many as five or six
times in one day." The trial court found that the lesbian practices were "clearly to the
neglect of supervision of the children." Towend v. Towend, No. 639, unpublished op. at 3
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The lower court seemed to suggest that if the mother changed
her nature, she might regain custody of her children. 625 In upholding
the lower court decision, the court of appeals noted that "the trial
court recognizes the general community disapproval of homosexual
activity, but.., was not concerned with it beyond the direct adverse
effect it had on the children. We'626are of the opinion the trial court's
decision was not tainted by bias.
This case involves two elements common to other child custody
cases. First, part of Mrs. Towend's conduct which the court
condemned involved a newspaper and TV/radio interview given at a
gay students organization of which she was a member. Despite the
clear first amendment implications of the court's holding, the court of
appeals dismissed Mrs. Towend's constitutional objections on the
grounds that the only issue before the court was whether Mrs.
Towend was a suitable person to raise her children. 627 Second, the
case is one of the most blatant examples of judicial voyeurism. Over
objection of counsel, the trial judge forced Mrs. Towend to respond to
questions regarding details of how Mrs. Towend engaged in
love-making. Mrs. Towend had, at that point, already admitted her
lesbianism and admitted the identity of her life-partner. The judge
referred to these intimate details on at least three occasions in his
opinion.628
In Smith v. Smith, 629 the court held that the mother's lesbianism

was not per se dispositive of her continued fitness as the custodian of
her two sons, but nevertheless examined "whether and to what extent
the emotional and mental health of the child [had] been affected by
the mother's deviant behavior. '630 Consulting clinical reports, the
court found that the social stigma of having a lesbian mother had a
traumatic emotional impact on one of the sons.
However, this case does not represent a clear example of judicial
homophobia. Three younger children were ultimately permitted to
remain with the mother, and the two older boys who went to their
father had expressed a strong desire to live with him. In fact, this case
represents positive precedent. The court stressed that "a causal
(Ohio Ct. App., Portage County Sept. 30, 1976).
625. The appeals court observed: "I would think that a lesbian, for the sake of the
children, would have abandoned the practice... ." No. 639, unpublished op. at 13 (Ohio
Ct. App., Portage County Sept. 30,1976).
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Assignments of Error & Brief of Defendant-Appellant, at 4.
629. N.Y. Fain. Ct., Richmond County Sept. 13, 1977, reported in 2 FAMILY L. REP. at
2693 (1977).
630. Id.
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connection between
lesbianism and its diverse effect upon the child
'631
should be shown.
From the preceding discussion it is evident that some courts are
beginning to evaluate homosexual parents on the basis of their
parenting abilities rather than on the basis of their sexual preference.
However, in each case where a homosexual parent has succeeded in
getting a court to examine the situation with reasonable objectivity,
the costs have been excessive. Because the homosexual parent must
first overcome homophobia and misinformation before getting to the
proper issue of the child's best interest, he or she inevitably incurs
tremendous legal expenses without guarantee of success. If the case is
lost at the first level, the cost of appeal is staggering and often
prohibitive. Justice for the homosexual parent does not come cheaply
or often.
XI. Unrecognized Families
Homosexual couples who are not allowed to enter into marriage
legally sanctioned by the state may nevertheless be able to achieve
some of the legal and financial benefits normally accruing to that
relationship. One commentator 632 suggests that homosexual persons
may soon have the option of a "quasi-marital" status.
Although private consensual homosexual activity might be
legalized in this country without creating many problems as it was
in Great Britain, the expansion of marriage to encompass
homosexual couples would alter the nature of a fundamental
institution as traditionally conceived.
The Supreme Court may in the future decide that such alteration
is beyond its competence and therefore that marriage should be
confined to its present definition absent a positive move on the part
of individual state legislatures to broaden it. If such proves to be
the case, particular legal benefits available only to married couples
might still be attacked on equal protection grounds under both the
Fourteenth and Twenty-seventh Amendments.
If the Court granted homosexuals some of these benefitswithout compelling states to grant marriage licenses-it might
eventually create in effect a 'quasi-marital' status. State legislatures
might explicitly grant such a status, and specify the attendant

631. Id. The court cited to what is probably the best article in this area, Hunter &
Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25
BUFFALO L. REv. 691 (1976).
632. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage,82 YALE L. J. 573 (1973).
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The Supreme Court's acceptance of such a quasi-marital status
does not appear to be imminent. At present, the most promising
method of obtaining many of the legal advantages of the marriage
relationship without obtaining a legally sanctioned marriage is the use
of the private contract.634 One of the major impediments to the
enforcement of contracts between nonmarried cohabitors has been
the finding by the courts that their meretricious relationship taints
and, hence, nullifies any agreement. In particular, public policy does
not recognize sexual acts as consideration for a contractual promise.
This interpretation of public policy prevented the enforcement of
contracts between nonmarried heterosexual cohabitors for many
years. However, the recent case of Marvin v. Marvin635 is generally
considered to have redefined the rights of nonmarried cohabitors with
regard to financial interests and property rights. The California
Supreme Court held that either party to a nonmarital relationship
may enforce an express or implied agreement dividing accumulated
property. Basing its decision on the policy that "adults who
voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are
nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting
their earnings and property rights," 636 the court declared that express
contracts between nonmarried cohabitors could be enforced "except
to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on the
consideration of meretricious sexual service." 637 In the absence of an
express contract, the court will look to 63
the
conduct of the parties to
8
see if such an agreement can be implied.
While Marvin deals with two heterosexual persons, nothing in its
language limits its application to heterosexuals. Immediately after the
decision was rendered, there was much speculation as to whether it
would be applicable to homosexual persons. 639 Shortly thereafter, the
Marvin reasoning was applied to a lesbian couple, when a San Diego
superior court judge ordered Denease Conley to pay monthly support
633. Id. at 588-89.
634. In a comprehensive article, Leonore J. Weitzman suggests the use of contracts by
nonmarried cohabiting couples and specifically deals with contracts between homosexual
life-partners. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change-A
Proposalfor Individual Contracts and Contracts in Lieu of Marriage, 62 CALIF. L. REV.
1169, 1235-36, 1255, 1286-87 (1974).
635. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106,134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
636. Id. at 674,557 P.2d at 116,134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
637. Id. at 665,447 P.2d at 110,134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
638. Id.
639. See Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
937, 967-68 (1977); 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1719 (1977).
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to Sherry D. Richardson. 640 The two women had participated in a
religious ceremony and had signed a written agreement dealing with
financial matters. When the relationship ended, Richardson brought
suit for support and division of accumulated property.
Whether other states will even follow Marvin with respect to
heterosexual nonmarried cohabitors is still doubtful. 641 It is even more
doubtful whether Marvin will be applied to homosexual couples,
especially in the majority of states where homosexual conduct is still a
crime. Homosexual couples in the states rejecting the liberal reading
of Marvin will have to fall back on traditional common-law methods
of arranging their financial affairs such as wills and powers of
attorneys .642
However, as the concept of family is redefined in American
society 64 3 there are small but interesting changes which bring the
homosexual family closer to the mainstream. For example, under the
New York Human Rights Law6 any two people living at the same
address are considered "family" members even if they are not
married or blood relations. The New York law forbids discrimination
on the basis of marital status in public accommodations, employment,
housing, and credit. On May 24, 1978, the Detroit (Michigan) City
Council similarly amended its definition of "family" as applied to
residential housing for single family occupancy. The new definition
removes the requirement of consanguinity or marriage. This change
was effectuated to bring housing ordinances in line with the new city
charter which forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or marital status. 64 5
Insurance companies also have discriminated against gay
couples. However, under a relatively new California regulation,
California insurance carriers may not discriminate on the basis of
640. The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 12.
641. See Beal v. Beal, 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2464 (Ore. 1978); Carlson v. Olson, 3
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2467 (Minn. 1977). In these cases, the courts adopted a position
similar to Marvin. But see Rehak v. Mathis, FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1185 (Ga. 1977)
(rejecting Marvin approach).
642. See Rivera, Legal Planningfor Loving Partnerships,in OUR RIGHT To LovE
(1978).
643. The "typical American family"-a married man supporting a wife and children-is
a mere six percent of the total of American families. Bell, Let's Get Rid of Families',
NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1977, at 19.
644. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(2) (McKinney 1972).
645. See The Advocate, July 12, 1978, at 10. However, a Department of Housing and
Urban Development policy under which unmarried couples, including homosexuals, were
eligible for public housing was recently nullified. Lesbian Connection, Sept. 1977, at 12.
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sexual orientation. 646 Such discrimination is similarly prohibited by a
Wisconsin regulation.647 In late 1976, the Illinois Department of
Insurance Regulations ruled that Illinois insurance companies could
no longer discriminate against gays and single women. 648
Another aspect of family life includes having and raising
children. While lesbian women have had children by artificial
insemination,649 the legal problems created by artificial insemination
for both homosexual and heterosexual couples are far from
resolved. 650 For those homosexual individuals who do not wish to
have children of their own, foster parenting is an altruistic way of
experiencing parenthood. In New York City, a controversial new
program has placed thirty youngsters between the ages of twelve and
seventeen with gay couples. These young boys have all been rejected
by their parents and shunned by welfare agencies and heterosexual
foster parents because of their homosexuality. 65'
In 1974 the State of Washington revised its statutes dealing with
foster family homes to provide that a foster parent or parents must be
stable, loving, and ready to meet the emotional needs of the children.
These laws have been construed to include homosexual foster parents
who possess the interest and qualifications to be licensed. Such
licensing of homosexual foster parents was approved in In re
Meyer,652 in which a homosexual foster father was awarded custody of
his homosexual foster child. However, in a later case, In re Davis,653
the court refused to place a sixteen-year-old boy who had been
declared incorrigible with a male homosexual couple who agreed to
act as his foster parents. The boy's previous foster and group home
placements had been unsuccessful because of his homosexual
tendencies. Two state social workers, two juvenile parole officers, a
psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a sociologist all agreed that the boy
should be placed in a gay foster home. His father, however, was
opposed to the placement on the grounds that it would effectively

646. See 2 SEX L. REP. at 17 (1976).
647. See 2 SEx L. REP. at 30 (1976).
648. See 2 SEX L. REP. at 41 (1976).
649. The Advocate, Feb. 22, 1978, at 6.
650. See generally, Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination:A Need For Policy
Formulation,19 DRAKE L. REV. 409 (1970); Note, Artificial Insemination: A Legislative
Remedy, 3 WEST ST. U.L. REv. 48 (1975).
651. Franks, Homosexual Foster Parents:An Advance or a Peril, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1974, at 47.
652. No. J74031 (Wash. Sup. Ct., King Cty. Mar. 12, 1974), cited in Petition for Writ of
Review at 17, Koop v. Koop, No. 2315-11 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
653. 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2845 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1975).
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eliminate the boy's chances of turning out "straight." 654 The court
agreed, observing that "substituting two male homosexuals for
parents does violence not only to the literal definition of who are
parents but offends the traditional concept of what a family is."655

While explicitly recognizing that the two men could not legitimize
their relationship under Washington law, the court nevertheless
criticized them for living in a meretricious relationship. The court
concluded that the boy "should be encouraged to behave normally
regardless of his sexual orientation" 656 and thus should not be placed
in a gay foster home.
Gay persons obviously have families and form family units with
concomitant legal and financial needs. However, the legal institutions
and policies of this country have only begun to recognize those
needs. 657 The provisions against discrimination in housing and
insurance have been adopted by only a relatively few states.
Moreover, alternatives to marriage and to traditional means of raising
a family are evidently still at the experimental stage. Consequently,
until courts and lawmakers are willing to either abandon the
conventional lay and legal definitions of marriage or create new legal
forms creating equal protections for nonmarried cohabitors,
homosexual couples must continue to develop alternative ways to
achieve the financial, legal, and emotional benefits conferred upon
the legally-recognized family unit.
Other Civil Issues
XH.Incorporation and Tax Exempt Status

Like many other citizens, homosexual Americans have organized
in groups to advance their cause, and like many other organized
groups they have seen the advantage of incorporation at some stage
in their organizational development. The two main benefits of
654. Id at 2846. The fallacy of this contention is discussed in Richards, supra note 25, at
729 & 756 n.235.
655. 1L
656. Id at 2847.
657. When Gertrude Stein died in 1946, Alice B. Toklas, her life-partner of 40 years,
found herself at the mercy of the Stein family. Through various legal mechanisms, the
Stein family left her virtually penniless. See S. STEWARD, DEAR SAMMY: LETrERS FROM
GERTRUDE STEIN AND ALICE B. TOKLAs 107 (1977); L. SINON, THE BIOGRAPHY OF
ALICE B. TOKLAS 247-50 (1977). Recently, the Portland, Oregon Town Council,
concerned about how gay couples who are splitting up deal with their property division,
offered the gay community an arbitration service. The Advocate, Aug. 9,1978, at 10.
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incorporation are the limited financial liability and more favorable tax
status it affords the individuals involved. In addition, numerous gay
organizations have sought to incorporate in order to challenge more
effectively discriminatory laws against homosexual individuals.
A frequent choice of corporate form for these groups is the
nonprofit corporation. Indeed, approximately one-third of all
corporations in the United States are nonprofit. 658 The primary
advantage of selecting the not-for-profit form is the tax-exempt status

which the organization may obtain under the federal Internal
Revenue Code. 659 Under certain circumstances a nonprofit
corporation can receive its own income tax free, 66° and under other
circumstances the corporation 661can be eligible to receive taxdeductible gifts from individuals.

Gay organizations have sometimes had difficulty in obtaining

corporate status. In Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 662 the Gay

Activists Alliance (GAA) attempted to become incorporated under
the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law. The Secretary of
State of New York refused to accept their certificate of incorporation,
stating that it was not in an acceptable form because of the use of the
word "gay," and further that its purposes were contrary to both the

public policy and to the Penal Law of New

York. 663 The

GAA asked

658. A. CONARD & R. KRAUSS, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 605 (1977). "Every
American State has a general law under which a nonprofit corporation can be formed for
virtually any lawful nonprofit purpose." Id For an examination of non-profit
incorporation for gay organizations, see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations
and the Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
659. A. CONARD & R. KRAUSS, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 606 (1977).
660. I.R.C. § 501.
661. I.R.C. §§ 170,507.
662. 66 Misc. 2d 456,320 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
663. The purposes set forth in the proposed Certificate of Incorporation were: "(a) To
safeguard the rights guaranteed homosexual individuals by the constitutions and civil
rights laws of the United States and the several States, through peaceful petition and
assembly and non-violent protest when necessary; (b) To speak out on public issues as a
homosexual civil rights organization, working within the framework of the laws of the
United States and the several States but vigilant and vigorous in fighting any
discrimination based on sexual orientation of the individual; (c) To work for the repeal of
all laws regulating sexual conduct and practices between consenting adults; (d) To work
for the passage of laws ensuring equal treatment under the law of all persons regardless of
sexual orientation; (e) To instill in homosexuals a sense of pride and selfworth; (f) To
promote a better understanding of homosexuality among homosexuals and heterosexuals
alike, in order to achieve mutual respect, understanding and friendship; (g) To hold
meetings and social events for the better realization of the aforesaid purposes enunciated
in (a) through (f) inclusive, above, and to achieve, ultimately the complete liberation of
homosexuals from all injustices visited upon them as such, that they may receive ultimate
recognition as free and equal members of the human community." Id at 456-57, 320
N.Y.S.2d at 995-96.
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the court to order the Secretary to accept the certificate. The trial
court upheld the Secretary's decision, ruling that such a decision, in
the absence of abuse, was within the Secretary's discretion. The court
further indicated that, by holding itself out as a homosexual civil
rights organization, the GAA 6must
be professing a present or future
64
intent to break New York law.
In a short, curt decision, the New York Supreme Court
reversed. 665 The court said that nowhere in the statute is the use of the
word "gay" proscribed, nor is the word obscene or vulgar. Moreover,
the purposes of the group were not unlawful because "[it is well
established that it is not unlawful for any individual or group of
individuals to peaceably agitate for the repeal of any law. '666 In a per
curiam decision, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. 667 The
highest court succinctly held that the Secretary of State did not have
the power to reject an incorporation certificate if the formal requisites
were complied with and the purpose was lawful, nor did he have the
power to decide that certain names were "inappropriate." Thus,
GAA was allowed to incorporate.
An attempted incorporation in Ohio in 1974 was not as
successful. The Greater Cincinnati Gay Society (GCGS) presented its
articles of incorporation as a nonprofit corporation to the Secretary of
State, who refused to accept the articles. In Grant v. Brown,668 GCGS
brought suit to enforce its rights. The Secretary claimed that he could
not accept the articles because homosexuality was a crime in Ohio.
While the suit was pending, the Ohio legislature enacted a new
criminal code which decriminalized private adult consensual sexual
behavior for heterosexual and homosexual persons alike. The Ohio
Supreme Court held that the Secretary acted correctly,
notwithstanding the change in the law: "We agree with the Secretary
of State that the promotion of homosexuality
as a valid life style is
'669
contrary to the public policy of the state.
In a stinging dissent, Justice Stern pointed out that not only was
there no statute against homosexual conduct in Ohio, but there was
664. ld. at 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97. The court did not seem to understand the
difference between status and conduct: "[I]t would seem that in order to be a homosexual,
the prohibited act must have at some time been committed or at least presently
contemplated." Id. at 458, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97.
665. Owles v. Lomenzo, 38 App. Div. 2d 981,329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972).
666. Id. at 982, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
667. GAA v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965,293 N.E.2d 255,341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
668. 39 Ohio St. 2d 112,313 N.E.2d 847 (1974).
669. Id. at 113-14, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
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no judicially stated policy against homosexuality. He said that
"nowhere in the recorded decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court has
any justice ever used the term 'homosexual' or 'homosexuality', let
alone discuss[ed] the policy implications of such a life style." 670 Justice
Stern also raised a constitutional issue by noting that both the Ohio
and United States constitutions permit people to speak and promote
their causes peaceably. 671 In Justice Stem's view, the Secretary's job
was essentially ministerial, and a decision such as this one was an
abuse of power .672
Interestingly, the attorneys for the state thought the articles
should be accepted, but the Secretary of State initially refused to
retreat from his position. 673 After the decision, however, the articles
were resubmitted and then accepted. 674
In re Thorn Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.675
raises an issue similar to the one in Brown. The Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund sought the status of a legal assistance
corporation in New York. Section 495 of the Judiciary Law of New
York 676 prohibits the practice of law by corporations, but exempts
corporations that are organized for "benevolent" or "charitable"
purposes and corporations designed to assist persons without the
financial ability to assert their civil rights. 677 The stated purposes of
the Lambda Fund were to provide legal services without charge in
situations where the legal fights of homosexuals were substantially
affected, to promote the availability of legal services to homosexuals
by encouraging and attracting homosexual persons to the legal
profession, and to educate homosexuals about their legal rights.678
The lower court, in a one-paragraph per curiam decision, said
that the described purposes of the Lambda Fund were "neither
benevolent nor charitable." 679 Moreover, the court said that there was
no demonstrated need for such a corporation because it had not been
shown that legal services would not be provided to homosexual
persons by existing lawyers. In response to Lambda's affidavit stating
that many attorneys will not accept cases involving homosexuality,

670.
671.
672.
673.
674.

Id at 118, 313 N.E.2d at 851 (footnote omitted).
See 8 AKRON L. REv. 375 (1975).
39 Ohio St. 2d at 114-18, 313 N.E.2d at 849-51 (1974).
Id. at 115 n.2, 313 N.E.2d at 849.
Conversation with Powell Grant, President and Trustee of GCGS (Aug. 8, 1978).

675. 40 App. Div. 2d, 337 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1972).
676. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 495 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-79).

677. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 495(5) (McKinney 1968).
678. 40 App. Div. 2d at 788,337 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
679. Id.
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the court replied that this was "no more than a matter of taste" 680 and
did not indicate a lack of available legal services.
In a per curiam opinion, the New York Court of Appeals
holding that the lower court's decision was
reversed and remanded,
"unsupportable. '681 Judge Burke's concurring opinion more explicitly
pointed out that the Lambda application was substantially identical to
that of the Puerto Rican Defense Fund, which had been approved:
"We can perceive no rational distinction in the need for group legal
services as between Puerto Ricans and homosexuals. Both groups are
minorities subject to varied discriminations and in need of legal
6
services." 82

On remand, the lower court granted the Lambda Fund's
application for incorporation 683 but struck one purpose from the
proposed articles which read: "to promote legal education among
homosexuals by recruiting and encouraging potential law students
who are homosexuals and by providing assistance to such students
after admission to law school. '' 684 Without further elaboration the
not fall within the type of legal
court said that such a purpose did 685
services the Judiciary Act permitted.
Once a group is incorporated, the next logical step is to obtain
the maximum tax benefits possible under the Internal Revenue
Code. 686 It's Time, the newsletter of the National Gay Task Force,

reported in October 1977 on a significant policy change by the
Internal Revenue Service that affected gay non-profit corporations. It
said:
The Internal Revenue Service has reversed its policy of denying
charitable tax-exempt status, under section 501(c)(3) of the tax
code, to otherwise eligible organizations that take the position that
homosexuality is an acceptable, alternative life style, rather than a
680. Id
681. In re Thom Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 609,301 N.E.2d
543, 347 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1973).
682. Id. at 615-16,301 N.E.2d at 546,347 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
683. In re Thorn Lambda Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d 353, 350
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973).
684. Id. at 354, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
685. If the court meant to inhibit the growth of the number of homosexual lawyers, it
was not very successful. See Gay Lawyers In and Out of the Closet, 8 JURIS DoCrOR 33
(1978).
686. See notes 659-61 & accompanying text supra. Incorporation is not always a
prerequisite to tax-exempt status. See I.R.C. § 501(c). For an examination of tax-exempt
status for gay organizations, see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizationsand the
Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
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'sickness, disturbance, or diseased pathology'. While any nonprofit
corporation is exempt from taxes on its income, the old IRS policy
prevented donors to gay charities from taking a tax deduction for
their contributions .... 687

Since the reported change a number of gay organizations have
been granted the right to receive tax-free gifts. 688 However, this
alleged policy change of the Internal Revenue Service has not been
officially promulgated and its exact dimensions are unknown. 689 At
the present time, each request of a gay organization to be given
is being handled in the national IRS office on
section 501(c)(3) status
690
a case-by-case basis.
The proliferation of gay organizations and their current
corporate status indicates that few, if any, states are reading their
incorporation statutes strictly so as to exclude gay organizations. This
fact, coupled with the new IRS stance, should enhance the ability of
gay organizations to further their causes.
XHLI. Liquor Licensing Cases
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution,

repealing prohibition, contained a broad grant of authority to the
states to regulate the use, distribution, and consumption of liquor.
The expansion of regulation of the liquor industry to include the
regulation of premises licensed for the sale of liquor is justified by
pointing to the harmful potentialities arising from the sale of liquor.
Under this "harmful potentiality" theory, not only must the sale be
regulated, but the premises within which liquor is sold and consumed
also must be controlled in order to avoid the alleged potential
harm.691
687. It's Time, Oct. 1977, at 1.
688. The Advocate, Aug. 9, 1978, at 10.
689. In a conversation on August 7, 1978 between the author and IRS Section Chief for
tax-exempt organizations, Jean Gessay, Ms. Gessay said that she was "not aware" of any
policy changes by the IRS. She said that if any gay organization had recently received a
new status it was because the new status was "appropriate." Moreover, she said she was
unaware of any written IRS policy about the tax-exempt status of gay organizations.
690. In a conversation between the author and Mr, Jim Herbst of the IRS Cincinnati
office on August 7, 1978, Mr. Herbst said that he believes that a new policy is in effect with
regard to gay organizations but that he had received no written directives on the subject.
His understanding was that the national office now handles such requests on a
case-by-case basis. He said that according to his understanding of past policy, gay
organizations that advocated homosexuality have been denied § 501(c)(3) status because
to grant such status would be against public policy. Now, he said, if the organization is
purely educational, it will receive § 501(c)(3) status.
691. Comment, The Ohio Liquor Control Commission's Right to Regulate, 9 AKRON L.
REv. 695, 697 (1976).
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Courts generally have subscribed to three theories when they
uphold state regulation of liquor supply and consumption. The first
theory is that the state enjoys a "super" police power over liquor sale
and distribution and this power justifies the use of broad, general
regulations which would otherwise run afoul of the charge of
unconstitutional vagueness. Under the second theory, a license to sell
liquor is a privilege, revocable by the state at its discretion without
ordinary due process protections. 692 The last theory allows a state to
constitutionally restrict forms of expression normally protected by the
first amendment because the twenty-first amendment confers more
693
than normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals.
In the 1950's and 1960's the broad power of the liquor control
agencies was used to eliminate, harass, and discourage gay bars. The
myths about the use of bars as meeting places and recreational sites
for homosexual persons largely have been disproved. For example,
such bars are not places where all homosexuals "hangout"; studies
show that only one homosexual in eight has ever visited a "gay"
695
bar.694 Lesbians have few bars and seldom go to them.
696
Homosexuals do not drink more than heterosexuals, and gay bars
do not cause homosexuality. 697 Although contacts for sexual activity
are often made there, the bars are probably more important as social
698
centers for persons denied other social outlets.
By far the greatest abundance of liquor licensing cases, spanning
the years 1952 through 1967, has been produced by the State of New
York. In 1952, Lynch's Builders Restaurant,Inc. v. O'Connel 699 was
decided per curiam by the New York Court of Appeals. Lynch had
lost his liquor license because he allegedly "suffered or permitted the

692. Id.
at 695.
693. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
694. See A. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 525 (1971); DJ. WEST,
HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 23-24,157,162 (1977).
695. See generallyA. KARLEN, SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY 524 (1971).
696. D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 202 (1977).

697. "Although such establishments are sometimes condemned as breeding grounds of
homosexuality, the charge is not convincing. Most of the people who go there (apart from
tourists and some straight friends) already are involved in the homosexual life." E.
SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICIMS 87 (1965).
698. "[T]hey also serve the vital function of enhancing group cohesion and morale in
the face of persistent moral condemnation by the society as a whole. For the individual
homosexual, such places provide a much-needed opportunity to drop the mask he is often
obliged to wear in the 'straight' (non-homosexual) world." Id at 86.
699. 303 N.Y. 408,103 N.E.2d 531 (1952).
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premises to become disorderly" 7°° by knowingly allowing homosexual
activities on the premises. What the "activities" were, the opinion
does not specify; however, the court indicated there was "ample
proof" and that it was not "less probative" because a criminal charge
based on that activity was dismissed.70 l Thus, according to the highest
court in New York, homosexual activity in a bar about which the
licensee knew or should have known rendered the bar disorderly and
subject to a liquor license revocation.
The next two cases, Stanwood United, Inc. v. O'ConnelP 2 and
People v. Arenella,7 3 provided some guidance as to the kind of
"activity" which could result in license revocation. In Stanwood, the
court said that "[s]uffering premises to become disorderly means
something more than a mere happening on one occasion. '' 704 The
charge resulting in license revocation was based on a one-time
observation by a policeman of fifteen males acting .'in a female
way.' 7 5 The police officer also arrested one person who allegedly
solicited him. The court was unconvinced that the bar was a
"gathering place for degenerates" because no other complaints were
registered either before or after the one police visit.7°6
In Arenella, the court held that one ten-minute visit by a
policeman who then testified that the premises appeared to be a
meeting place for homosexual individuals was insufficient evidence to
justify revocation of a liquor license. However, the court explicitly
stated that "[i]f the premises in question were frequented by
homosexuals or sex deviates in an open and notorious manner, for the
purpose of soliciting others to commit lewd and indecent acts.., then
the premises would be 'disorderly."' 70 7 The court gave some
protection to the owners of gay bars when it said that "[u]nless some
prohibited acts took place in the premises, the mere fact that
homosexuals patronized the place, would not make the premises
'708
'disorderly' within the meaning of the statute.
70 9
In Fulton Bar and Grill, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority,
however, no prohibited acts were detailed. The finding of the state
liquor authority, that the licensee had "knowingly permitted the
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.

N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 106(6) (McKinney Supp. 1977-78).
303 N.Y. at 410, 103 N.E. 2d at 531.
283 App. Div. 79,126 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1953).
139 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1954).
293 App. Div. at 82, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
Id. at 80,126 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
Id at 81, 126 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
People v. Arenella, 139 N.Y.S.2d 186,189 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1954).
Id
11 App. Div. 2d 771,205 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1960) (mem.).
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licensed premises to be used as a gathering place for homosexuals and
degenerates who conducted themselves in an offensive and indecent
manner, 710 was upheld by the court as sufficient to label the premises
disorderly and to justify revoking the license. In Gilmer v.
Hostetter,71 the court, upholding a license revocation, defined even
more liberally the kind of behavior that would constitute disorderly
conduct when homosexual individuals were involved. It held that
"regular resort" by homosexual persons to the bar in question made
712
the bar "disorderly" even without proof of homosexual solicitation.
According to the court, this "disorder" could be inferred from
of certain acts which indicated
observation on a number of occasions
"overt homosexual tendencies. '713
In Kerma RestaurantCorp. v. Slate LiquorAuthority,7 14 the lower

court made what might be viewed as a liberal statement when it said,
"[M]ere congregation of homosexuals, where there is no breach of the
peace, does not make the licensed premises disorderly .... -"715 This
statement seems to indicate that a court would look for a criminal
offense before judging a bar to be "disorderly." However, the court in
Kerma upheld the license revocation on the testimony of a policeman
who stated that "several of the patrons exhibited characteristicsand
mannerisms which evidenced homosexual propensities; that he heard
several male patrons address each other in endearing terms and saw
several of them sit on the laps of others; that he was solicited by a
male patron for a lewd and indecent act; [and] that only male patrons
were present. 71 6 While "mere congregation" did not prove disorderly
premises, these further acts, the court held, were sufficient to uphold
the license revocation.
Kerma was appealed and reversed.7 17 The New York Court of
Appeals found no proof in the record of any breach of the peace, and
cited with approval the lower court's statement that a mere
congregation without a breach of the peace was insufficient. Beyond
that, the court was critical of the basis of the lower court's decision.
"Indulgence in the inference that... 'several' ... [of the] men in a
710. Id at 771, 205 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
711. 20 App. Div. 2d 586,245 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1963) (mer.).
712. Id at 587,245 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
713. Id
714. 27 App. Div. 2d 918,278 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1967) (mem.).
715. Id at 918,278 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
716. Id
717. Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 111,233 N.E.2d 833,286
N.Y.S.2d 822 (1967).
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grill.., were, from their dress and makeup, homosexuals does not
support the additional inference that they would create disorder. 71 8
The court opined, "It is reasonable to think that even though he
dresses strangely a homosexual may be orderly.. .,719 The court did
warn that if the licensee had known of the alleged homosexual
solicitation that would be proof of suffering or permitting a disorderly
premise. 720
During the appeal of Kerma, the decision in Kifisia Foods, Inc. v.
New York State Liquor Authority7 2 l was handed down. There the
court summarily upheld a license revocation because the licensee
allegedly permitted homosexual individuals to remain in his
restaurant while acting in a lewd and indecent manner. Three
policemen testified that they had been solicited, 722 but the opinion
does not indicate whether or not the licensee knew or had reason to
know of the solicitations.
In Becker v. New York State Liquor Authority,723 the appeals

court upheld suspension of a liquor license on the grounds that the
licensee had permitted homosexual individuals to patronize his
restaurant and to conduct themselves in an indecent manner. As
pointed out by the dissent, no conviction of solicitation was involved.
Upholding the suspension on appeal, 724 the New York Court of
Appeals narrowed the standard for suspending licenses by holding
that fondling of primary sexual organs in a licensed premise on a
public dance floor constituted "disorder" under the New York
statute. The court made a further important point: such behavior, it
said, constitutes "disorder" whether between heterosexuals or
homosexuals. 725
If Kerma and Becker are to be taken at their face value, a
licensee in New York can allow homosexual persons to frequent his
bar without fear that his license will be revoked or suspended as long
as the licensee does not knowingly permit solicitation on the premises
nor allow fondling of primary sexual organs among his patrons.
In spite of its limiting effect in license revocation cases, the
Becker decision was used to broaden coverage under a penal statute
to include owners of homosexual establishments. In People v.
718. Id. at 115,233 N.E.2d at 835,286 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25.
719. Id. at 115,233 N.E.2d at 835,286 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
720. Id. at 116, 233 N.E.2d at 835, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
721. 28 App. Div. 2d 841,281 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1967) (mem.).
722. Id.at 842, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
723. 28 App. Div. 2d 980,283 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1967) (mem.).
724. Becker v. New York State Liquor Auth., 21 N.Y.2d 289, 234 N.E.2d 443, 287
N.Y.S.2d 400 (1967).
725. Id. at 292,234 N.E.2d at 444,287 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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deCurtis,726 the defendant was convicted of keeping a disorderly
house in violation of a New York penal law under which persons
cannot "maintain or keep a house of ill-fame.., for the
encouragement or practice by persons of lewdness, fornication,
unlawful sexual intercourse, or for any other indecent or disorderly
act ....727 The statute was originally intended to apply to
heterosexual prostitution. 728 In order to apply it to a restaurant that
allegedly allowed homosexual activities on its premises, the court
used the definition from Becker that public fondling of primary sexual
organs constitutes "disorder" whether between heterosexual or
homosexual persons. Given this definition of disorder, the conviction
under the statute was upheld.
California, like New York, has a large group of liquor license
cases spanning the years 1951 through 1960. When Stoumen v.
Reilly7 29 was decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1951, it
appeared to be a clear victory for liquor licensees who catered to
homosexual patrons. The liquor license of the plaintiff had been
revoked because he was found to have conducted a disorderly house
730
in violation of section 58 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
The conviction was supported by the licensing board's finding that
"persons of known homosexual tendencies patronized said premises
and used said premises as a meeting place." 731 The California
Supreme Court reversed, saying that no evidence of any illegal or
immoral conduct on the premises had been shown: "[Slomething
more must be shown than that many of his patrons were homosexuals
'732
and that they used his restaurant and bar as a meeting place.
Subsequent to Stoumen, the legislature added subdivision (e) of

726. 63 Misc. 2d 246,311 N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. Div. 1970).
727. Former N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1146, cited in idat 247,311 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
728. In Harris v. United States, 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1974), the District of Columbia
court analogized a homosexual health club to a heterosexual house of prostitution. On this
basis, the court found that the club was a "bawdy or disorderly" house, and could thus he a
nuisance per se.
729. 37 Cal. 2d 713,234 P.2d 969 (1951).
730. Section 58 provided: "Every licensee or agent or employee of any licensee who
keeps or permits to be used or suffers to be used, in conjunction with a licensed premises,
any disorderly house or place in which people abide or to which people resort, to the
disturbance of the neighborhood, or in which people abide or to which people resort for
purposes which are injurious to the public morals, health, convenience or safety shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 715,234 P.2d at 970.
731. Id at 715, 234 P.2d at 971.
732. Id. at 717, 234 P.2d at 971.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

section 24200 to the Business and Professions Code,733 which
provided for suspension of a license "where a portion of the premises
of the licensee upon which the activities permitted by the license are
conducted are a resort for... sexual perverts." Moreover, a general
community reputation that a particular bar was a resort for sexual
perverts was allowed as proof of a violation of this section.
Initially, California appellate courts reconciled subdivision (e)
with Stoumen by construing the "something more" than mere
patronage requirement to mean any homosexual activity, even if the
activity did not constitute a violation of the penal code. 734 In Vallerga
v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control 735 however, the

California Supreme Court struck down subdivision (e), holding that it
was unconstitutional to revoke a liquor license solely on the basis that
a bar or restaurant is a resort736for a certain class of persons:
"something more" must be shown.
While the Vallerga court struck down section 24200(e), it
specifically called attention to another statute which could provide a
basis for license revocation in such cases. The court pointed out that
article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution vested in the
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control the authority to revoke a
license for good cause when the continuance of the license would be
"contrary to public welfare or morals. '737 Under this authority, the

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control revoked liquor licenses
for violation of California Business and Professions Code section
2561,738 which prohibits keeping a disorderly house. The revocations
were upheld in Benedetti v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control739 Morell v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,740

733. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1217, § 1, at 2230-31.
734. See Nickola v. Munro, 162 Cal. App. 2d 449, 328 P.2d 271 (1958); Kershaw v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 155 Cal. App. 2d 544, 318 P.2d 494 (1957). In
both cases, liquor licenses were suspended under § 24200(e) even though there was no
evidence of an illegal act. The court in Nickola ruled: "(W]hen one male, by acts of the
type here involved, seeks sexual gratification from another in a public tavern, he has
committed acts of sex perversion and demonstrated that he is a sex pervert." 162 Cal. App.
2d at 457, 328 P.2d at 276.
735. 53 Cal. 2d 313,347 P.2d 909, 1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1959).
736. Warning that homosexuals may not be held to a higher degree of moral conduct
than heterosexuals, the court nevertheless said that "any public display which manifests
sexual desires, whether they be heterosexual or homosexual in nature" may be regulated.
Id. at 319, 347 P.2d at 912, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
737. Id. at 321,347 P.2d at 913,1 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
738. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25601 (West 1964). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
24200(b) (West 1964) permits revocation of a license for violation of § 25601.
739. 187 Cal. App. 2d 213, 9 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1960).
740. 204 Cal. App. 2d 504,22 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1962).
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and Stoumen v. Munro.741 As in the New York cases, 742 the catch-all
notion of "disorderly house" was held to embrace establishments
visited by homosexual persons. In all cases, the courts ruled that the
licensee was not required to have actual knowledge of the acts which
made the premises a "disorderly house." 743
The number of reported California cases falls off after 1961,
perhaps indicating that gay bars were gaining tolerance and that
police had begun to use their efforts in another direction. This
conclusion is somewhat undermined by Francisco Enterprises v.
Kirby,744 in which a holder of an alcoholic beverage license in
California attempted to enjoin the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control from revoking his license. The plaintiff's allegations
are novel with respect to liquor licensing cases. He claimed that the
revocation proceedings were the result of a conspiracy among state
officers to do away with his business solely because it was frequented
by homosexuals; that the proceedings deprived him of due process
and equal protection, and chilled his patrons' rights of freedom of
speech; and that the state statute under which his license would be
revoked as contrary to "public welfare or morals" and "public morals,
health, convenience and safety" was unconstitutionally vague.745 The
741. 219 Cal. App. 2d 302, 33 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1963). Sol Stoumen, the petitioner in this
action, was also the petitioner in Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
See text accompanying notes 729-32 supra.
742. See text accompanying notes 699-728 supra.
743. In almost all of these cases, there are lengthy descriptions of the homosexual
activity found to constitute disorder. Usually the activity includes same sex dancing, same
sex kissing, same sex hugging, and allegedly same sex fondling of private parts. There is
usually testimony that the men speak in high-pitched voices, giggle and mince and the
women are mannishly attired. Because of the repetitiveness of the testimony it has not
been detailed here. Usually there is no direct evidence of any sexual crime although the
police agents almost always allege that they were solicited for deviant sex acts. Sometimes
there are convictions of patrons for these alleged solicitations. The whole issue of police
harassment and entrapment of male homosexuals in California is detailed in Project, The
Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and
Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 647 (1966).
See also Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 337
P.2d 203 (1959). In Sultan, the city board of police commissioners revoked a Turkish bath
owner's license on the ground that the business was carried on in an unlawful and
improper manner. The complaint against Sultan alleged that his establishment was a
"hangout for male degenerates of all types who have committed on the premises indecent,
lewd, lascivious acts prohibited by law." Id at 191-92, 337 P.2d at 205. The judge
categorized the acts performed there not only as illegal and immoral but also as
"disgusting," id. at 196,337 P.2d at 208, and upheld the license revocation.
744. 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973).
745. Id-at 484.
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the Ninth Circuit,
merits of these allegations were not reached by 746
which upheld a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.
Pennsylvania courts have uniformly supported the state liquor
board in its license revocations. One of the grounds on which a
suspension was upheld in the 1966 case of Anthony Wayne Bar and
Restaurant, Inc.,747 was that the employees of the licensee permitted
"disorderly or improper conduct 748 on the licensed premises. The
evidence supporting such a finding consisted primarily of
observations by a police officer of conversations, dancing, and
suggestive actions by the male clientele. The ground for suspension in
another 1966 case, In re Revocation of License of Clock Bar, Inc.,749
was permitting solicitation of patrons for immoral purposes.75 0
Despite the fact that "[t]here was no evidence of any solicitations of
patrons except those encouraged by the agents" of the Liquor
Control Board,751 the court nevertheless upheld the suspension.
The last Pennsylvania case to deal with gay bars was Freedman
Liquor License Case.752 There, an appeals court overturned a finding
of no public disturbance, and hence no disorder, to uphold the
suspension of a restaurant liquor license. In its cursory discussion of
the issues, the court refused even to set out the "revolting" testimony
leading to the license revocation, except to say that it supported the
liquor board's findings.75 3 The court cited Anthony Wayne Bar754 for
the proposition that activities by homosexuals constitute disorderly
and improper conduct. 755 Again, as in other states, no reported cases
appear in Pennsylvania after the late 1960's.
A Louisiana case in 1957, Kotteman v. Grevemberg,756 upheld the
revocation of a permit to sell beer on the grounds that the general
conduct of the establishment and the type of patrons who frequented
'757
it, were "not conducive to an orderly, law abiding establishment.
The charges included evidence that over 250 arrests had been made
on the premises over a two and one-half year period and testimony of

746. Id.
747. 42 Pa. D. & C. 2d 712 (1966), affd, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 756 (1967).
748. d. at 713.
749. 85 Dauphin C. 125 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1966).
750. A second ground for the suspension, keeping of a disorderly house, was not
sustained. Id. at 130-31.
751. Id. at 132.
752. 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 132,235 A.2d 624 (1967).
753. Id. at 134,235 A.2d at 625.
754. See text accompanying notes 747-48 supra.
755. 211 Pa. Super. at 134,235 A.2d at 625.
756. 233 La. 327, 96 So. 2d 601 (1957).
757. Id. at 330-31, 96 So. 2d at 602.
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police that the bar was "notorious as a place in which perverts and sex
deviates congregated."' 758 The court upheld the revocation saying,
"On the merits of the appeal we find little to discuss." 759
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in the 1964 case of Cesaroniv.
Smith,760 took much the same position as courts in sister states with
regard to revocation of licenses of bars patronized by homosexuals. In
Cesaroni,the court found the evidence sufficient to hold the licensee's
establishment was disorderly under the Rhode Island statute7 61 even
though no evidence in the record indicated that the conduct within

the bar disturbed those living in the neighborhood. The court held
that the legislature intended "to condition the continued operation of
establishments" on the licensee's ability to prevent conditions which
762
directly or "by indirection offend the sensibilities of the neighbors.
The bias of the court is evident in its statement that the licensee
for
permitted his bar "to become attractive as a gathering place '763
deviates of both sexes, a virtual house of assignation for perverts.
The single published case in Florida on the subject of gay bars,
Inman v. City of Miami,764 deals with the constitutionality of a Miami
ordinance prohibiting a liquor licensee from knowingly employing a
homosexual person, knowingly selling or serving a homosexual
person alcoholic beverages, or knowingly allowing two or more
homosexual persons to congregate or remain in his place of business.
The court upheld the law on the grounds that it had a rational
relationship to public health, morals, safety, and the general welfare.
The court concluded that "[t]he object of the ordinance as a whole is
to prevent the congregation at liquor establishments of persons likely
to prey upon the public by attempting to recruit other persons for acts
758. I at 335, 96 So. 2d at 603.
759. Id at 334, 96 So. 2d at 603.
760. 98 R.I. 377,202 A.2d 292 (1964).
761. The statute provided: "If any licensed person shall permit the house or place where
he is licensed to sell beverages under the provisions of this title to become disorderly so as
to annoy and disturb the persons inhabiting or residing in the neighborhood thereof,...
and if it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the board, body or official hearing
such charge that he has ... permitted to be done any of the things hereinbefore in this
section mentioned, then said board, body or official may suspend or revoke his license or
enter other order thereon." Id at 380, 202 A.2d at 294.
762. Id.at 384,202 A.2d at 296.
763. Id The court continued: "This obviously induced these unfortunate people to flock
to a place where they would be assured that their conduct would be tolerated and where
any residual reluctance at participation in acts of perversion would be overcome by the
Id.
availability of alcoholic beverages .....
764. 197 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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765 No basis
which have been declared illegal by the Legislature .... ,,
for the conclusion that mere congregation by homosexual persons
would lead to lawbreaking is revealed by the opinion.
In Paddock Bar, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage
Control,766 a New Jersey appeals court upheld the suspension of a
liquor license where the licensee was charged with permitting persons
"who appeared to be homosexuals" to congregate upon his
premises 67 Where it was clearly proven that the patrons had the
appearance of homosexual persons, actual proof of homosexual status
was not required. "It is often in the plumage," said the court, "that we
identify the bird. ' 768 The court held that "it is inimical to the
preservation of our social, and moral welfare to permit public taverns
to be converted into recreational fraternity houses for homosexuals
and prostitutes." 769
Four years later, another New Jersey appeals court in Murphy's
Tavern v. Davis770 found in a fashion similar to Paddock that the
patrons looked and acted like homosexual individuals. Such
appearance and conduct was held to be a sufficient basis upon which
to punish a licensee who allowed such persons to assemble on his
premises. 771 The court concluded that it was not "callous to the
problem of the homosexual medically or socially" 772 but that tight
mandated maintenance of accepted
control over the liquor business
773
standards of public decency.
In 1967 the New Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the issues
raised in Paddock and Murphy in the case of One Eleven Wines &
Liquors Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control 774 The court
held that the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control was unjustified
in disciplining licensees because persons with homosexual
mannerisms were permitted to congregate in their establishments.
The court, citing to Robinson v. California775 for support, pointed out

765. Id. at 52.
766. 46 N.J. Super. 405, 134 A.2d 779 (1957).
767. The business was held to be offensive to common decency and public morals. Id.
at 407, 134 A.2d at 779.
768. Id. at 408-09, 134 A.2d at 780. The characteristics involved included, among others,
"effeminate pitch of voice," "manipulation of cigarettes," giggling, and rocking and
swaying of posteriors in a "maidenly fashion." Id at 409, 134 A.2d at 781.
769. Id. at 408, 134 A.2d at 780.
770. 70 N.J. Super. 87,175 A.2d 1 (1961).
771. Id. at 95,175 A.2d at 5.
772. Id. at 96, 175 A.2d at 6.
773. Id.
774. 50 N.J. 329,235 A.2d 12 (1967).
775. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson dealt with a California statute that made narcotics
addiction a misdemeanor. The Supreme Court held that the statute inflicted cruel and
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that "though in our culture homosexuals are indeed unfortunates,
their status does not make them criminals or outlaws.

' 776

Therefore,

the court said, as long as homosexual persons break no laws, they
have a right to congregate in public, and that includes patronizing
taverns. The court said that the Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control produced no evidence to show what actual harm gay persons
did in bars. The court warned that any further proceedings by the
Department should be based on "specific charges of improper
' 777
conduct" rather than on "general charges of mere congregation.

Thus the New Jersey court joins those of New York and
California in agreeing that, in order to revoke a license under liquor
regulation statutes, something more must be shown than mere status
of the bar owner's patrons as homosexual. This posture is much to be
preferred over that of many states where the standards under which
licensees are prosecuted remain broad and for the most part
ill-defined, thereby allowing virtually rubber-stamp confirmation of
prosecutions under state liquor licensing statutes. Nevertheless, even
under the stricter standard, the hands of the licensing boards are not
tied. As the New Jersey case, One Eleven Wines, points out along with
the Vallerga case 778 which it cites with approval, the courts have left
plenty of space for the beverage control departments to revoke
licenses if they can show specific lewd and immoral conduct of
patrons, with or without knowledge of the licensee in some cases.
Even if bar owners seemingly need have little fear of prosecution
from their licensing boards at present (to be inferred from the fact
that few cases are finding their way into the courts), the lack of
prosecution is more likely due to political disinterest than lack of a
strong statute or court approval of prosecutions by the licensing
departments.
XIV. Universities and Other Public Forums

The following cases, which relate to the first amendment rights of
homosexual individuals and their organizations, reveal that courts
almost without exception have upheld the right of homosexual
unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments because it
made the "status" of drug addiction a criminal offense regardless of the offender's actual
behavior.
776. 50 N.J. at 342,235 A.2d at 18.
777. Ia at 342,235 A.2d at 19.
778. Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 313, 347 P.2d
909,1 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1959). See notes 735-36 and accompanying text supra.
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persons to speak and organize. The bulk of these cases arise from
confrontations between universities and gay student organizations.
Associated Students of Sacramento State College v. Butz, 779 a
California superior court decision, presaged the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the landmark student organization
case of Healy v. James.780 In Associated Students, the college denied
recognition to a homosexual group, Society for Homosexual
Freedom, despite the fact that the group had complied with all the
proper procedures for recognition. 781 The court, in a straight-forward
first amendment analysis pointed out that once public facilities are
opened as a forum, the state cannot censor ideas by denying access to
the forum based on the content of the ideas to be presented. 7 82
Moreover, absent a clear and present danger or reasonable grounds
to believe that a serious evil will result, free speech cannot be
limited.783 Finding no evidence of imminent illegal acts in the case at
bar, the court ordered the college to reconsider recognition of the
group.
779. Civ. No. 200795 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento, Feb. 15, 1971), reported in 3 C.L.
BULL. 63 (1971).
780. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Supreme Court held that denial of university
recognition to a politically active student group, Students for a Democratic Society,
affected the group's first amendment rights and that recognition could only be denied
under extremely narrow and strict circumstances. For an examination of the right of
association doctrine as applied to gay organizations see Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual
Organizationand the Right of Association, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1979).
781. The college indicated that the denial was based on a number of factors: (1)
Recognition would endorse or promote homosexual behavior; (2) Recognition would
draw homosexuals to the campus; (3) Recognition would expose minors to homosexual
advocacy and practice; (4) Recognition would create too great a risk which might lead
students to engage in illegal behavior. 3 C.L. BULL. at 63.
782. "The idea that freedom of speech secures to speakers some right to use public
places for expression is the core of the 'public forum' concept." Note, The Public Forum:
Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the FirstAmendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
See also Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV.
1.
783. Citing to Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), the court ruled that a
limitation on free speech will not be allowed merely because the ideas involved are
unpopular or embarrassing. The court stated: "The denial [of recognition] in this case
seems to be based on mere suspicion, disgust, unpopularity, and fear of what might occur.
Mere suspicion cannot be sufficient grounds for denying the Society and the petitioner
certain constitutional guarantees. The evidence presented at the hearing was woefully
weak in support of any reasonable fear that recognition of the Society would increase the
risk that students would engage in illegal homosexual behavior on the campus. The
California Supreme Court has ruled that it cannot be assumed that when a group of
persons, some of whom are homosexuals, meet together that they shall use the meeting
place for illegal activities; or that a person's use of facilities can be denied on the bases
[sic] of what one suspects he might do on such premises." 3 C.L. BULL. at 63.
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In Wood v. Davison,784 the first reported federal case to deal with

the right of a university to regulate the activities of a gay student
organization, the state-supported University of Georgia allowed a
homosexual student organization to register but denied use of
university facilities to the group for a conference and dance. The basis
for the denial was that these activities were not within the purposes of
which is believed to be
the university and "introduce[d] an element
'785
not in the best interest of the University.
The court brought this case under the umbrella of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Healy v. James.786 Healy held that denial of
recognition to a student group, rather than denial of facilities,
abridged first amendment rights. The court noted, however, that
Healy also dealt with the second issue when it observed that denial of
facilities was the primary means of infringing on freedom of
expression. 787 The Wood court enumerated three possible
circumstances under which denial of facilities might be countenanced:
(1) if the campus organization refused to abide by reasonable
regulations; (2) if there was a demonstrable danger of violence or
disruption; (3) if the meeting in question violated state or federal
law.788 None of these circumstances being present, the court found
that the university had not met its burden of justifying denial of access
to the facilities.
Wood v. Davison was not appealed. Two years passed before the
next gay student organization case reached a federal court. In early
1974, a district court decided Gay Students Organization of the
University of New Hampshire v. Bonner.289 Like Wood the case
involved denial of access to facilities rather than denial of recognition
to the homosexual student group.
After a complaint to the university by the Governor of New
Hampshire with respect to a dance sponsored by the Gay Student
Organization (GSO), the university banned all social functions of that
organization. Shortly thereafter, the organization sponsored a play at
which allegedly obscene materials were distributed by persons who
were not GSO members.79 The Governor of New Hampshire
responded with an open letter to the trustees of the university:
784. 351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972).

785. Id. at 545 n.5.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.

408 U.S. 169 (1972). See note 780 supra.
351 F. Supp. at 546-47.
Id. at 547-48.
367 F. Supp. 1088 (D.N.H.), modified, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1090-92.

1146
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[I]ndecency and moral filthy will no longer be allowed on our
campuses.
I am not interested in legalistic hairsplitting .... Either you take
firm, fair and positive action to rid your campuses of socially
abhorrent activities or I, as [G]overnor, will stand solidly against
of one more cent of taxpayers' money for your
the expenditure
7 91
institutions.

Not surprisingly, the university then ordered an even more rigid ban
on GSO social functions. A lawsuit ensued.79
In holding the university's action to be a clear violation of the
first amendment, the court used tests similar to those of Wood v.
Davison.7 93 Finding no evidence of either refusal to obey university

regulations, violence, or violation of law, 794 the court held that GSO
was entitled to use facilities in the same manner as other university
student organizations.

On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed. 795 Responding to the
university's argument that "social events" are not among the class of
protected associational activities, 796 the court noted that GSO was a
cause-oriented political group. As such, while its social functions do
not constitute "pure speech," its "conduct may have a communicative
content sufficient to bring it within the ambit of the First
Amendment. ''797 The court found that "expression, assembly and
petition constitute significant aspects of the GSO's conduct in holding
social events. '798 Because the regulation of GSO's social events was
its expression, the organization's freedom of
based on the content of 799
expression was curtailed.
791. Id. at 1092.
792. As one of its defenses, the university pointed to the Governor's position. The
district court replied that "a State university may not be blackmailed into depriving its
students of their constitutional rights." Id at 1100.
793. See text accompanying note 788 supra.
794. The university argued that GSO functions were "tantamount to criminal
solicitation of deviate sexual relations," 367 F. Supp. at 1100, contrary to New Hampshire
law. The court, however, found neither evidence of illegal behavior or solicitation at GSO
functions nor that GSO advocated public homosexual acts, stating that the university
could reasonably regulate if such situations actually arose.
795. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
796. I at 659.
797. Id at 660.
798. Id at 660-61.
799. Like the district court, the First Circuit found no evidence of imminent lawless
action. The court ruled also that the university could regulate overt sexual behavior
(heterosexual or otherwise), idt at 663, but that it could not ban GSO's social functions
consistent with the first amendment.
In University of New Hampshire v. April, 115 N.H. 576, 347 A.2d 446 (1975), the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire turned aside the university's attempt to accomplish the
same results by an action in state court. The university sought a determination of whether
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Mississippi Gay Allicance v. Goudelock,8°° decided in 1976,
involved a clash between a nonhomosexual student organization and
an off-campus homosexual group. The newspaper of the University of
Mississippi, a state-supported school, was run and edited by students.
Its editor, Mr. Goudelock, refused to accept a paid advertisement
tendered by the Mississippi Gay Alliance (MGA), an off-campus
homosexual group, announcing its Gay Center which offered
counseling, legal aid, and a library of homosexual literature. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed a district court decision in favor of the university.
Both courts agreed that the case did not involve the state action
necessary to trigger a first amendment review, because, although the
paper was supported in part by activity fees of students, university
officials did not supervise or control the paper's content.80 1
In dictum, the court supported the position of student editor
Goudelock.80 2 The court found that a Mississippi statute condemning
"any intercourse which is unnatural, detestable and abominable"80 3
was constitutional, and, therefore, the editor had the right not to be
8°4
involved with such activity.
In a strong dissent,805 Justice Goldberg declared that the
advertisement in question was protected speech, and that it did not
involve criminal or illegal activity. The status of being "homosexual,"
he noted, is not illegal in Mississippi. Justice Goldberg took the
position that the case should be remanded on the issue of whether the
student newspaper constituted state action, implying that such state
action was involved.8 06 If the paper's activities constituted state
action, and it accepted paid advertisements, then there must be equal
it could permissibly regulate GSO activities if homosexuality were found to be an illness or
mental disorder. The state supreme court refused to hear the case on the basis of res
judicata; the university, the court said, was attempting to relitigate the issues already
decided in the federal court.
800. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
801. id at 1075.
802. The judge's attitude toward the homosexual group became rather blatant when he
referred to them as "this off-campus cell." Id at 1075 (emphasis added).
803. Id.
804. Id. at 1075-76. In a footnote, Justice Coleman, the writer of the majority opinion,
made it clear that he believed that no newspaper in Mississippi could be required to take
"solicitations for homosexual contacts." Id.at 1076 n.4. In so stating, the justice apparently
equated the Gay Center advertisement with solicitation.
805. Id. at 1076.
806. "I have little doubt that this court would review a decision by the students to
exclude blacks from participation on the newspaper staff as a decision imbued with state
action." Id. at 1085.
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access to that service, without discrimination based on content. Thus,
Justice Goldberg would treat the state-supported student newspaper
under the public-forum doctrine, at least with respect to paid
advertisements.
The Fourth Circuit case of Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews 80 7 is squarely in line with Wood and Bonner and has a
Virginia Commonwealth
strong factual similarity to Healy.
University (VCU) refused to recognize the Gay Alliance of Students
(GAS) as a registered student organization. The district court found
that there was "no cognizable constitutional deprivation" because of
nonrecognition but nevertheless ordered VCU to give GAS access to
many university facilities and services. 80 8 The Fourth Circuit found a
clear deprivation of first amendment rights 80 9 and ordered VCU to
register the gay student organization. In so holding, the court
reiterated the Healy warning: a university cannot restrict speech or
association solely because it finds the group's views abhorrent. 810 The
concurring opinion echoed this thesis: "The stifling of advocacy is
even more abhorrent, even more sickening. It rings the death knell of
'811
a free society."
The 1977 case of Gay Lib v. University of Missouri812 originated
with the university's refusal to recognize a homosexual student
organization based on "a concern for the impact of recognition on the
general relationship of the University to the public at large. '813 In the
course of an administrative hearing on the issue, which included
expert and lay testimony, the hearing officer made a finding that
807. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
808. See id. at 164.

809. Because the university gave no reasons why it withheld registration, the parties
stipulated to the university's probable reasons in the trial court: "1 As a matter of logic,
the existence of GAS as a recognized campus organization would increase the opportunity
for homosexual contacts. 2 Recognition of GAS would tend to encourage some students
to join the organization who otherwise might not join. 3 Some students may benefit from
membership in GAS and some may not, and to some it would confer neither benefit nor
detriment. 4 The existence of GAS would tend to attract other homosexuals to VCU." Id.
at 163-64.
The court found these reasons constitutionally insufficient to support an abridgment
of first amendment rights. In response to the university's argument that recognition of
GAS would increase the opportunity for homosexual contacts, the court said, "[Even if
affording GAS registration does increase the opportunity for homosexual contacts, that
fact is insufficient to overcome the associational rights of members of GAS." Id. at 166.
810. Id
811. Id. at 168.
812. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). For further
discussion of this case, see 46 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 489 (1978); 43 MO. L. REv. 109

(1978).

813. 558 F.2d at 851.
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recognition of Gay Lib as a student organization would cause

increased violations of Missouri sodomy laws. 814 This finding was the
15
basis for the district court's decision in favor of the university.8
Recognizing that denial of recognition was an infringement of the
first amendment, the district court nevertheless reasoned that the
university had overcome the heavy burden imposed on it by Healy
8 16
and was thus constitutionally justified in its decision.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

reversed. The court pointed out that Healy, combined with the
decisions in Bonner and Matthews, militated for recognition.8 17 The
expert testimony below, on the basis of which the district court found

that violation of sodomy laws would result from recognition, was
found insufficient to justify prior restraint by the government for the
group of students in question.818 Gay Lib did not advocate breaking
university rules. The court stated, "It is difficult to singularly ascribe
evil connotations to the group simply because they are
homosexuals."8 19 To do so, the court said, would impermissibly
814. The other findings of the hearing officer were that recognition of Gay Lib by the
university will:
"(1) give a formal status to and tend to reinforce the personal identities of the
homosexual members of those organizations and will perpetuate and expand an abnormal
way of life, unless contrary to their intention as stated in their written purposes, the
homosexual members make a concerted effort to seek treatment, recognize homosexuality
as abnormal and attempt to cease their homosexual practices;
(2) tend to cause latent or potential homosexuals who become members to become
overt homosexuals;
(3) tend to expand homosexual behavior which will cause increased violations of
section 563.230 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri;
(4) be undesirable insofar as homosexuals will counsel other homosexuals, i.e., the
sick and abnormal counseling others who are similarly ill and abnormal; and
(5) constitute an implied approval by the University of the abnormal homosexual
lifestyle as a normal way of life and would be so understood by many students and other
members of the public, even though, and despite the fact that, the University's regulations
for student organizations provide that recognition of an organization by the University
does not constitute approval or endorsement of the organization's aims or activities." Id.
at 851 n.7.
815. 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
816. Id.at 1370. The court found that recognition of Gay Lib would be "likely to incite,
promote, and result in acts contrary to and in violation of the sodomy statute" of Missouri.
Id.
817. 558 F.2d at 853.
818. 1& at 854. The court was critical of the expert testimony, saying that the opinions
were without basis in scientific fact and were neither historically nor empirically verified.
II.
819. Id. at 856.
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penalize persons because of their status .820
Rehearing was denied en banc by the Eighth Circuit with a fourfour split in voting. The Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari. 821 Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice
Rehnquist 822 made it clear that he wanted to hear the case so that he
might overrule the Eighth Circuit: "Writ large, the issue posed in this
case is the extent to which a self-governing democracy, having made
certain acts criminal, may prevent or discourage individuals from
engaging in speech or conduct which encourages others to violate
those laws."''
Rehnquist analogized the nonrecognition of the gay group to a
measles quarantine. "[T]he question is more akin to whether those
suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of
quarantine regulations, to associate together and with others who do
not presently have measles, in order to urge repeal of a state law
providing that the measles sufferers be quarantined." 824 Justice
Rehnquist's view of the constitutional rights of homosexual persons
seems not to be in doubt.
The issues confronted by courts when organizations of
homosexual persons clash with the administrators of academia are
also present in cases involving nonuniversity forums. Toward a Gayer
Bicentennial Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation,821
for example, involved the use of a state building as a forum for a
homosexual organization. "Toward a Gayer Bicentennial
Committee," composed of representatives from a number of gay
organizations in Rhode Island, was formed to provide information to
the public at large about the legal, political, and social aspirations of
homosexuals through the medium of the bicentennial celebration.
The group requested that the Rhode Island Bicentennial Commission
include in its official calendar several events that the Committee
proposed to conduct, and also requested use of the Old State House
as a site for one of the events.
The Commission denied the requests, 826 claiming that they failed
to satisfy the formal requirements for such proposals. The court found
no evidence that the stated reason controlled the Commission's
action; rather, it seemed clear that the homosexual nature of the
820.
821.
case.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.

Id.
434 U.S. 1080 (1978). Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Burger voted to hear the
Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent.
434 U.S. at 1082.
Id at 1084. Presumably Justice Rehnquist believes homosexuality is contagious.
417 F. Supp. 632 (D.R.I. 1976).
Id at 633.
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Committee provided the true motivation for refusing the requests.

The court ruled that the Bicentennial Commission had made the Old
State House a public forum, limited reasonably to the expression of
bicentennial themes. Having created a limited public forum, the
Commission could not restrict access arbitrarily. Therefore, the court
ordered the Commission either to accept the Committee's proposals

or to formulate "in writing, in clear and precise terms capable of
even-handed application, the standards to be used in evaluating the
plaintiffs' request for endorsement. 827

Sixteen days later, the same parties were again before the same
court.828 The Commission had chosen to promulgate new standards
rather than accept the Committee's proposals. After the Committee
submitted a new proposal, the Commission again voted to deny
bicentennial endorsement.
The Committee's proposal included several events. The first was

a request for the use of the Old State House for an address on the
subject of treatment of homosexual persons during Colonial and
Revolutionary times. The Commission refused the proposal829 on the

ground that access was tantamount to endorsement, and endorsement
meant approval. The court reiterated its ruling that such reasoning
was no excuse for curtailing first amendment rights830 and ordered the
Commission to grant the use of the forum. 831

827. Id at 641-42. The court also ruled that if the Commission decided to issue new
standards, the Committee must be afforded a fair opportunity to present a new proposal.
Id. at 642.
The court obviously could not resist the opportunity to comment: "I cannot help but
note the irony of the Bicentennial Commission expressing reluctance to provide a forum
for the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights because they might advocate
conduct which is illegal. Does the Bicentennial Commission need reminding that, from the
perspective of British loyalists, the Bicentennial celebrates one of history's greatest illegal
events?" Id.
828. Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation,
417 F. Supp. 642 (D.R.I. 1976).
829. The Commission had first denied the request on the ground that the time slot was
already promised to another group. The Committee then agreed to reschedule.
830. 417 F. Supp. at 645.
831. Commission endorsement of the other proposed events, a parade, a Gay Pride Day
and a Gay Pride Week, was also at issue. The court said although these other events did
not involve access to a public forum, they did involve a constitutionally protected interest,
freedom of speech. Therefore, the Commission, a state body, could not withhold its
endorsement arbitrarily. After an examination of the proposed events, the court ordered
the Commission to endorse the Congress of People with Gay Concerns and only withheld
an order on the parade because it would be too late to be effective. Id at 647.
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32
Like the preceding case, Aumiller v. University of Delaware
involves no denial of recognition to a gay student organization.
Strictly speaking, Aumiller is an employment case but is discussed in
this section because the first amendment provides the basis for its
holding. Speaking in his capacity as the faculty advisor to a
recognized gay student organization, Richard Aumiller, a professor at
the University of Delaware, 33 made statements regarding
homosexuality that were reported in newspaper articless 34 The fact
that Aumiller was himself gay was known by his immediate superiors

when he was hired, and by all the university administrators involved

when his contract was renewed for the first time. When his contract
came up for renewal after the appearance of the newspaper articles,
however, the president of the university refused to sign it.835

The court said that the nonrenewal of Aumiller's contract was
clearly a direct consequence of his newspaper statements; therefore

the proper issue was whether the university had violated his first
amendment rights. The court relied on Pickering v. Board of

Education 36 to develop the criteria for judging Aumiller's statements:

The teacher's right to free speech must be balanced with the state's
fights as an employer, but such balancing is to occur only when the
statements can be shown, or are presumed, to impede the teacher's

classroom performance, to have substantially disrupted regular school
operations, or to have violated some type of confidentiality. 837 The
court said that none of these factors applied in Aumiller's case, and
832. 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
833. While there are few cases on the subject, it would appear that university and
college teachers who are homosexuals are not discriminated against nearly as much as are
elementary and secondary school teachers. According to The Advocate, June 28, 1978, at
15, the president of Pennsylvania State University recently reinstated a gay professor fired
because of his homosexuality. His firing was protested by the Pennsylvania chapter of the
American Association of University Professors. However, in Hawaii, Maui Community
College is presently being sued by Arnold A. Sciullo because his contract as a lecturer was
not renewed. According to Mr. Sciullo's allegations, Provost Moikeba, a member of the
Church of Latter Day Saints, refused to allow Sciullo to be rehired because of the
provost's own religious beliefs condemning homosexuality. The Advocate, May 17, 1978,
at 10.
The American Association of University Professors voted in June of 1976 to oppose
discrimination by colleges and universities on the basis of sexual preference. Lesbian
Connection, Dec. 1976, at 14.
834. The details of Aumiller's statements to the newspapers and the various responses
by President Trabant are numerous. The court's opinion with the appended newspaper
articles is 46 pages long. In describing the case, the factual details have been omitted.
835. 434 F. Supp. at 1285-86. The court said that whether the university could fire
Aumiller because he was a homosexual was not in issue. Id at 1292 n.56.
836. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
837. 434 F. Supp. at 1292.
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thus concluded that by failing to renew Aumiller's contract, the
838
University violated his first amendment rights.
839
A third "public forum" case, Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan,
involved the 1976-77 Anchorage Bluebook, a paperback guide to
services and organizations in the metropolitan area published by the
City of Anchorage. The mayor of Anchorage had ordered that an
entry listing and describing the Alaska Gay Coalitione4 be deleted
from the guide. The court made a factual finding that the Gay
Coalition's name was omitted solely because of the personal beliefs of
its members.841
The Gay Coalition argued that the Blue Book was in essence a
public forum, and therefore, the government could not deny access to
that forum because of the content of its message. The court agreed,
holding that the city could not deny access to the pages of the Blue
Book on the basis of the content of an organization's beliefs. 842
Whether involving universities or other public forums, cases in
this section are unlike any others described in this Article. Nowhere
else is there such a consistent respect for the constitutional rights of
the homosexual individual.843 If people are indeed educated through
the means of expression of ideas, gay rights advocates have a real
838. "The Court fully recognizes that homosexuality is an extremely emotional and
controversial topic and that Aumiller's opinions on the subject quite likely represent a
minority view. But this unpopularity can not justify the limitation of Aumiller's First
Amendment rights by the University of Delaware." Id at 1301.
Aumiller was awarded back pay for one year and compensatory damages from the
university as well as damages for mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment. Most
interestingly he was awarded $5000 punitive damages against the president of the
university, who was found by the court to have acted maliciously and wantonly. Id at
1307-12.
839. 578 P.2d 951 (Alas. 1978).
840. The Coalition submitted a description of its purpose and activities which included
its ability to furnish speakers to educate on the subject of homosexuality. Ia at 953.
841. Id.at 955.
842. The city argued that the Gay Coalition had not been actually harmed by the
deletion of its material from the Blue Book The court did not agree. "(T]he suppression
of speech in itself... is the evil to be avoided .... Any further showing of adverse
consequences... is unnecessary." Id at 960.
843. There are other similar cases currently in the courts. A gay student organization
sued the College of the Redwoods in Eureka, California asserting that the college's refusal
to recognize their organization officially violated its first amendment rights. Hi Gear, June
1977, at 4. At last report the college had changed its policy. Lesbian Connection, Dec.
1977, at 10. According to a leading gay newspaper, in 1975 gay students filed an action
against Texas A & M in federal district court, which was subsequently dismissed. Plaintiffs
are currently challenging the dismissal in the Fifth Circuit, citing to the Bonner, Matthews
and Missouridecisions for support. See The Advocate, June 28,1978, at 17.
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chance to speak out because their speech and association seem
securely protected at least from government intervention. The
"Catch-22" of this situation, however, is that the same free speech
which is constitutionally protected may cause the speaker to lose his
or her job in the private sector or to be accused of "flaunting," thus
endangering even public sector j obs. 84
XV. Immigration and Naturalization

The homosexuality of an alien can crucially affect his or her
admission to the United States, ability to remain in the country and to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States.
An alien who is a homosexual can be denied entry into the
United States under two sections of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.845 Section 212(a)(4) provides that aliens "afflicted with
psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation" shall be excluded from
admission into the United States."'846 Section 212(a)(9) provides that
"aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude..., or aliens who admit having committed such a crime, or

aliens who admit committing acts which constitute the essential
847
elements of such a crime" shall also be excluded from admission.
The two exclusionary criteria can be applied to aliens at a variety
of times. 84 When an alien applies for an entry visa, he or she can be
denied the right to enter.849 Such a denial has a ring of finality: refusal
of an entry visa to an alien is not reviewable by a United States
court. 850 Second, once granted, a visa can be reevaluated at a border
or port of entry under the same admission criteria.851 Third, under the
"last entry" doctrine, an alien who leaves the United States for any
844. See generally sections on Employment and Related Occupational Discrimination
at text accompanying notes 31-449 supra.
845. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1502 (1976).
846. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976).
847. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1976).
848. For a detailed description of immigration and naturalization problems and
procedures, see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1978).
849. The application for an immigrant visa asks whether the applicant suffers from
psychopathic personality or sexual deviation, and the medical examination form requires
the examining physician to examine for and report any indications of psychopathic
personality or sexual deviation. See Dept. of State Form PS-150: Application for
Immigrant Visa & Alien Registration; Dept. of State Form FS-398: Medical Exam of Visa
Applicants.
850. Montgomery v. French, 299 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kellogg, 30
F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
851. C. GORDON &

(1978).

H. ROSENFIELD,

1 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

3-148
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period of time or for any reason (a vacation, a business trip, or a visit
to a dying mother) may be reevaluated upon return to the United
States as if he or she were entering for the first time.852 Thus, an alien
clearly admissible at the time of his or her original entry may be
excluded on the basis of conduct, such as homosexual 53acts, that
occurred while he or she was residing in the United States.
Fourth, under section 241(a)(1) of the Act, an alien can be
deported at any time if it can be shown that he or she was excludable
at the time of entry.8 54 Under this section, aliens who have lived in the
United States for years are potentially subject to deportation for acts
they may have committed long before their first entry into the United
States.
Finally, an alien who desires to change his or her status from
nonimmigrant to permanent resident may again be evaluated as if he
or she were seeking original entry.8 55 The alien's conduct since the
original entry becomes relevant to the change of status.
The application of these exclusionary criteria can be a continuing
process that constantly hangs over the alien's head. This is
particularly true of the homosexual alien who is directly affected by
the triple effect of the above described criteria: if an alien admits he
has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, he may be
excluded under section 212(a)(9); even if he escapes the snare of that
section, he may be denied entry as being "mentally defective" under
section 212(a)(4); if he denies either, he may be excluded for
committing perjury.
The question of whether the homosexual is a psychopathic
personality has been considered on a number of occasions. 856 Under
the 1917 Immigration and Nationality Act, aliens were excluded who
were "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority" or who were
found to be and certified by the examining surgeon as being

852. Id. at 2-23.
853. See Barber v. Rietmann, 248 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1957).
854. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
855. An alien can enter the United States as a nonimmigrant with the intention of only
a temporary visit. Students, businessmen, and various consular officials, for example, have
nonimmigrant visas. An alien can also enter as an immigrant seeking permanent residence
and eventually citizenship. Amarante v. Rosenberg, 326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964).
856. Some cases never reach the courts but are decided by the Board of Immigration
Appeals. See, e.g., In re Steel, 12 I.N. Dec. 302 (B.I.A. 1967); In re LaRochelle, 11 I.N.
Dec. 436 (B.I.A. 1965); In re J, 2 I.N. Dec. 533 (B.I.A. 1946); In re Z, 2 I.N. Dec. 316
(B.I.A. 1945).
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"mentally defective. '857 In United States v. Flores-Rodriguez,858 an
alien was deported for perjury when he failed to state on his visa
application that he had been convicted of soliciting, a crime involving
moral turpitude. 859 In the course of determining that
Flores-Rodriguez's perjury was material, the court indicated that if
the alien had not covered up his soliciting conviction, he would
probably have been excluded as a person of constitutional
psychopathic inferiority or as a mental defective. The court defined
"constitutional
psychopathic
inferiority"
as
characterizing
"individuals who show a life-long and constitutional tendency not to
conform to group customs, and who habitually misbehave so
86°
flagrantly that they are continually in trouble with the authorities."
The court also stated that "the term 'mentally defective,' as used in
the statute, is a concept embracing more than intellectual capacity or
lack thereof.... We think this language was designed to exclude
homosexuals with exhibitionistic tendencies and other groups ' with
lewd proclivities similarly repugnant to the mores of our society. "861

The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act removed the phrase
"persons of constitutional psychopathic personality" and substituted
the phrase "afflicted with psychopathic personality. '862 Under the
new language, the Fifth Circuit held in Quiroz v. Neely863that the
lesbian in question was a psychopathic personality and hence
excludable. The court disregarded the testimony of two doctors that
homosexuals are not necessarily psychopathic personalities as that
term is understood and used in the medical profession. Rather, the
judge looked to legislative history of the Act and concluded,
"[w]hatever the phrase 'psychopathic personality' may mean to the
psychiatrist, to the Congress it was intended to include homosexuals
and sex perverts." 864 A year later, however, the Ninth Circuit in Fleuti
v. Rosenberg 65 voided a deportation order against alien Fleuti on the
857. Ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875 (repealed 1952). See Richards, supra note 25, at 727 n. 117.
858. 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956).
859. The offense was a violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(8) (McKinney 1967) which
prohibits loitering in a "public place soliciting men for the purpose of committing a crime
against nature."
860. 237 F.2d at 411.
861. Id. Concurring with the majority opinion, Judge Frank was highly critical of the
statutory interpretation of his colleagues, and went so far as to draw attention to the
purported homosexuality of Plato. Id. at 414 n.6.
862. Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, tit. II, ch. 2, § 212(a)(4), (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)
(1976)).
863. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961).
864. id.at 907.
865. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Fleuti was
a victim of the "last entry" doctrine. Fleuti, a Swiss, was admitted as a permanent resident
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ground that the term "psychopathic personality" failed to give
definite warning that homosexuality or sex perversion are included in
the term, and thereby violated due process.
The Ninth Circuit maintained this position in 1966 in Lavoie v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.866 In that same year the
Second Circuit in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service 67 again reached an opposite conclusion and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court8 68 affirmed the Second Circuit's
holding that by its use of the term "psychopathic personality" in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress intended to exclude
homosexuals from admission. 869 The Court concluded that even if an
applicant could get no fair warning from this phrase the statute was
not void, because at the time when the standards of admission were
applied one was either "afflicted with a psychopathic personality" or
one was not. Adequate warning was irrelevant because there was no
conduct to avoid.
Registering a strong dissent,870 Justice Douglas called
psychopathic personality "much too treacherously vague a term to
allow the high penalty of deportation to turn on it."8'71 He pointed out
facts that few have chosen to deal with regarding the policy of total
exclusion of homosexuals:
It is common knowledge that in this century homosexuals have
risen high in our own public service-both in Congress and in the
Executive Branch-and have served with distinction. It is therefore
in 1952. In 1956 he spent a few hours in Ensenada, Mexico. In 1959 the Immigration and
Naturalization Service filed deportation charges against Fleuti claiming that in 1956, his
last reentry, he was excludable because he was a homosexual person.
On appeal, the Supreme Court refused to deal with the constitutionality of the phrase
"psychopathic personality," focusing, instead, on whether a brief excursion was included
within the purview of the Act. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
866. 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 572 (1967). The
Supreme Court vacated the order of the court of appeals and remanded in light of its
opinion in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 867-72 infra. On remand, the Ninth Circuit found Lavoie to have
been a "psychopathic personality" at time of entry and affirmed the deportation order.
Lavoie v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 854 (1970).
867. 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), affd, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
868. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
869. Id. at 119. See also Note, Limitations on CongressionalPower to Deport Resident
Aliens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 YALE L.J. 931 (1959).
870. 387 U.S. at 125. Justice Fortas concurred with this dissent. Justice Brennan also
dissented, id., relying on Judge Moore's dissent below, 363 F.2d 488, 496 (1966).
871. 387 U.S. at 127.

I
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not credible that Congress wanted to deport everyone and anyone
who was a sexual deviate, no matter how blameless his social
conduct had been nor how
creative his work nor how valuable his
872
contribution to society.

Douglas quoted with favor Judge Moore's dissent below: "'To label a
group so large 'excludable aliens' would be tantamount to saying that
Sappho, Leonardo da Vinci, Michaelangelo, Andre Gide and perhaps
even Shakespeare, were they to come to life again, would be deemed
unfit to visit our shores." ' 873 During the debate between the Second
and Ninth Circuits and before the decision by the Supreme Court in
Boutilier, Congress in 1965 amended section 212(a)(4) of the Act by
adding the words "sexual deviation. '874 The additional words were
875
intended to make clear any doubts about Congressional intentions.
In light of the Boutilier decision the addition was unnecessary, but it
did provide double protection that no homosexual would enter the
876
United States.
The second exclusionary criterion that often affects homosexual
aliens is the exclusion of persons who have committed crimes of
moral turpitude. 877 The statute does not merely apply to those who
have been convicted, but also to those who admit the crime or admit
the acts that constitute the crime. Because there is no judicial review
when a visa is denied, the question of whether admission of
homosexual acts that are not crimes in one's home country would
affect the admissibility of an alien remains unanswered .878
Courts have easily found various crimes involving homosexuality
to be crimes involving "moral turpitude." In Ganduxe y Marino v.
Murff,879 the court found that the offense of disorderly conduct by
872. Id at 129.
873. Id. at 130 (quoting 363 F.2d at 497-98 (Moore, J., dissenting)).
874. Act of Oct. 3,1975, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 919 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(4) (1978)).
875. See H.R. REp. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1965); S. REP. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
876. The amendment also affected aliens who applied for a change of status. In Campos
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 402 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1968), a young man who
had lived in the United States for 11 years sought a change of status from non-immigrant
student to permanent resident. Although he had been deemed admissible at the time of
his entry, Campos was re-evaluated when he applied for change of status and was ordered
to be deported for allegedly being a "Class A-Sexual Deviate." The Ninth Circuit upheld
the deportation order.
877. See note 847 & accompanying text supra.
878. The Soviet Union and the United States are the only major countries in Europe
and North America still punishing homosexuals criminally. W. BARNETT, SEXUAL
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrrTUTION 293 (1973).
879. 183 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd mem., 378 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
164 U.S. 824 (1960).
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loitering for purpose of inducing men to commit acts against nature,
for which the penalty was a twenty-five dollar fine or ten days in jail,
was clearly "a crime involving moral turpitude." The case hinged on
the fact that the defendant had failed to report this arrest. Such a

misrepresentation was material, said the court, because if the
Immigration and Naturalization Service had known of it, he could
have been excluded as "a psychopathic personality." This resulted in
a no-win situation for Sr. Ganduxe y Marino for if he told the truth,
he was excludable under one section and if he lied, he could be

deported for perjury. In Babouris v. Esperdy,880 a deportation for a
conviction under the same disorderly conduct statute used in

Ganduxe was upheld. The court refused to accept petitioner's
argument that under New York law the particular action was
considered an "offense" not a crime, ruling that an alien's status did
not depend on the classifications of misconduct adopted by states. 881

Given the fact that in twenty-nine of the fifty states homosexual
acts are still illegal,m and that often homosexuals are singled out for
harassment by law enforcement officials, it is more likely that
homosexually active aliens will run afoul of the law than
heterosexually active aliens. The homosexual alien who is caught runs
the risk of deportation and the inability to change his immigrant
status.
For the homosexual alien who seeks naturalization the standards

differ from those of admission. 883 To become a citizen, the petitioner
must prove that during the statutory waiting period he or she was a

880. 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 913 (1960). Barbouris was
ordered deported after living in the United States 39 years.
881. Id. at 623. In another case involving the New York disorderly conduct statute, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a violation
of that statute was a "crime involving moral turpitude." Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d
184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961). The court summarily avoided the issue of

whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague, ruling that the issue was settled by the
Supreme Court in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (195 1). In Jordan, the Court held
that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" did not lack sufficiently definite
standards.
For other cases involving crimes of "moral turpitude," see Marinelli v. Ryan, 285 F.2d
474 (2d Cir. 196 1); Hudson v. Esperdy, 200 F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 196 1) (per curiam).

882. See Appendix A infra.
883. In this section it is to be presumed that the alien was not excludable at the time of
admission; that is, the alien was not a homosexual person at the time of admission,
although he or she may be a homosexual person at the time of the petition for
naturalization.
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"person of good moral character. 884 Good moral character is not
defined in the statute, and homosexuals are not specifically
mentioned as persons who do not have good moral character.885
In In re Schmidt,886 the court ruled that a lesbian did not possess
the requisite "good moral character" to be naturalized despite the
following findings: all of the alien's homosexual behavior had been in
the privacy of her home with adult partners; she had been regularly
and successfully employed for fourteen years; she had never been
convicted of a crime; and her reputation, except for her sexual
preference, was beyond reproach. In support of its conclusion that the
woman's admitted practices of sexual deviation were not "consistent
887
with good moral character as the 'ordinary man or woman' sees it,"
the court quoted a New Jersey divorce opinion: "Few behavioral
deviations are more offensive to American mores than is
888
homosexuality."
Three more recent cases have taken a broader view of "good
moral character." In re Labady,889 decided in 1971 by a United States
District Court in New York, found a homosexual man to be "a person
of good moral character" and entitled to naturalization. The court
made clear its own position by saying, "If the criterion were our own
personal moral principles, we would deny the petition, subscribing as
we personally do to the general 'revulsion' or 'moral conviction or
instinctive feeling' against homosexuality." 890 Laying aside its
revulsion, however, the court focused on whether the challenged
conduct was private or public in nature: "[P]rivate conduct which is
not harmful to others, even though it may violate the personal moral
code of most of us, does not violate public morality which is the only
proper concern of § 1427."891
884. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1976).
885. The statute does name drunkards, adulterers, murderers, prostitutes and gamblers.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1976).
886. 56 Misc. 2d 456,289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct., Dutchess County 1968).

887. Id. at 460,289 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
888. H. v. H., 59 N.J. Super. 227,237, 157 A.2d 721,727 (1959).
889. 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
890. Id at 927.
891. Id.at 927-28. The court reviewed at length the changing position of the
homosexual in the United States with regard to criminal statutes and employment. The
court then drew this conclusion with respect to the petitioner: "He has led a quiet,
peaceful, law-abiding life as an immigrant in the United States. Although he has engaged
on occasion in purely private homosexual relations with consenting adults, he has not
corrupted the morals of others, such as minors, or engaged in any publicly offensive
activities, such as solicitation of public display. He is gainfully employed, highly regarded
by his employer and associates, and he has submitted to therapy that was unsuccessful.
Under all of the circumstances, setting aside our personal moral views, we cannot say that

April 1999]

THE LEGAL POSITION OF HOMOSEXUALS

In 1973, in Kovacs v. United States,892 the Second Circuit upheld
the denial of a petition for naturalization of a homosexual immigrant.
However, the lack of good moral character found in this case resulted
not from the petitioner's homosexuality but from his false testimony.
The court said, "This is not a case like Labady... where the applicant
testified truthfully about prior homosexual acts, yet still was granted
naturalization because of the private character of his sexual life. Had
Kovacs testified truthfully about his past, the petition might well have
been granted."8 93
894
The trend begun with Labady was continued in In re Brodie,
wherein the court granted naturalization despite the applicant's
homosexuality. The court focused on the private nature of the alien's
sexual life, his lack of contact with minors, and his otherwise good
behavior. The court also noted that homosexual acts were no longer
criminal between consenting adults under state law and that a local
city council had passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in
employment against homosexuals. The court concluded: "Noting
these indications, I am convinced that the community regards
homosexual behavior between consenting adults with tolerance, if not
indifference. Brodie is a person
of good moral character and his
'895
petition should be granted.
Brodie, Kovacs, and Labady apparently moved the Immigration
and Nationalization Service to reformulate its policy. In August, 1976,
the Service announced a new policy regarding the naturalization of
homosexuals: "The fact that a petitioner for naturalization is or has
been a practicing sexual deviate, during the relevant statutory period
is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for finding that he lacks the necessary
good moral character. ' 896 The interpretation continues: "However,
where there has been a conviction of a homosexual act or the
admission or the commission of such an act in a jurisdictionin which it
is a criminal offense... the Service view is that a showing of good
moral character is precluded. '897 Thus, homosexuality per se does not
presently prevent naturalization. However, the commission of a
homosexual act or admission of such an act can be cause for the
his conduct has violated public morality... ." Id- at 930 (emphasis added).
892. 476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973).
893. Id.at 845.
894. 394 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Or. 1975).
895. Id.
896. Immigration and Naturalization Service Interpretations § 316.1(f)(7) (1976)
(emphasis added).
897. Id. (emphasis added).
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finding of lack of good moral character. This policy results in an
interesting anomaly because in twenty-one states homosexual conduct
is irrelevant while in the other twenty-nine states it is grounds for
898
denial of a naturalization petition.
The position and policies of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service have come under increasing criticism from gay rights and civil
rights leaders. Under the Carter administration, Immigration and
Naturalization Service administrators have met with National Gay
Task Force 899 members to discuss changes in policy. As a
consequence of a meeting held on April 4,1978, between the National
Gay Task Force, the Surgeon General of the United States, and the
top representatives of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the United States Public Health Service will no longer define
homosexual persons as either "sex deviants" or "psychopathic
personalities." 9°° This change of policy should mean that homosexual
aliens will no longer automatically be denied entry into the United
States because of their homosexual status. If the applicant has been
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, however, that conviction
would still constitute a bar to entry.

Criminal Issues
XVI. Criminalization of Homosexual Behavior
This Article does not attempt a descriptive survey of cases
dealing with criminal charges of sodomy or other sexual acts of
homosexual persons;901 they are simply too numerous. 902 Moreover,
898. See Appendix A infra.
899. The National Gay Task Force is an organization devoted to gay civil fights. See
note 70 supra.
900. This change reflects the position of the American Psychiatric Association. The
Public Health Service has announced that it will inform its officers at border crossings of
the new policy; similar information will be given to Immigration officials, and State
Department Visa officers. It's Time, May 1978, at 1-2.
After trying for 25 years, a Danish-born lesbian was granted United States citizenship
in March 1978. She said that she had spent the last 17 years haggling with immigration
officials over the connection between her sexual preference and "her suitability to become
an official American." The woman reported that she did not know why her petition was
suddenly granted. Lesbian Connection, June 1978, at 8.
901. All the sexual acts penalized when committed between persons of the same sex
also can be performed by persons of the opposite sex. Laws forbidding certain sexual acts
often do not differentiate as to heterosexuals or homosexuals, married or unmarried
persons. Kinsey estimated that if all the laws then currently on the books forbidding
various sex acts were enforced, 95% of all white American males would be subject to
prosecution. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE
HUMAN MALE 390-93 (1948).
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no aspect of homosexual behavior has been more thoroughly

examined by legal scholars than the criminal area. The criminalization
of homosexual behavior has been analyzed from a constitutional
viewpoint, 9°3 a moral viewpoint, 9°4 a psychiatric viewpoint,9 5 a
sociological viewpoint 9O6 and last, but hardly least, from the viewpoint
of a right to privacy.907 With the proposal of the Model Penal Code,908
many articles were written discussing a particular state's law in the
area of homosexual criminal conduct. 90 9 These articles provide a
902. See, e.g., 81 CJ.S. Sodomy §§ 1-16 (1977); 70 AM. JUR. 2d Sodomy §§ 1-26 (1973).
Many cases appear in West's Decennial Digests and General Digest under the topic
Sodomy.
903. See Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern
Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 344 (1977); Comment,
Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different, 38 ALB. L. REV. 84 (1973);
Comment, The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 553 (1976);
Note, The Constitutionalityof Laws ForbiddingPrivateHomosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1613 (1974). See also W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1973).
904. See Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral
Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977); Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality,
40 U. COLO. L. REV. 199 (1968); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The
Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581
(1967).
905. See Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29
TEMP. L.Q. 273 (1956).
906. See Ford, Homosexuals and the Law: Why the Status Quo?, 5 CAL. W.L. REV. 232
(1969).
907. See Richards, supra note 25; Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12 GON. L. REV. 587
(1977); Silver, The Future of ConstitutionalPrivacy, 21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 211 (1977); Taber,
Consent, Not Morality, as the ProperLimitation on Sexual Privacy, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 637 (1977). The preceding articles are not limited to or focused solely on homosexual
conduct.
908. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Official Draft, 1962).
909. Fields, Privacy "Rights" and the New Oregon CriminalCode, 51 ORE. L REV. 494
1972): Fisher, The Sex Offender Provisions of the ProposedNew Maryland Criminal Code:
Should Private, ConsentingAdult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded?, 30 MD. L. REV. 91
(1 970); Johnson, Crimes Against Nature in Tennessee: Out of the Darkand Into the Light?,
5 MEM. STATE U.L. REV. 319 (1975); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32
BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1966) (New York); Potter, Sex Offenses, 28 ME. L. REV. 65
(1976) (Maine); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
669 (1963) (general discussion); Stimmel, Criminality of Voluntary Sexual Acts in
Colorado, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 268 (1968); Von Beitel, The Criminalizationof Private
HomosexualActs: A JurisprudentialCase Study of a Decision by the Texas Bar Penal Code
Revision Committee, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (1976); Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior:
The Desirability of Legislative Proscription,30 ALB. L. REV. 291 (1966) (New York);
Comment, Revision of the Law of the Sex Crimes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 78
DICK. L. REV. 73 (1973); Comment, Criminal Law-ConsensualHomosexual Behavior-
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wealth of information with regard to the history of such laws and their
jurisprudential development.
Given the wealth of material in this area coupled with the focus
of this Article on the civil problems of homosexual persons, a detailed
description of the cases in this area seems unnecessary. However,
since the criminality of homosexual behavior affects the homosexual
person's ability to be employed, to be naturalized, to hold a
professional license and to obtain a security clearance, 910 to mention
only a few instances, the reader should know the current state of the
law in this area. Therefore, Appendix A 91 details, by state, the
various statutes either prohibiting or decriminalizing homosexual
behavior.
Many state statutes, that have criminalized homosexual behavior,
have also been subject to numerous constitutional challenges.
Appendix B lists by state the most recent cases challenging
constitutionality of the respective statute.
One such case, however, warrants special consideration. In Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond,912 two adult, sexually
active, homosexual men sought in a federal district court a
The Need for Legislative Reform, 57 KY. L.J. 591 (1969) (Kentucky); Comment, Sexual
Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971) (California);
Comment, Oral Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 523 (1974) (California); Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior Under the New Illinois
CriminalCode, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 220.
910. "Once convicted or once their condition becomes known to the relevant
authorities, male sex deviants (like the leprous or the insane) must expect some legal and
social restrictions. If they work in certain fields, such as teaching, or governmental posts
involving security risk, they will lose their jobs. If they belong to a profession with strict
disciplinary rules, like solicitors and medical men, they may have their license to practice
taken away. They will not be accepted for admission to the armed forces or the merchant
navy, they will be found unsuitable for a wide range of employment such as police, prison
service, youth workers and so forth. They will never be considered for important posts in
politics or public life. They may even encounter difficulties if they want to enter as
students at a university. They will be rejected if they apply to emigrate to another
country." D.J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (1967).
911. The reader should be warned that this area of the law is subject to rapid changes
and should be aware that this chart may soon be outdated.
912. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901, rehearingdenied, 425
U.S. 985 (1976). For commentary on this case, see Comment, ConstitutionalProtection of
Private Sexual Conduct Among Consenting Adults: Another Look at Sodomy Statutes, 62
IOWA L. REV. 568 (1976); Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: A Set-Back for
the Right of Privacy,65 KY. L.J. 748 (1977); 15 DUQ. L. REv, 123 (1976).
Many of the important civil cases, previously discussed, explicitly refer to the court's
decision in Doe. See Cyr v. Walls, 439 F. Supp. 697, 700-01 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Saal v.
Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 198 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air
Force, Civ. No. 75-1750 (D.D.C. July 16, 1976) reported in 2 SEx. L. REP. 53, rev'd, 47
U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 1978).
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declaratory judgment that the Virginia statute which criminalized
sodomy was unconstitutional. The statute under attack proscribed:
"Crimes Against Nature-If any person shall carnally know in any
manner any brute animal or carnally know any male or female person
by anus or by or with the mouth or voluntarily submit to such carnal
'913
knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony.
The statute applies to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals and,
at least on its face, to married persons as well as unmarried persons.
The district court upheld that statute and apparently approved state
criminal intervention in adult private consensual sex which did not fit
the traditional standard of penile-vaginal sexual intercourse between
a man and a woman. When the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision, the press decried the decision as a setback for gay
rights. 91 4 A close examination of the opinion, however, shows that it
represents a much broader setback for all nonmarital sexual conduct.
The majority opinion concluded that there was no constitutional
bar to punishing homosexual behavior. 9 5 The court relied almost
exclusively on Griswold v. Connecticut916 which it restricted
completely to its facts, interpreting the rule of that case to apply only
to marital privacy. In finding that extra-marital sex, especially
homosexual conduct, is not constitutionally protected, the court relied
upon Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,917 which was cited
with approval by Justice Goldberg in Griswold.
Because the right of privacy enunciated in Griswold applied oniy
in the marital context, homosexual conduct, which "is obviously no
portion of marriage, home or family life," 918 was outside the pale of
constitutional protection. The court concluded that "[i]f a State
determines that punishment therefor, even when committed in the
home, is appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency, it is

913. VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950).
914. TIME, Apr. 12,1976, at 50.
915. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
916. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a forceful argument that Griswold should be applied to
protect homosexual conduct see Richards, supra note 25.
917. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
918. 403 F. Supp. at 1202 (emphasis added). One of the basic premises of this Article
illustrates that the court's statement is patently erroneous. A close examination of this
Article will reveal factual evidence that homosexual persons marry in the traditional sense
and also in the nontraditional sense, consequently homosexual persons have spouses
and/or partners; they often are parents and have children; they all have families in the
sense of mothers, fathers and siblings; and they have homes and participate in family life
in a variety of ways.
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not for the courts to say that the State is not free to do so."919
The court did not clearly indicate whether the state was
constitutionally required to establish a legitimate interest in
criminalizing such conduct. However, the court observed that if such
proof were necessary, the state of Virginia had satisfied the requisite
burden because the statute was directed to the suppression of
crime.920 The circularity of that reasoning is clear: a state may declare
conduct criminal in order to suppress crime. Moreover, the court
noted that the state did not have to show that moral delinquency
actually resulted from homosexuality, but only that the proscribed
conduct was likely to contributeto moral delinquency. 921 In support of
this conclusion, the court pointed to the longevity of the Virginia
statute, the fact that other states had similar provisions and, lastly, to
the Judaic and Christian origins of such proscriptions. 922
In a forceful dissent, Judge Merhige pointed out that the court
had ignored the Supreme Court's decisions in Eisenstadt v. Baird,M
which extended the Griswold protections to single unmarried persons,
and in Stanley v. Georgia,924 which protected private actions in the
home. He concluded that the right of privacy is not limited to marital
relationships but that all intimate personal decisions or private
matters are constitutionally protected,92 observing that "[t]he right to
select consenting adult sexual partners must be considered within this
category.

''926

Not only did Judge Merhige conclude that private adult
consensual homosexual conduct was constitutionally protected, but
he felt that Virginia had failed to show any compelling interest for its
regulation.927 He noted that the state had made no offer of evidence
that homosexual conduct caused society any significant harm and
summarily rejected, as "unworthy of judicial response," the
suggestion that the prohibition of homosexual conduct would
encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent divorce.m Judge
Merhige observed that the majority decision was based solely on the
promotion of morality and decency, 929 which was beyond the state's
919.
920.
921.
922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1202-03.
405 U.S. 430 (1972).
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
403 F. Supp. at 1205.
Id. at 1204.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id.
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power, and concluded that "the issue centers not
around morality or
930
decency, but the constitutional right of privacy."
The district court's decision was appealed directly to the United
States Supreme Court and was summarily affirmed. 931 The judicial
obligation of the Supreme Court to explain its decision is particularly
compelling in light of the district court's failure to consider the two
recent Supreme Court decisions in Stanley and Eisenstadt. The
Supreme Court's failure to address the constitutional issues raised by
Doe has been severely criticized by legal scholars and popularly
interpreted as a continuing license for harassment and discrimination
against homosexual individuals.
Conclusion
The purpose of this Article is to bring together all the legal
sources necessary to give the reader a comprehensive picture of the
legal status of homosexual individuals in our country today and is
intended to be useful not only to the legal scholar but to the
practitioner and layperson as well.
Because this area of the law is so young and so fragmented it has
not been possible to find broad rules which cut across all the areas
involved. However, a thorough reading of the Article does reveal
systematic and pervasive discrimination against homosexual
individuals in our courts and dispels the popular idea that, because
homosexual individuals occupy every walk of life, there is no real
discrimination against them.932 On the contrary, homosexual
individuals are penalized in all aspects of their lives because of their
sexual preference. They lose their jobs, their children, and numerous
other precious rights as a result of many current judicial policies.
In the short time since this Article was completed, there have
been a few judicial and legislative victories for the proponents of
homosexual rights. Leonard Matlovich's case against the U.S. Air
Force was remanded to the district court by the District of Columbia
Circuit Court on the grounds that the Air Force had failed to
930. Id.
931. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens noted probable
jurisdiction. However, the vote of four justices is needed to obtain plenary consideration
with oral argument. Ohio v. Price, 360 U.S. 246,246-47 (1959).
932. See Leo, Homosexuality: Tolerance vs. Approval, TIME, Jan. 8, 1979, at 48, 51;
Robinson, Invisible Men: The Issue is Visibility, Not Discrimination,THE NEW REPUBLIC,
June 3, 1968, at 9.
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rationally explain why Sgt. Matlovich should not qualify as one of the
"exceptional" homosexual servicemen who is retained. 933 John Singer
was ordered reinstated by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority
of the United States Civil Service Commission 934 and the Internal
Revenue Service finally issued a Revenue Ruling making gay
organizations eligible for tax-exempt status. 935 The beginning months
of 1978 saw numerous gay-rights ordinances overthrown by popular
referendum, 936 but in November of 1978 the attempt to repeal the
Seattle, Washington ordinance protecting gay persons failed and in
California, the infamous Briggs Amendment, which would have
937
discriminated against gay teachers, failed to win popular approval.
There are some signs of progress, but they are hard won and, as this
Article reveals, such successes only scratch the surface.
The resolution of the problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, at a minimum, judges, in particular, as well as attorneys,
need to examine their homophobic attitudes and the many popularly
held myths and stereotypes. Only after such a reevaluation of judicial
and societal attitudes can our legal system begin to achieve a fair and
equal application of the laws to all persons.
Oh who is that young sinner with the handcuffs on his wrists?
And what has he been after that they groan and shake their fists?
And wherefore is he wearing such a conscience-stricken air?
Oh they're taking him to prison for the colour of his hair.
'Tis a shame to human nature, such a head of hair as his;
In the good old time 'twas hanging for the colour that it is;
Though hanging isn't bad enough and flaying would be fair
For the nameless and abominable colour of his hair.
Oh a deal of pains he's taken and a pretty price he's paid
To hide his poll or dye it of a mentionable shade;
But they've pulled the beggar's hat off for the world to see and
stare, And they're haling him to justice for the colour of his hair.

933. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 45 U.S.L.W. 2361 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 1978).
See text accompanying notes 303-16 supra.
934. Appeal of John F. Singer, Dec. No. SE07138002 (Federal Employee Appeals
Auth., Seattle Field Office July 21, 1978). See text accompanying notes 134-48 supra.
935. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-33 I.R.B. 10. See text accompanying notes 658-90 supra.
936. See It's Time, June-July 1978, at 1.
937. See The Advocate, Dec. 13, 1978, at 9.
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Now 'tis oakum for his fingers and the treadmill for his feet,
And the quarry-gang on Portland in the cold and in the heat,
And between his spells of labour in the time he has to spare
He can curse the God that made him for the colour of his hair.
A.E. Housman

938

938. THE COLLECTED POEMS OF A.E. HOUSEMAN 233 (1965). This poem was written
near the time of the trial of Oscar Wilde.
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Appendix A
Part One-State Statutes ProhibitingPrivate,
Consensual,Adult Homosexual Sexual Acts'
Type of Statute

State and Code
(Michie 1978)

modern definitionb (married
couples excluded)

13-1411,
13-1412 (West Supp. 1977) d

common law definition';
"lewd and lascivious acts"

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813

modem definition
(homosexual acts only)

ALA. CODE § 13a-6-65(A)(3)

ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§

(1977)

D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3502
(West 1973)

modem definition

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976)

"unnatural and lascivious act"

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1977)

modern definition

IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1978)

common law definition

KAN. STAT. § 21-3505 (1974)

modern definition
(homosexual acts only)

KY. REV. STAT. § 510.100 (1975)

modem definition (married
couples excluded)

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:89,

modem definition

14:89.1 (West Supp. 1978)
(Michie Supp. 1977)

"sodomy" (undefined);
"unnatural and perverted
sex practices"'

MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 272, § 34
and § 35 (Michie 1968)

common law definition;
"unnatural and lascivious act"

MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.158,
750.338, 750.338a (1968)

common law definition; "gross
indecency" between males;
"gross indecency" between
females

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293

modern definition

MD. ANN. CODE §§ 27-553,27-554

(West Supp. 1978)
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972)

common law definition

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon
Supp. 1978)

modern definition

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-505

modern definition
(homosexual acts only)

(1975)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1977)

modern definition
(homosexual acts only)

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2a: 143-1 (West 1969)

common law definition

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney
1975)

modern definition (married
couples excluded)

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969)

common law definition

§ 886

common law definition

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,

(West 1951)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3124

modern definition

(Purdon 1973)
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-10-1 (1969)

common law definition

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (1976)

"abominable crime of
buggery"

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975)

common law definition

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,

modem definition
(homosexual acts only)

§ 21.06 (Vernon 1974)
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-403

modern definition

(Supp. 1977)
VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp. 1978)

modern definition

Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West

modem definition

Supp. 1978)
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PartTwo-States Which Have DecriminalizedPrivate,
Consensual,Adult Homosexual Sexual Acts
Law and Effective Date

State
Alaska
California

1978 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 166 (effective Jan.
1, 1980).
1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 71, § 7 (effective July 1,
1976).

Colorado

1971 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 121, § 1 (approved
June 2, 1971).

Connecticut

1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 828, § 214 (effective Oct.
1, 1971).

Delaware

58 Del. Laws, ch. 497, § 1 (effective Apr. 1,
1973).

Hawaii

1972 Haw. Sess. Laws, act 9, § 1 (effective Jan.
1, 1973).

Illinois

1961 Ill. Laws, p. 1983, § 11-2 (effective Jan. 1,
1962).

Indiana

1976 Ind. Acts, P.L. 148, § 24 (effective July 1,
1977).

Iowa

1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 520 (effective Jan.
1, 1978).

Maine

1975 Me. Acts, ch. 499, § 5 (effective Mar. 1,
1976).

Nebraska

1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38, § 328 (effective July

1, 1978).
New Hampshire

1973 N.H. Laws, 532: 26, x (effective Nov. 1,
1973).

New Mexico

1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 109, § 8.

North Dakota

1977 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 122, § 1 (approved
Mar. 19, 1977).

Ohio

1972 Ohio Laws, 134 v H 511, § 2 (effective
Jan. 1, 1974).
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Oregon

1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 432 (167.040)
(effective Jan. 1, 1972).

South Dakota

1976 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 158, § 22-8 (effective
Apr. 1, 1977).

Vermont

1977 Vt. Acts, No. 51, § 3 (effective July 1,
1977).

Washington

1975 Wash. Laws, 1st. exec. sess., ch. 260
(effective July 1, 1976).
1976 W. Va. Acts, ch. 43 (effective June 11,
1976).

West Virginia
Wyoming

1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 70, § 3 (effective
May 27, 1977).

a. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have laws forbidding "deviant"
sexual behavior. Even though these laws include nearly every type of sexual act except
penile-vaginal intercourse, the crime is usually called "sodomy". Those statutes
prohibiting sexual relations only between people of the same sex have been indicated as
proscribing "homosexual acts only".
b. States using modem definitions of the prohibited acts specifically describe what is
prohibited rather than using general terms such as "sodomy" or the vague common-law
definition. See note 4 infra.
c. States using the common law definition of "sodomy" use language similar to "the
abominable and detestable crime against nature with mankind or beast."
d. Effective October 1,1978.
e. Defined in the statute as oral sexual acts.
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Appendix B
Most Recent Court Decisionson the Constitutionality of State Statutes
ProhibitingPrivate ConsensualAdult Homosexual Sexual Acts
Summary of the Decision

State

Case Name

Alabama

Horn v. State, 41
Ala. App. 489,273
So. 2d 249 (1973)

not vague'

Williams v. State,
55 Ala. App. 436,
316 So. 2d 362 (1975)

Horn upheld

Arizona

State v. Bateman,
113 Ariz. 107,547
P.2d 6, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 864 (1976)

not vague or overbroad;
did not violate right of
privacy or freedom of
expression

Arkansas

Carterv. State, 255
Ark. 225,500 S.W.2d
368 (1973)

not vague or cruel and
unusual punishment;
did not violate equal
protection or establish
religion; no standing to
raise privacy issue

District of Columbia

Stewart v. United
States, 364 A.2d
1205 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1976)

did not violate equal
protection or establish
religion; no standing to
raise privacy issue

Florida

Bell v. State, 289
So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1973)

not vague

State v. Sandstrom,
344 So. 2d 554
(Fla. 1976)

Bell upheld

Georgia

Wanzer v. State, 232
Ga. 523,207 S.E.2d
466 (1974)

not vague; statute not
overbroad

Idaho

State v. Carringer,95
Idaho 929, 523 P.2d
532 (1974)

not vague
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Kansas

State v. Thompson,
221 Kan. 165, 558
P.2d 1079 (1976)

no standing to raise privacy or equal protection

Kentucky

Cooper v.
Commonwealth, 550
S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1977)

did not violate equal
protection

Louisiana

State v. Lindsey, 310
So. 2d 89 (La. 1975)

not vague

State v. McCoy, 337
So. 2d 192 (La. 1976)

did not violate right of
privacy

Maryland

Hughes v. State, 14
Md. App. 497,
287 A.2d 299 (1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1025 (1972)

not vague; did not violate equal protection; no
standing to raise privacy
issue

Massachusetts

Commonwealth v.
Balthazar,366 Mass.
298,318 N.E.2d 478
(1974)

ch. 272, § 35 is not
vague but is inapplicable to adult, consensual
private acts

Commonwealth v.
Gallant,369 N.E.2d
707 (1977)

mentions ch. 272, § 34
without deciding its
constitutionality

People v. Dexter, 6
Mich. App. 247, 148
N.W.2d 915 (1967)

"gross indecency" not
vague

People v. Howell, 395
Mich. 16,238 N.W.2d
148 (1976)

"gross indecency" statute constitutional only
as applied to acts in
public, with minors, or
without consenth

People v. Penn, 70
Mich. App. 638,247
N.W.2d 575 (1976)

follows Howell

People v. Clark, 68
Mich. App. 48, 241
N.W.2d 756 (1976)

follows Dexter

People v. Jones,75

follows Dexter

Michigan

1176

1176
Minnesota
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Mich. App. 261,254
N.W.2d 863 (1977)
statute mentioned but
State v. Witt, 308
its constitutionality was
Minn. 214,245
not at issue
N.W.2d 612 (1976)
not vague

Mississippi

State v. Mays, 329 So.
2d 65 (Miss. 1976)

Missouri

State v. Crawford,478 not vague; did not vioS.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972) late equal protection

Montana

State v. Ballew, 166
Mont. 270, 532 P.2d
407 (1975)

not vague

Nevada

Hogan v. State, 84
Nev. 372,441 P.2d
620 (1968)

not vague

Allan v. State, 91
Nev. 650,541 P.2d
656 (1975)

no standing to raise privacy issue

New Jersey

State v. Lair,62 N.J.
388,301 A.2d 748
(1973)

not vague; did not violate equal protection

New York

People v. Rice, 41
N.Y.2d 1018,363
N.E.2d 1371,395
N.Y.S.2d 626 (1977)

refused to determine
constitutional issue on
an appeal of a nonfinal
order

North Carolina

State v. Enslin, 25 N.C. notvague
App. 662,214 S.E.2d
318 (1975)
State v. Jarrell,24
N.C. App. 610,211
S.E.2d 837 (1975)

Oklahoma

no standing to raise privacy issue

not vague or overbroad
Canfield v. State, 506
P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim.
App.), appealdismissed,
414 U.S. 991 (1973)
Carson v. State, 529
P.2d 499 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1974)

notvague
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Pennsylvania

United States v.
Brewer, 363 F. Supp.
606 (M.D. Penn.),
affd, 491 F.2d
751 (1973)

constitutional as to prisoners; no standing to
argue rights of non-prisoners

Rhode Island

State v. Levitt, 371
A.2d 596 (1977)

not vague; no standing
to raise privacy issue

South Carolina

no cases

Tennessee

Rose v. Locke, 423
U.S. 48 (1975)

not vague

Young v. State, 531
S.W.2d 560 (1975)

not vague; no decision
on overbreadth or privacy

Texas

Pruettv. State, 463
S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1970)

no violation of privacy

Utah

no cases

Virginia

see text accompanying
Doe v. Commonnotes 911-30 supra
wealth's Attorney for
Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
affd mem., 425 U.S.
901, rehearingdenied,
425 U.S. 985 (1976)

Wisconsin

Jones v. State, 55 Wis.
2d 742,200 N.W.2d
587 (1972)

not vague or overbroad
or unconstitutionally
applied

Gossett v. State, 73
Wis. 2d 135,242
N.W.2d 899 (1976)

declined to determine
constitutionality of statute as applied to consensual acts

f. The most recent decisions on the constitutionality of state "sodomy" statutes have
been listed by state although some of the cases may not refer to the most recent version of
a particular state's law. In some states, the statutes have merely been reenacted and
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renumbered, but in other states substantial changes in wording have been made since
these decisions were handed down.
g. The statute does not violate due process because of vagueness.
h. The court was split 3-3 on this issue.

